Harris v. State
| Docket Number: | 2013-KA-02009-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 08-18-2015 Opinion Author: Maxwell, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Armed robbery - Right to speedy trial - Admission of 911 call - M.R.E. 403 - M.R.E. 401 - M.R.E. 803(2) - Excited utterance - Sufficiency of evidence Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Barnes, Ishee, Carlton, Fair, James and Wilson, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 11-25-2013 Appealed from: WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: RICHARD A. SMITH Disposition: Convicted of armed robbery Case Number: 2012-0069 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Leroy Harris |
BRANDON ISAAC DORSEY |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: BILLY L. GORE | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Armed robbery - Right to speedy trial - Admission of 911 call - M.R.E. 403 - M.R.E. 401 - M.R.E. 803(2) - Excited utterance - Sufficiency of evidence |
| Summary of the Facts: | Leroy Harris was convicted of armed robbery. He was sentenced to twenty years, with fifteen years to serve and five years of post-release supervision. The judge tacked on five years for firearm enhancement. Harris appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Right to speedy trial Harris argues that the delay between his arrest and trial violated his right to a speedy trial. The constitutional speedy-trial right attaches when an individual is accused. The court considers the length of delay, the reason for delay, whether defendant asserted his right, and any resulting prejudice. Since the delay in this case was over eight months, a presumption of prejudice arose. While most of the delay is explained, some is not. Securing an interpreter for the victim did cause a delay. But it was not lengthy. There is also some question about the expediency of the State’s forensic testing. The State sought further fingerprint and firearm examination, between the time of arrest and indictment. The circuit judge was not certain if forensic testing was promptly completed. The judge found all delays after Harris’s co-defendant requested his first continuance were for valid reasons. From this point, the judge attributed much of the delay to Harris for not seeking severance from his codefendant. Harris offered no evidence that his codefendant’s continuances were not for good cause. The judge found these continuance-based delays weighed against Harris, particularly since Harris did not seek a severance until just before trial. Thus, some delays are attributable to the State and some to Harris. While shortly after Harris’s arrest his attorney made a general demand for a speedy trial, neither Harris nor his attorney set the motion for a hearing. Harris did file a pro se “Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Provide a Speedy Trial.” And he petitioned the clerk, then later sought a hearing on that motion. But the particular remedy he requested in his motion was “dismissal” of his indictment—not a “speedy trial.” A demand for dismissal for violation of the right to speedy trial is not the equivalent of a demand for a speedy trial. Thus, Harris’s failure to seek a ruling on his speedy-trial demand weighs against Harris. The sole prejudice alleged by Harris was that his pretrial detention was “anxiety-producing.” However, he offers nothing to support his anxiety claim. Harris does not allege any evidence to support how his defense was impaired. Thus, this factor weighs against Harris. Under the totality of the circumstances, Harris’s right to a speedy trial was not violated by the delay. Issue 2: 911 call Harris argues that the circuit court erred in admitting a digital recording of the victim’s 911 call after his counsel objected under M.R.E. 403. While relevant evidence under M.R.E. 401 is generally admissible, it may be excluded under Rule 403 if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. M.R.E. 803(2), the excited-utterance exception, allows a statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition to be admitted. Here, the victim had just been robbed at gunpoint and immediately relayed the details during the 911 call. Thus, her descriptions to the dispatcher while she was under the stress of an armed robbery qualified as an excited utterance. Issue 3: Sufficiency of evidence Harris challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Here, the victim had a clear view of Harris when he stuck a pistol in her face and grabbed her purse full of cash. The taking was obviously against her will. And she easily identified him from a photo lineup. When the two men fled from the truck, officers found Harris’s cell phone, which displayed his photo as the screen saver, on the passenger seat. Harris’s fingerprints matched the prints from the outside passenger handle of the truck. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was more than sufficient to prove an armed robbery and a firearm enhancement. |
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