Morrow v. Morrow


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Docket Number: 2009-CA-01319-COA
Linked Case(s): 2009-CA-01319-COA ; 2009-CT-01319-SCT ; 2009-CT-01319-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 10-17-2013
Opinion Author: Lamar, J.

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 10-02-2012
Opinion Author: Ishee, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Real property - Property ownership - Reformation of deed - Intent - Doctrine of after-acquired property - Affirmative defense - Equitable lien
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Griffis, P.J., Roberts, Maxwell, Russell and Fair, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Irving, P.J.
Concurs in Result Only: Barnes and Carlton, JJ.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY
Writ of Certiorari: Granted
Appealed from Court of Appeals

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 10-23-2006
Appealed from: Itawamba County Chancery Court
Judge: Talmadge Littlejohn
Disposition: DENIED CLAIM FOR EQUITABLE LIEN ON REAL PROPERTY
Case Number: 2000-0286
  Consolidated: 2009-CA-01355-COA Phillip Morrow v. Joel Morrow, Administrator of the Estates of Goucher Morrow, Deceased and Reba Eloise Sparks Morrow, Deceased, and Ronald Morrow; Itawamba Chancery Court; LC Case #: 2000-0285; Ruling Date: 02/15/2007; Ruling Judge: Talmadge Littlejohn

Note: The Supreme Court found that the chancery court erred by not quieting and confirming title to the property in Phillip, and it reversed the Court of Appeals and the chancery court. The original Court of Appeals opinion can be found at http://courts.ms.gov/Images/Opinions/CO77704.pdf

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Phillip Morrow




CASEY L. LOTT



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief

  • Appellee: Joel Morrow, Administrator of the Estates of Goucher Morrow, Deceased and Reba Eloise Sparks Morrow, Deceased, and Ronald Morrow MICHAEL D. TAPSCOTT  

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    Topic: Real property - Property ownership - Reformation of deed - Intent - Doctrine of after-acquired property - Affirmative defense - Equitable lien

    Summary of the Facts: Gocher and Reba Morrow owned two tracts of land consisting of approximately 160 acres and 40 acres. In 1993, the Morrows deeded the property to their son, Phillip, without reservations (Deed 1) after Reba was involved in a motor-vehicle accident she feared would result in litigation against them. Phillip claims that three years later, he and the Morrows decided Phillip should deed the property back to the Morrows so that they could then deed the property back to Phillip while reserving a life estate. As such, Phillip and the Morrows hired an attorney to help complete the transactions. The land records on file show that on April 22, 1996, a warranty deed was executed from Phillip to the Morrows (Deed 3) conveying the property to Phillip’s parents. On March 23, 1996, the Morrows executed a warranty deed conveying the property to Phillip with the reservation of a life estate unto themselves (Deed 2). Gocher passed away in 1999, and Reba passed away in 2000. Phillip then filed a complaint against his brothers, Joel and Ronald, to quiet and confirm title and his sole ownership of the property. The chancery court determined that the law supported the passing of the property to the Morrows estate upon Reba’s death in 2000 and division of the property equally among the three brothers. The chancery court also found Phillip’s claim for an equitable lien to be without merit. Phillip appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Property ownership Phillip argues that the chancery court avoided the issue of delivery of Deed 2 and Deed 3. Mississippi law directs attention toward the date of delivery in matters questioning the effective date of a deed. In this case, the chancery court recognized that the matter of delivery relates back to “the acknowledgment . . . where the one who notarized [Deed 2 and Deed 3] said it was signed and delivered.” Phillip argues that the intention of the parties was for his parents to retain a life estate in the property but for Phillip to ultimately inherit the land and that it is the intention of the parties that determines whether a deed has been delivered. However, the only testimony available with regard to the intention of the parties is that of Phillip. Phillip also argues that the chancery court improperly declined to reform Deed 2 to reflect a delivery date of April 23, 1996 – the date on which Deed 2 was recorded in the chancery court. In order to reform a deed, the movant must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an error exists in a deed that contradicts the true intention of the parties involved. Phillip failed to provide evidence, other than his own testimony, to prove the intention of the parties regarding delivery differed from the actual delivery of the deeds. Thus, he failed to meet his burden of proof. Issue 2: Doctrine of after-acquired property Phillip argues that even if Deed 3 were not reformed, title to the property should have vested in Phillip under the doctrine of after-acquired property. This doctrine must be acknowledged as an affirmative defense in the pleadings of the case so as to give the opposing party notice. Phillip failed to raise the doctrine as an affirmative defense or mention the doctrine or its elements in any pleadings. Thus, he failed to meet the notice requirement necessary to invoke the doctrine. Even if he had however, his assertion fails on the merits. The doctrine provides that if the grantor subsequently acquires title, which he has purported to convey, from other than the grantee himself or one claiming under or deriving title from him, then the after-acquired title will lawfully pass to the grantee without encumbrance. Phillip did not claim the benefit of the doctrine through someone else’s conveyance of the property but through his own re-conveyance of the property to his parents. For the doctrine to apply, Phillip must have attempted to convey the property to his parents without any authority to do so. Issue 3: Equitable lien Phillip argues the chancery court erred in denying his request for an equitable lien in the amount of $527,000 on the property to reflect the alleged unjust enrichment received by his brothers through inheritance of the property. Phillip asserts that he incurred extensive farming costs and expenses, as well as hours of manual labor on the farm, from the 1980s until the chancery court’s conveyance of the property to the three brothers. However, as noted by the chancery court, the overwhelming majority of Phillip’s expenses ultimately benefitted Phillip since the profits were enjoyed by Phillip as income and none of the expenses incurred by Phillip permanently improved the property.


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