Flowers v. State


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Docket Number: 2004-DP-00738-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2004-DP-00738-SCT
Oral Argument: 02-16-2006
 

 

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Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 02-01-2007
Opinion Author: Graves, J.
Holding: Reversed and Remanded

Additional Case Information: Topic: Death penalty direct appeal - Peremptory challenges
Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, P.J., Diaz and Dickinson, JJ.
Dissenting Author : Smith, C.J.
Dissent Joined By : Easley, Carlson and Randolph, JJ.
Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Cobb, P.J.
Concur in Part, Concur in Result Joined By 1: Joined In Part by Dickinson, J.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - DEATH PENALTY - DIRECT APPEAL

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 02-12-2004
Appealed from: Montgomery County Circuit Court
Judge: Clarence E. Morgan, III
Disposition: Appellant was convicted on four counts of capital murder and sentenced to death.
Case Number: 2003-0071-CR

Note: Motion for Rehearing is denied. The original opinions are withdrawn, and these opinions are substituted therefor.

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Curtis Giovanni Flowers




Andre de Gruy; David Paul Voisin



 

Appellee: State of Mississippi Judy T. Martin; Marvin L. White, Jr.; Jim Hood  

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Topic: Death penalty direct appeal - Peremptory challenges

Summary of the Facts: The motion for rehearing is denied, and these opinions are substituted for the original opinions. Curtis Flowers was convicted on four counts of capital murder and was sentenced to death. He appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Flowers argues that the court erred in denying his Batson claim below because the State exercised its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory way when it used all fifteen peremptory strikes on African-American jurors. Though the State exercised all fifteen of its peremptory strikes against African-American jurors, Flowers only contests the striking of eleven of those fifteen jurors. With regard to juror Hamer, Because the State offered several valid race neutral reasons for striking Hamer which went unrebutted by Flowers at trial, the trial court did not err in ruling that, under the totality of the circumstances, the striking of Hamer was race-neutral. With regard to juror Golden, the trial court, who had the benefit of actually observing the witnesses and their responses, found that Flowers did not meet his burden in finding that the peremptory strike of Golden was a pretext for racial discrimination. Though the record shows no measurable difference between the views of Golden and two similarly-situated white jurors, the trial judge’s determination was not clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence introduced during voir dire, so as to warrant a reversal. With regard to the State’s strike of juror Kendle, the trial court did not err in failing to find this strike pretextual. The State offered two valid race-neutral reasons, Kendle’s extensive connections with the Flowers family and his legal problems. Flowers failed to rebut these reasons at trial so the trial court should not be held in error for relying on the State’s proffered reasons. With regard to juror Curry, the trial court upheld the State’s strike of Curry as race-neutral on the basis that she had worked with the other family member. This is a valid race-neutral reason and may ordinarily be sufficient to support a finding that the strike was not pretextual. However, when the main reason given for the strike, that Curry previously worked with Flowers’ sister, is viewed in light of the fact that another white jury member who was not struck by the State, had as tenuous a relationship with Flowers or his family members as Curry, discrimination can be inferred. This inference of discrimination is heightened by the fact that another reason given for the strike, Curry’s supposed opposition to the death penalty, is unsubstantiated by the record. With regard to juror Reed, the court’s ruling is problematic. While the State’s proffered reasons were race neutral, Reed’s position on the death penalty was virtually indistinguishable from two white jurors whom the State did not strike, and even though Reed had worked at Multicraft two years previously, she no longer worked there at the time of trial and even stated that she knew none of Flowers’ family members who supposedly worked at Multicraft. However, even if some of the reasons may be suspect, they do not rise to the point of being clearly erroneous. With regard to juror Pittman, there is nothing in the record to support the State’s contention that Pittman said she did not believe Flowers committed the crime or that Pittman had formed any opinion regarding the case. With regard to juror Robinson, the trial court’s ruling concerning the strike of Robinson is not clearly erroneous. However, the racial neutrality of the State’s proffered reasons is highly suspect. Robinson did indicate that he did not favor the death penalty but also stated that he could apply the death penalty if the court authorized it. The State also challenged Robinson because he had voted not guilty in a previous trial. A juror’s prior vote on a civil jury has little, if any, relevance to how that juror may vote in a capital murder trial. This proffered reason by the State becomes more susceptible to an inference of pretext since the State did not question other white jurors about prior jury service. With regard to juror Minnieweather, the fact that Minnieweather’s father was prosecuted for manslaughter in Montgomery County by the district attorney in this case and tried by the judge in this case, is sufficient grounds to support a peremptory challenge. However, the fact that the State failed to voir dire white jurors concerning a characteristic which the State deemed important in its decision to strike Minnieweather evinces disparate treatment and leads to an inference that race played a role in the State’s jury selection process. With regard to juror Robinson, the prosecutor alleged that he had information concerning the arrest of Robinson’s son, questioned Robinson as to whether he had knowledge of that arrest, and Robinson replied that he was unaware of any criminal charges against his son. The prosecutor later stated that he did not believe Robinson when he denied knowing about his son’s drug-related activities since law enforcement officers had previously conducted a drug raid at Robinson’s house. These are valid race neutral reasons for exercising a peremptory strike, and Flowers has totally failed to rebut the first reason proffered by the State. With regard to juror Hearn, apart from stating that he had already formed an opinion that Flowers was not guilty and at one point indicating that he could not vote guilty, Hearn indicated that he “probably would” automatically vote for a life sentence as opposed to the death penalty. Thus, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to uphold this strike as being race-neutral. With regard to juror Powell, she indicated that she had known Flowers’ mother for a long time, roughly twenty years. These connections are sufficient to establish that Powell had a prior relationship with members of the defendant’s family, a valid race-neutral reason. Of the six hundred summonses sent out to potential jurors in this case, three hundred juror questionnaires were filled out by potential jurors and received by the court in response to the summonses. At least 120 potential jurors indicated that they were of African-American descent, meaning that at least forty percent of the potential jury pool was African-American. The prosecutor exercised all fifteen of his peremptory strikes on African-Americans, and the lone African-American who ultimately sat on Flowers’ jury was seated after the State ran out of peremptory challenges. Such a result cannot be considered happenstance. While each individual strike may have justifiably appeared to the trial court to be sufficiently race neutral, the trial court also has a duty to look at the State’s use of peremptory challenges in toto. While the Court does not abolish peremptory challenges or adopt a limited voir dire rule, the Court is inclined to consider such options if the attorneys of this State persist in violating the principles of Batson by racially profiling jurors. Based on the State’s Batson violation, this case is reversed and remanded for a new trial.


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