Carter v. Carter


<- Return to Search Results


Docket Number: 2011-CA-00463-COA
Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 10-02-2012
Opinion Author: Maxwell, J.
Holding: Reversed and Remanded
Additional Case Information: Topic: Divorce: Habitual cruel and inhuman treatment - Division of marital property - Legal standard - Marital debt
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Russell and Fair, JJ.
Dissenting Author : Carlton, J.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 03-02-2011
Appealed from: Claiborne County Chancery Court
Judge: Vincent Davis
Disposition: AWARDED APPELLEE ALL MARITAL PROPERTY, EQUALLY DIVIDED MARITAL DEBT, AND AWARDED APPELLEE $11,000 CREDIT AGAINST MARITAL DEBT
Case Number: 2010-0037GN
  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: William Anthony Carter




 MARTY CRAIG ROBERTSON MATTHEW STANLEY EASTERLING



  
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief
    		•
    Appellee: Linda McClure Carter MARCIE TANNER SOUTHERLAND  
    Synopsis provided by:

    If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
    hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office.
    Topic: Divorce: Habitual cruel and inhuman treatment - Division of marital property - Legal standard - Marital debt
    Summary of the Facts: Linda and William Carter signed a pre-nuptial agreement. Under this agreement, all separate property owned before the marriage remained separate, and all future income and separately acquired property likewise remained separate. When Linda was granted a divorce based on William’s habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, William had a monthly disability income of approximately $2,200 and separate assets including a $108,000 retirement account. Linda had an $800 monthly income and no separate assets. The chancellor awarded Linda sole physical custody of their one child but awarded no additional child support because the child already received approximately $1,200 a month based on William’s disability. The chancellor also awarded Linda the marital home and the lot, which was adjacent to other property owned by Linda’s family. The chancellor found this distribution eliminated the need to award alimony. The chancellor then divided the $49,000 debt owed on the marital home equally—assigning $24,500 to each party. But the chancellor credited Linda $15,000—what Linda had testified was the value of her home—instead of $4,000, the actual amount for which she sold the home. William moved to have the chancellor reconsider the $15,000 credit. The chancellor found the proper credit was $11,000, not $15,000, and ordered William to pay $34,500 and Linda $13,500. William appeals.
    Summary of Opinion Analysis: William argues the chancellor must have applied the wrong legal standard because a proper application of Ferguson could not have yielded the inequitable result of William’s receiving no marital property but a majority of the marital debt. He also challenges the basis for the $11,000 credit. The chancellor determined, based on the pre-nuptial agreement, the home and the lot were the only marital assets. He then considered each Ferguson factor. The chancellor found Linda did not have the financial means to obtain a new place to live, while William did. Essentially the chancellor was awarding Linda the use of the house as a place for her and her son to live. It also eliminated the need to award her alimony. There was no abuse of discretion in this analysis. Debts acquired during the course of the marriage are also subject to equitable distribution. While the amended divorce judgment resulted in William being assigned over seventy percent of the marital debt, there is nothing inherently inequitable about this division. However, there is error in how the chancellor reached this result. There is no evidence to support the $11,000 credit given to Linda. While Linda testified her home was worth $15,000, she also testified she willingly sold it to her neighbor for $4,000. So if Linda is to be credited for separate property that she converted into marital property, the amount of her credit should be $4,000—the fair market value of the home and the amount of money she invested in the marital home—and not $11,000—the difference between the fair market value and the amount she claimed her home was worth. Thus, the entire equitable distribution is reversed and remanded for the chancellor to reconsider.


    Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court