McAdams v. Perkins


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Docket Number: 2015-CA-00966-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 12-08-2016
Opinion Author: Lamar, J.
Holding: Reversed and rendered.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Bill of exceptions - City council resolution - Section 25-1-47 - Hiring of legal representation by city council - Election contest - Section 21-17-5
Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Dickinson and Randolph, P.JJ., Coleman, Maxwell and Beam, JJ.
Dissenting Author : Kitchens, J.
Dissent Joined By : King, J.
Procedural History: Hearing on Merits
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - OTHER

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 05-11-2015
Appealed from: LEFLORE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
Judge: HON. MARGARET CAREY-McCRAY
Disposition: Held that the Greenwood City Council's decision to hire legal counsel to represent the city's interest in an election contest exceeded its power and violated the Mississippi Constitution
Case Number: 2014-0074(CM)(L)

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Carolyn McAdams




MARC A. BIGGERS



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief

  • Appellee: Sheriel F. Perkins WILLIE J. PERKINS, SR.  

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    Topic: Bill of exceptions - City council resolution - Section 25-1-47 - Hiring of legal representation by city council - Election contest - Section 21-17-5

    Summary of the Facts: The City of Greenwood held a general election in which two candidates sought the office of mayor: Carolyn McAdams, the incumbent, and Sheriel Perkins. McAdams won the election, receiving 52.05 percent of the votes cast. Perkins filed an election contest and named McAdams, in her individual capacity, as the sole defendant. The Greenwood city attorney requested an attorney general opinion, asking if the municipality could “(1) reimburse the Mayor for legal fees and costs she has incurred to defend the state-action allegations in federal court; and (2) retain [counsel] . . . to represent the City’s interest in upholding the validity of the municipal election and the actions of its elections officials, going forward.” The Attorney General’s Office said that the council could employ a law firm to defend claims made against municipal officers acting in their official capacity under section 25-1-47 and that the council could hire a law firm under section 21-17-5 after it determined it had an interest in the election contest, but that the council could not reimburse the mayor for her personal attorney’s fees. The Council passed a resolution employing Butler Snow, LLP—the same firm employed by McAdams—“to represent the City’s interest in upholding the validity of the municipal election and actions of its election officials.” Though not a party to the election contest, the Greenwood City Council determined it had an interest in the election contest. Perkins appealed to the circuit court by filing a Bill of Exceptions challenging the council’s resolution. In her capacity as mayor, McAdams certified the Bill of Exceptions. The circuit court reversed the council’s decision to hire Butler Snow, finding the resolution to be beyond its scope or powers and in violation of the Mississippi Constitution. Following the circuit court’s decision, the council tabled a “Resolution to Approve an Appeal of the Order and Opinion.” McAdams, in her official capacity, filed a Notice of Appeal.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Perkins argues that McAdams, by certifying the Bill of Exceptions, is estopped from raising her issues on appeal. McAdams argues correctly that, while “the bill of exceptions reflects the actions taken and the decision made, such signature does not constitute an agreement with Perkins that the resolution was prohibited by law or was otherwise improper.” Therefore, McAdams is not estopped from raising her issues on appeal. McAdams asks the Court to determine whether section 25-1-47 permitted the council to hire Butler Snow. The plain language of section 25-1-47 permits the council to hire legal representation even if no city officials are named as defendants in a lawsuit. To require that formal litigation be filed against the city before the council may retain legal representation pursuant to section 25-1-47 places a significant limitation on the council’s authority; such a limitation does not conform to the plain language of section 25-1-47. While it is true that a municipal officer is not a proper party to an election contest, section 25-1-47 permits the governing authorities of a municipality to employ legal representation to defend “claims” challenging the official actions of municipal officers, regardless of whether municipal officers are named defendants. Section 21-17-5 likewise permitted the council’s resolution. Under section 21-17-5, the governing authorities may adopt resolutions pertaining to municipal finances as long as the resolutions do not violate Mississippi law. A municipality may not pay for the attorney’s fees incurred by a candidate in an election contest; the payment of such fees is a donation of public funds to a private individual. Though Perkins asserts numerous times that the City authorized payment of McAdams’s attorney fees, the resolution passed by the Council shows otherwise. The resolution states that “the City of Greenwood is hereby authorized to retain the services of Butler Snow, LLP for representation of the City’s interests in reference to the election contest.” Nowhere in the resolution does it state that the council is paying for McAdams’s fees as well. Further, the fact that Butler Snow’s services may provide overlapping support to both McAdams and the council does not transform the council’s resolution into an unlawful donation. Although Perkins argues that McAdams “lacks authority to pursue this appeal . . . on behalf of the City of Greenwood and the Greenwood City Council where the Greenwood City Council has authorized no such appeal,” there is nothing in the statutes governing the mayor-council form of government or the relevant caselaw that prohibits a mayor from pursuing an appeal on behalf of a municipality, absent the council’s express prohibition. And there is no evidence in this record that the council voted to prohibit this appeal, or that the council objects to McAdams pursuing it here.


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