Mollaghan, et al. v. Varnell, et al.
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-02005-SCT Linked Case(s): 2010-CA-02005-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-01-2012 Opinion Author: Lamar, J. Holding: DA-Affirmed; CA-Reversed and rendered. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Sexual harassment - Section 1983 - Procedural due process - Gender discrimination - Retaliation Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson and Dickinson, P.JJ., Randolph, Kitchens, Chandler and King, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Pierce, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial/JNOV Nature of the Case: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-20-2008 Appealed from: Forrest County Circuit Court Judge: Robert Helfrich Disposition: Denied and granted certain motions for JNOV. Case Number: CI01-0056 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | John Mollaghan and John Vincent v. Sonya Varnell, Individually and Officially, Estate of Dr. Horace Fleming, Deceased; Richard Giannini, Individually and Officially; and University of Southern Mississippi AND Sonya Varnell |
KIM T. CHAZE
ALEXANDER IGNATIEV |
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| Appellee: | Ged O'Connor | MATTHEW D. MILLER WILLIAM E. WHITFIELD, III NICHOLAS K. THOMPSON MARK D. MORRISON HERMAN M. HOLLENSED, JR. BRYAN NELSON CARLTON W. REEVES | ||
| Appellee #2: | ||||
| Appellee #3: | ||||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Sexual harassment - Section 1983 - Procedural due process - Gender discrimination - Retaliation |
| Summary of the Facts: | John Vincent and John Mollaghan were employed by the University of Southern Mississippi as coaches for the women’s soccer team under one-year contracts. Both Vincent’s and Mollaghan’s contracts stated that USM reserved the right to transfer, reassign, or change the duties of the employee during the term of the contract. Ged O’Connor was the graduate assistant coach for the women’s soccer team during the 1999-2000 time period and did not have an employment contract with USM. In 1999, Sonya Varnell and Richard Giannini became the senior women’s administrator for women’s sports and the USM athletic director, respectively. Vincent, Mollaghan, and O’Connor argue that Varnell and Giannini immediately made clear they preferred women to coach women’s sports, and Giannini testified that he did feel that women should coach women’s sports if women’s sports were ever to be at the same level as men’s sports. In 1999, Vincent filed a grievance alleging that Varnell improperly had interfered with the soccer program and that Giannini had reassigned him without a hearing. Vincent never received a hearing on his grievance. Vincent remained in a teaching position until his contract expired on June 30, 2000, and his contract was not renewed. After Vincent was reassigned in December 1999, Mollaghan was promoted to interim head coach. Although he applied for the position of head coach, and interviewed twice, Matt Clark, a male who was the head coach for Auburn University at the time, was ultimately hired as head coach for the women’s soccer team and remained in that position for four years. During the interview process for head coach, Mollaghan received an unfavorable annual review from Varnell, which he felt contributed to his not being hired as head coach. Mollaghan filed a grievance over his annual review on May 7, 2000, but he testified that he never received a reply, as he felt he was entitled to under USM’s staff handbook. Mollaghan filed a second grievance on May 19, 2000, alleging improper conduct between Varnell and the student athletes, but he testified that he never received a hearing on his second grievance either. Ultimately, Mollaghan accepted a coaching position with Spring Hill College prior to his contract with USM expiring. After Vincent was reassigned and Mollaghan was promoted to interim head coach, O’Connor continued in his position as graduate assistant coach for the women’s soccer team. O’Connor eventually resigned his position as graduate assistant coach to accept a position at the University of Louisiana-Monroe. Vincent, Mollaghan, and O’Connor filed suit against USM and Varnell, Giannini, and Dr. Hoarce Fleming, in their individual and official capacities, asserting various federal and state-law claims. Prior to trial, Varnell, Giannini, Fleming, and USM filed a joint motion for summary judgment, which the circuit court granted in part and denied in part. The circuit court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims except for O’Connor’s sexual-harassment claim brought against Varnell in her individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Vincent’s and Mollaghan’s procedural due process claims asserted against Varnell, Giannini, and Fleming in their individual capacities; and Vincent’s, Mollaghan’s, and O’Connor’s gender-discrimination and retaliation claims asserted under Section 1983 against Varnell and Giannini in their individual capacities. The jury returned