Broome v. General Motors, LLC


<- Return to Search Results


Docket Number: 2013-CA-01580-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 08-14-2014
Opinion Author: King, J.
Holding: Reversed and remanded.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Contract - Magnuson-Moss Act - Statute of limitations - Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act - Section 63-17-159 - Section 75-2-101 - UCC
Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Dickinson and Randolph, P.JJ., Lamar, Kitchens, Chandler, Pierce and Coleman, JJ.
Procedural History: Dismissal
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - CONTRACT

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 08-16-2013
Appealed from: JACKSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
Judge: ROBERT P. KREBS
Disposition: Dismissed plaintiffs' claim as barred by the statute of limitations
Case Number: 2012-00,138

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Terri Broome and Paul Broome




SHIREEN HORMOZDI, ERIC KACZANDER



 

Appellee: General Motors, LLC PAUL V. CASSISA, JR.  

Synopsis provided by:

If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office.

Topic: Contract - Magnuson-Moss Act - Statute of limitations - Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act - Section 63-17-159 - Section 75-2-101 - UCC

Summary of the Facts: Paul and Terri Broome purchased a 2010 Chevrolet Equinox from a Chevrolet dealership in April 2010. The vehicle came with a three-year or 36,000 mile warranty. The vehicle had various defects which the Broomes attempted to have repaired through the dealership. When the dealership was unable to fix the defects, the Broomes filed suit against the manufacturer of the vehicle, General Motors, for breach of written and implied warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Act. General Motors filed a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. The county court granted the motion to dismiss. The Broomes appealed to circuit court which affirmed. The Broomes appeal.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Because the Magnuson-Moss Act does not have a statute of limitations, the statute of limitations of the most analogous state law applies. The county court found that the most analogous state statute is the Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act, section 63-17-159, which requires an action to be brought either one year after the expiration of the express warranty, or eighteen months after the delivery of the vehicle to the consumer, whichever is earlier. The Broomes ask the Court to determine whether section 63-17-159(6) or section 75-2-101 is the most analogous state statute to the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act for the purposes of determining the statute of limitations for Magnuson-Moss Act claims in Mississippi. If section 75-2-101 is the most analogous state statute, the claims are not barred because the UCC’s six-year statute of limitations applies. Mississippi’s UCC is broader in scope than the Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act and applies to “transactions in goods.” While the Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act applies only to express warranties, the UCC applies to both written and implied warranties. Unlike the Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act, the UCC permits buyers to collect damages for the difference between the contract price and the value of the nonconforming goods. Like the UCC, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is broad in its application and applies to any consumer product, including motor vehicles. General Motors argues that the remedies available under the Magnuson-Moss Act are similar to those available under the Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act. The Broomes argue, however, that the remedies available to a consumer under the Magnuson-Moss Act are similar to those in the UCC when the claim is for breach of express limited warranty, which is the Broomes’ claim. When other courts have considered the question presented in today’s case, they have found consistently that their states’ UCC is the most analogous state statute to the Magnuson-Moss Act. Although the Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act does share some characteristics with the Magnuson-Moss Act, when the statutes as a whole are compared to the Magnuson-Moss Act, the UCC is most analogous. The UCC and Magnuson-Moss Act are similar in scope, including claims for any consumer product, rather than the Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act’s limited application to motor vehicles. Thus, the Legislature likely intended for consumers to be able to bring claims similar to the Broomes’ for breach of warranty under statutes other than the Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act. As such, the UCC’s six-year statute of limitations applies to the Broomes’ Magnuson-Moss Act claim.


Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court