Campbell v. State
| Docket Number: | 2011-CT-00272-SCT Linked Case(s): 2011-KA-00272-COA ; 2011-KA-00272-COA ; 2011-CT-00272-SCT ; 2011-CT-00272-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 08-01-2013 Opinion Author: Lamar, J. Holding: Court of Appeals reversed; Circuit court reinstated and affirmed |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 07-17-2012 Opinion Author: Griffis, P.J. Holding: Reversed and Rendered |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Fondling minor over whom he held position of trust - Weight of evidence - Section 97-5-23(2) - De facto foster parent - Identification as perpetrator of crime - Proof of age - Jury instruction Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Dickinson and Randolph, P.JJ., Kitchens, Chandler, Pierce, King and Coleman, JJ. Judge(s) Concurring Separately: Chandler, J., Specially Concurs With Separate Written Opinion Joined by Dickinson, P.J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY Writ of Certiorari: Granted |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 02-18-2011 Appealed from: Lafayette County Circuit Court Judge: Robert Elliott Disposition: CONVICTED OF FONDLING AND SENTENCED TO SEVEN YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WITH FIVE YEARS SUSPENDED AND TWO YEARS OF POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION Case Number: LK2008-279 |
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| Note: | The Supreme Court found, among other things, that there was sufficient evidence that Campbell was in a position of trust or authority over Lauren, and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals opinion can be found at http://courts.ms.gov/Images/Opinions/CO77266.pdf | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | David Campbell |
STEVEN E. FARESE, SR. |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: BILLY L. GORE |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Fondling minor over whom he held position of trust - Weight of evidence - Section 97-5-23(2) - De facto foster parent - Identification as perpetrator of crime - Proof of age - Jury instruction |
| Summary of the Facts: | David Campbell was convicted of fondling a minor over whom he held a position of trust or authority. The Court of Appeals reversed and rendered his conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Weight of evidence To be convicted under section 97-5-23(2), the State must prove that the person charged was in a position of trust or authority over the minor at the time the crime occurred. Under the statute, “[a] person in a position of trust or authority over a child includes without limitation a child’s teacher, counselor, physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, minister, priest, physical therapist, chiropractor, legal guardian, parent, stepparent, aunt, uncle, scout leader or coach.” Campbell argues that sufficient evidence was not presented at trial to allow the jury to find that he was the victim’s foster father or that he occupied a position of trust or authority over her. Section 97-5-23(2) does not limit the categories of people who can be found to be in a position of trust or authority over a minor to those who have a legal relationship with the child or who hold some license or certification. Although Campbell was not a licensed foster parent, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine that Campbell was in a position of trust or authority over the victim because he acted as her de facto foster parent. The victim testified that she believed Campbell was her foster father, that she lived with the Campbells for several months, that she had her own bedroom in the Campbells’ residence, that she was allowed to have a friend over to spend that night with her while living with the Campbells after she asked permission, that she went on family vacations with the Campbells, and that the Campbells imposed rules on her. The victim’s social worker testified that the Campbells had physical custody of the victim and were treating her as one of their own children until they could be licensed. It is clear that the victim was much more than a visitor in Campbell’s home. Campbell also argues that there was not sufficient evidence for the jury to convict him because he was never identified as the perpetrator of the crime, and that no evidence was presented that Campbell, the defendant, was the same person as Campbell, the alleged perpetrator of the crime. The character and adequacy of evidence of identification of an accused in a criminal case is primarily a question for the jury. Identification based on the testimony of a single witness, if complying with the standard in criminal cases, can support a conviction. Here, the jury heard testimony from an officer that he had investigated David Campbell, the defendant, based upon the victim’s allegations, and that he had concluded there was a sexual relationship between the two. Furthermore, the jury heard several witnesses testify regarding the sexual relationship between the victim and David Campbell, including the victim herself. Thus, there was sufficient evidence from the testimony as a whole for the jury to conclude that David Campbell, the defendant, was David Campbell, the alleged perpetrator of the crime. Campbell also argues that the only evidence presented to the jury regarding his age is the victim’s testimony that she “believed” Campbell to be forty-two years old at the time of the crime, and that such testimony is not credible. The Court has held that similar testimony is sufficient to prove a defendant’s age. Based on the evidence, the verdict was not contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Issue 2: Jury instruction Campbell argues that the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction which was not supported by Mississippi law. He argues that two subsections in the instruction singled out and gave undue prominence to certain evidence and also invited the jury to speculate that the kiss was done with the purpose of satisfying Campbell’s lust. Because Campbell did not specifically object at trial to the instruction on the same grounds he now raises on appeal, his argument is procedurally barred. |
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