verdicts in favor of Vincent, Mollaghan, and O’Connor. The jury awarded Vincent $500,000; Mollaghan $376,000; and O’Connor $300,000. Varnell, Giannini, and Fleming filed a Joint Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or, Alternatively, for a New Trial as to the Separate Plaintiff John Vincent, which the circuit court granted in part and denied in part. Varnell appealed the circuit court’s denial of her motion for JNOV on O’Connor’s sexual-harassment claim; Vincent and Mollaghan appealed the circuit court’s grant of JNOV on their gender-discrimination, retaliation, and due-process claims. O’Connor did not perfect an appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Sexual harassment Varnell argues that the circuit court erred in denying her motion for JNOV on O’Connor’s sexual-harassment claim asserted against her under Section 1983. A plaintiff claiming sexual harassment must prove that the conduct was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted discrimination because of sex. To succeed on a quid pro quo claim, a plaintiff must show that he suffered a tangible employment action and the tangible employment action resulted from his acceptance or rejection of his supervisor’s alleged sexual advances. In this case, O’Connor did not present any evidence that would support a finding that he had suffered a tangible employment action as a result of his rejection of Varnell’s alleged sexual advances. To succeed on a hostile-work-environment claim, a plaintiff must show that the plaintiff belongs to a protected group; he was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; the harassment complained of was based on sex; the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of his employment; and his employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action. Here, O’Connor complained of only two instances in which he claims Varnell sexually harassed him. Neither of those instances involved physically threatening conduct nor did they interfere with O’Connor’s work performance. The two incidents, viewed in the light most favorable to O’Connor, amounted to no more than simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents and are not actionable under Section 1983. Therefore, the circuit court erred in denying Varnell’s motion for JNOV on the sexual-harassment claim. Issue 2: Due process Vincent and Mollaghan argue that the circuit court erred by granting JNOV and finding the evidence was insufficient to support a jury verdict on their procedural-due process claim. To prevail on a procedural-due-process claim, a plaintiff must prove he was deprived of a protected property interest and he was denied the process due him. Vincent and Mollaghan argue that they were entitled to a hearing and investigation on their grievances under their employment contracts and USM’s staff handbook. However, assuming arguendo that they were, neither Vincent nor Mollaghan has identified any protected property interest in his1999-2000 employment contract that he lost as a result. Thus, there is no error. Issue 3: Gender discrimination Vincent and Mollaghan argue that the circuit court erred in granting the defendants’ motion for JNOV on their claims of gender discrimination asserted under Section 1983 against Varnell and Giannini. Vincent and Mollaghan argue they were discharged because of their gender. However, the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to both Vincent and Mollaghan, did not show that either was “discharged” – Vincent remained employed by USM until his contract expired, and his contract was not renewed; Mollaghan accepted another position prior to the expiration of his contract, which actually was extended for thirty days. Issue 4: Retaliation Vincent and Mollaghan argue that the circuit court erred in granting JNOV on their retaliation claims asserted under Section 1983, because they were retaliated against for reporting the alleged sexual harassment. To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, a plaintiff must show that he engaged in activity protected by Title VII, that an adverse employment action occurred, and that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Even if a plaintiff’s protected conduct is a substantial element in a defendant’s decision to terminate an employee, no liability for unlawful retaliation arises if the employee would have been terminated even in the absence of the protected conduct. Assuming arguendo that Vincent’s reassignment from head coach of the women’s soccer team to a teaching position and the nonrenewal of his contract were materially adverse employment actions, Vincent has presented insufficient evidence to show that the employment actions would not have occurred if he had not reported the alleged sexual harassment. Mollaghan failed to present evidence that he suffered any adverse employment action. The evidence is undisputed that Mollaghan was promoted to interim head coach and remained interim head coach after he had filed his grievance. |
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