Brown v. State
| Docket Number: | 2004-KA-00432-COA Linked Case(s): 2004-KA-00432-COA |
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| Oral Argument: | 05-09-2006 | |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 08-15-2006 Opinion Author: Lee, P.J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Murder & First degree arson - Suppression of statement - Medical records - Prosecutorial misconduct - Cross-examination - Expert testimony - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Weight of evidence Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Myers, P.J., Southwick, Irving, Chandler, Griffis, Barnes, Ishee and Roberts, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 02-09-2004 Appealed from: Pike County Circuit Court Judge: Keith Starrett Disposition: CONVICTED OF COUNT I: FIRST DEGREE ARSON AND SENTENCE OF TWENTY YEARS; COUNT II: MURDER AND SENTENCE OF LIFE TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO SENTENCE IN COUNT I, BOTH IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND ORDERED TO PAY RESTITUTION OF $5,000 TO THE CRIME VICTIMS’ COMPENSATION FUND. Case Number: 02-536-KA |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Louis Edward Brown |
William E. Goodwin |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | Jacob Ray; Charles W. Maris, Jr.; Jim Hood |
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| Topic: | Murder & First degree arson - Suppression of statement - Medical records - Prosecutorial misconduct - Cross-examination - Expert testimony - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Weight of evidence |
| Summary of the Facts: | Louis Brown was found guilty of the crimes of murder and first degree arson. Brown was sentenced to serve twenty years on the first degree arson charge and a term of life on the murder charge. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Suppression of statement Brown argues that the court erred in failing to suppress his statement to the police because of his low IQ. A statement by a defendant is admissible if the defendant was given a Miranda warning, and then knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his rights. Prior to signing a Miranda waiver of rights form, Brown was advised of his rights and informed the officer that he understood his rights. At no time during his statement did Brown ever admit to committing either murder or arson. A psychologist concluded that Brown was competent to stand trial and that, at the time of the crimes, Brown was capable of distinguishing between right and wrong. Given this evidence, the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to hear Brown’s statement denying involvement in the crimes. Issue 2: Medical records Brown argues that the victim’s medical records should have been allowed into evidence as the content of the records was relevant and exculpatory. Apparently, the medical records contained evidence that the victim had been previously treated for gasoline addiction. As Brown ultimately decided not to pursue the issue of whether the medical records were admissible, he cannot now claim that he should have been granted a continuance to properly obtain the records. Issue 3: Prosecutorial misconduct Brown argues that there was evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, because the prosecutor threatened the investigator from the Public Defender’s Office with criminal action; asked the victim’s family members to assert a medical privilege on behalf of the victim in order to keep out possible exculpatory evidence; and attempted to elicit information that Brown had refused a polygraph exam. The record shows that the prosecutor stated he has no intention of instituting criminal proceedings against the investigator. With regard to the medical records, Brown ultimately decided not to place the medical records into evidence. With regard to a mention of a polygraph exam the officer’s statement concerning the polygraph was not elicited by the State; rather, the officer was testifying as to his procedure upon interrogating Brown a second time. Issue 4: Cross-examination Brown argues that the court erred in refusing to allow him to cross-examine an officer about his knowledge of the husband of the victim. Brown wanted information concerning possible arrests. There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in determining that the charges were not relevant since they were in fact charges and not convictions. Issue 5: Expert testimony Brown argues that the officer was not an expert on fingerprints and should not have been allowed to testify about obtaining fingerprints. Brown clearly began this line of questioning by asking the officer about why he decided not to fingerprint the gas can. Furthermore, as one of the officer’s duties as an investigator was to take fingerprints off various objects, it was proper for him to testify as to why he did not take fingerprints on this particular occasion. Issue 6: Ineffective assistance of counsel Brown argues that his trial counsel failed to call the psychologist to explain the results of her examination; his trial counsel did not understand the proper method of obtaining medical records and the procedures to introduce them into evidence; the medical records should have been proffered to preserve the record for appeal; and trial counsel allowed themselves to be bullied by the State, making them lose control over the case. The exchanges in the record clearly show that Brown’s trial counsel vigorously defended him, quite the opposite of what Brown alleges. In addition, Brown has still failed to show that this supposed deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Issue 7: Weight of evidence Brown argues that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. From the record it is clear that Brown was the last person to see the victim alive. Brown was seen near the scene of the crime; a gas can was found in the abandoned car where Brown had been sitting; there was testimony that Brown had access to this particular gas can and had used it in the past; Brown was heard threatening to destroy the victim and their trailer if she ever left him; and there was testimony that gasoline was the accelerant. Given this evidence, allowing the guilty verdict to stand would not sanction an unconscionable injustice. |
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