Bodne v. King
| Docket Number: | 2000-CT-00610-SCT Linked Case(s): 2000-CA-00610-COA |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 01-23-2003 Opinion Author: Pittman, C.J. Holding: Court of Appeals - Reversed; Chancery Court - Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce: Habitual cruel and unusual treatment - Findings of fact - M.R.C.P. 52(a) - Sufficiency of evidence - Division of marital property Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, P.J., Waller, Cobb, Diaz, Easley, Carlson and Graves, JJ. Dissenting Author : McRae, P.J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 03-22-2000 Appealed from: Hinds County Chancery Court Judge: Patricia D. Wise Disposition: PLAINTIFF GRANTED A DIVORCE ON THE GROUNDS OF HABITUAL CRUEL AND INHUMAN TREATMENT. Case Number: G-97-2264W4 |
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| Note: | The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that the trial court's decision was based on insufficient evidence to grant a divorce. The original Court of Appeals opinion can be found at http://courts.ms.gov/Images/Opinions/Conv10629.pdf . | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Jack D. Bodne |
MERRIDA COXWELL |
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| Appellee: | Alice Susan King | DONALD W. BOYKIN |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Divorce: Habitual cruel and unusual treatment - Findings of fact - M.R.C.P. 52(a) - Sufficiency of evidence - Division of marital property |
| Summary of the Facts: | Alice Susan King Bodne was granted a divorce from her husband , Jack Bodne, on grounds of habitual cruel and unusual treatment. Jack appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Cruel and unusual treatment The Court of Appeals found the chancellor’s findings insufficient to meet the standard of proof. M.R.C.P. 52(a) allows the court, in a case tried without a jury, to make specific findings of facts and conclusions of law, but requires the court to do so when requested by a party. Because Jack made no such request, the appellate court accepts facts specifically found unless manifestly wrong and presumes that the chancellor resolved, in the appellee's favor, those fact issues not specifically found. The chancellor made a specific finding that Susan and her witnesses were credible but made no finding regarding Jack’s credibility. Therefore, the testimony by and for Susan should be given substantial weight, while Jack's testimony should be given less weight. Habitual cruel and unusual treatment is conduct that endangers life, limb, or health, or creates a reasonable apprehension of such danger, rendering the relationship unsafe, or conduct which is so unnatural as to make the marriage revolting to the offended spouse and render it impossible for that spouse to discharge the duties of marriage. Although physical violence directed at the offended spouse is not required, such things as unkindness, rudeness, petty indignities, frivolous quarrels, incompatibility or lack of affection are not sufficient. There is a dual focus on the conduct of the offending spouse and the impact of that conduct on the offended spouse. Here, the evidence to support the divorce included an indictment against Jack for three counts of attempted murder, testimony that Susan was frequently subject to verbal abuse, an assault charge Jack brought against Susan but never prosecuted, testimony regarding the pressure Jack placed on Susan to continue his business in his absence, testimony regarding Jack's selfish use of marital assets, and questions surrounding child pornography which was found on the couple’s home computer. Because the sum of the evidence supports a finding of unnatural and infamous conduct, the chancellor’s judgment granting a divorce is reinstated. Issue 2: Division of marital property The chancellor found two parcels of land to be marital property subject to division. Jack argues that one of the parcels should have been classified as his separate property. By the time of the divorce Jack had conveyed to Susan the property he claims as separate property. Therefore, it appears to have been commingled by this conveyance. |
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