C.T., et al. v. R.D.H., et al.
| Docket Number: | 2001-CA-01597-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-24-2003 Opinion Author: Carlson, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Adoption - Jurisdiction - Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act - Section 93-23-11 - Section 93-23-5(1)(c)(i) - Consent - Section 93-15-103(2) - Section 93-17-7 - Necessary party - Section 93-17-5 - M.R.C.P. 41(b) - Standard for dismissal Judge(s) Concurring: Pittman, C.J., Smith, P.J., Waller, Easley and Graves, JJ. Judge(s) Concurring Separately: Cobb, J., Specially Concurs With Separate Written Opinion Joined by Graves, J. Dissenting Author : McRae, P.J. Dissent Joined By : Diaz, J. Procedural History: Dismissal Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-05-2001 Appealed from: Clarke County Chancery Court Judge: Sarah P. Springer Disposition: Dismissed a complaint to revoke consent to an adoption. Case Number: 455-S |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Adoption - Jurisdiction - Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act - Section 93-23-11 - Section 93-23-5(1)(c)(i) - Consent - Section 93-15-103(2) - Section 93-17-7 - Necessary party - Section 93-17-5 - M.R.C.P. 41(b) - Standard for dismissal |
| Summary of the Facts: | Rick and Carol filed a sworn complaint for adoption of Diane. The complaint was also signed under oath by Camille, the child’s natural mother. However, Camille shortly thereafter filed an objection, requesting the court to set aside, cancel and hold for naught any documents she signed or executed in anticipation of the adoption matter. Camille and Sally, the material grandmother of the child, then filed a Complaint to Revoke Consent and For Custody of Minor Child. The court entered a Judgment of Adoption, and Camille and Sally appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Jurisdiction Camille and Sally argue that the court erred in determining that the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act applied in the adoption proceeding and that the Act conferred jurisdiction on the chancery court. They argue that Arizona, not Mississippi, is the home state of the child and that the child had not lived in Mississippi for the requisite six months under the UCCJA, thereby defeating jurisdiction in the Mississippi courts. Consensual adoptions where all parties are present do not fall within the meaning of a custody proceeding as envisioned by the UCCJA. The adoption in this case was contested. In addition, the adoptive parents are Mississippi residents, but the natural mother, guardian-maternal grandmother, and the adopted child were deemed to be non-residents of Mississippi at the time of commencement of the trial court proceedings. Mississippi trial courts must especially look to the possible application of the UCCJA provisions in contested adoption cases if it appears that there might be a possible conflict with a foreign court already exercising continuing jurisdiction over the matter and should be sparing in their application of the UCCJA to contested adoption cases. In this case, the chancellor had a right to apply the UCCJA provisions at the first hearing so as to inquire further about the purported Arizona guardianship to determine if the Mississippi courts should yield to the Arizona courts on the issue of Diane’s custody, and, if it were determined that the guardianship had been terminated and that no other foreign court was asserting jurisdiction over the custody of Diane, then additionally so as to inquire about the application of the jurisdictional provisions of the UCCJA. The record includes no exhibit to document the establishment of an Arizona guardianship nor does it include any exhibit to document the termination of the guardianship. However, there was testimony that the Arizona judge did revoke the guardianship and both Sally and Camille received copies of the judge’s final judgment terminating the guardianship. Since the Arizona guardianship had been terminated and there was no evidence of other pending proceedings in foreign courts concerning custody of Diane, section 93-23-11 does not prohibit assertion of jurisdiction by the Mississippi courts. Under section 93-23-5(1)(c)(i), the chancery court had jurisdiction to make a child custody determination as to Diane because Diane was physically present in Mississippi and she had been abandoned. When, as here, a chancellor in a contested adoption is called upon to make a pre-adoption determination as to the appropriate custody of the child who is the subject of the adoption proceedings, and there are unresolved issues such as whether other persons might have legal custody of the child because of proceedings in foreign courts, whether Mississippi is the home state of the child, whether the child has been abandoned or abused, or whether all interested parties are present, then the chancellor may appropriately consider the applicability of the UCCJA. Issue 2: Consent Camille and Sally argue that the failure to have Camille served with process upon the filing of the adoption complaint coupled with Rick and Carol instead having Camille, an unmarried minor, to execute the original adoption complaint as a party, deprived the chancery court of jurisdiction. Section 93-15-103(2) provides that the rights of a parent with reference to a child, including parental rights to control or withhold consent to an adoption, and the right to receive notice of a hearing on a petition for adoption, may be relinquished and the relationship of the parent and child terminated by the execution of a written voluntary release, signed by the parent, regardless of the age of the parent. Camille originally joined in the adoption complaint, as evidenced by her signature on the document. A written voluntary release or consent by the parent terminates the parental rights, and section 93-17-7 provides that no objection to the adoption from the natural parent may thereafter be sustained. The record clearly supports the chancellor’s finding that Camille failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Camille’s consent to the adoption was procured by Rick and Carol’s exercise of undue influence or fraud. Issue 3: Necessary party Camille and Sally argue that Sally should have been joined as a necessary and indispensable party. Section 93-17-5 provides that there shall be made parties to the proceeding by process or by the filing therein of a consent to the adoptions proposed the parents, or parent, if only one parent, though either be under the age of 21 years. Not only does the statute make no mention of a requirement that the guardian of a minor parent be joined, but Sally participated fully in the adoption proceedings. Issue 4: Dismissal The chancellor granted Rick and Carol motion for dismissal under M.R.C.P. 41(b), and Camille and Sally argue that the chancellor employed an erroneous standard in granting the motion to dismiss, i.e., instead of a "light most favorable" test, the chancellor was required to employ a "consider the evidence fairly" test. In considering a motion to dismiss, the judge should consider the evidence fairly, as distinguished from in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and the court should dismiss the case if it would find for the defendant. If anything, the "light most favorable" standard employed by the chancellor would provide Camille even greater protection than the "consider the evidence fairly" rule. Therefore, the chancellor did not err by finding Camille had failed to meet her burden of proof. |
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