Byrom v. State
| Docket Number: | 2001-DP-00529-SCT Linked Case(s): 2001-DP-00529-SCT ; 2001-DP-00529-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 10-16-2003 Opinion Author: Carlson, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Death penalty - Disclosure of psychiatric reports - URCCC 9.04 - Change of venue - Psychiatric examination - Medical records - Pornography - Suppression of statement - Reopening of hearing - Defective indictment - Disclosure of evidence - Guilt by association - Accessory after the fact instruction - Cross-examination - Dog’s tracking qualifications - Murder instruction - Death sentence - Proportionality analysis Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, P.J., Waller, Cobb and Easley, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz, J. Dissenting Author : Graves, J. Dissenting Author : Pittman, C.J. Dissent Joined By : McRae, P.J., and Graves, J. Dissenting Author : McRae, P.J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - DEATH PENALTY - DIRECT APPEAL |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 11-18-2000 Appealed from: Tishomingo County Circuit Court Judge: Thomas J. Gardner Disposition: Appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. District Attorney: John Richard Young Case Number: CR99-065 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Michelle Byrom |
TERRY LYNN WOOD |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JUDY T. MARTIN MARVIN L. WHITE, JR. |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Death penalty - Disclosure of psychiatric reports - URCCC 9.04 - Change of venue - Psychiatric examination - Medical records - Pornography - Suppression of statement - Reopening of hearing - Defective indictment - Disclosure of evidence - Guilt by association - Accessory after the fact instruction - Cross-examination - Dog’s tracking qualifications - Murder instruction - Death sentence - Proportionality analysis |
| Summary of the Facts: | Michelle Byrom was convicted of capital murder. Following the verdict, Byrom petitioned the court for a sentencing hearing before the judge, without a jury. The court granted the petition and sentenced Byrom to death by lethal injection. Byrom appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Disclosure of psychiatric reports During a pretrial hearing, the judge ordered the defense to disclose to the State the reports of a court-appointed psychologist and a psychiatrist hired by Byrom after the court granted her request for a psychiatric expert. Byrom argues that disclosure of these two reports should not have been required until after a guilty verdict was returned and the sentencing phase began. URCCC 9.04 provides that if the defendant requests discovery under this rule, the defendant shall, subject to constitutional limitations, promptly disclose to the prosecutor reports of experts which the defendant may offer in evidence. Therefore, Byrom was required to promptly disclose the report, which the defense had informed the State they intended to introduce at trial. Issue 2: Change of venue Byrom argues that the court erred in not granting a change of venue. However, no motion for a change of venue appears in the record. It is the responsibility of the movant to obtain a ruling from the court on motions and failure to do so constitutes a waiver. In addition, there is no evidence showing that the failure to move Byrom’s trial to another county was prejudicial to her case. Issue 3: Psychiatric examination Byrom argues that the court erred in ordering her and her co-defendants to be evaluated by the same psychologist. Beyond an allegation that the psychologist divulged to attorneys that one of the co-defendants had confided in him that he had shot the victim, Byrom fails to identify where she was prejudiced by having the psychologist examine all of the defendants. Issue 4: Medical records Byrom argues that the court erred in requiring her to turn over all of her medical records to the psychologist. However, she does not make any specific argument nor does she cite any relevant authority with regard to this claim. Failure to cite relevant authority obviates the appellate court’s obligation to review the issue. In addition, once a patient puts her health in issue at trial, she waives her physician-patient privilege. Issue 5: Pornography Byrom argues that the court erred in ruling that pornographic tapes were inadmissible, because they would have shown the victim’s purported fixation with pornography. However, Byrom was not prejudiced by its exclusion, because this fact was adequately shown through other reliable means. Issue 6: Suppression of statement Byrom argues that one of the statements she gave should have been suppressed because she was given a defective Miranda warning which did not apprise her of her right to have an attorney present during interrogation. Although the warnings were not the classic warnings, Byrom was fairly advised of her rights. The first words out of the sheriff’s mouth let Byrom know that before we ask you any questions you must understand that you have the right to remain silent. In addition, any error committed in admitting this third statement would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt since Byrom had already been informed of some variation of her rights on two prior occasions. Byrom also argues that the sheriff and his deputies, at a minimum, should have been required to advise her that her prior statements could not be used against her. A suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings. It is clear from the totality of the circumstances that Byrom was advised of her rights on numerous occasions and that she understood and knowingly waived those rights. Byrom also argues that she would not have been incarcerated but for the taint of the excluded confessions. However, there was ample evidence from her fourth confession to support her incarceration for the crime. Byrom also argues that the sheriff threatened and deceived her during her interrogations. The remedy for coercive interrogation practices is exclusion of the statements in which the coercion was present. It does not require the exclusion of all subsequent interrogations that are preceded by proper Miranda warnings and are not coercive. In addition, no prejudice resulted from the sheriff’s comments. Byrom argues that Sheriff Department personnel intentionally lost or destroyed the tapes of her co-defendant’s interviews because they failed to properly advise him of his Miranda rights. However, the sheriff testified that the tape simply did not exist, because the tape recorder malfunctioned and the interview was not recorded. Byrom also argues that the judge erred by refusing to permit her counsel to question the sheriff regarding the content of the co-defendant’s missing statements. A court's rulings on the extent of cross-examination will be reversed only when an abuse of discretion is shown. Here, the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the cross-examination of the sheriff. Issue 7: Reopening of hearing Byrom argues that the judge erred in refusing to reopen the suppression hearing to allow her the opportunity to call her co-defendant to the stand to testify about the conditions of his interviews with law enforcement. This issue is barred, because she cites no authority in support. In addition, the refusal to allow the co-defendant to testify occurred during a suppression hearing so the jury had not yet been empaneled. Byrom was able to cross-examine this witness at trial. Issue 8: Defective indictment Byrom argues that the indictment was defective because it failed to identify co-conspirators; it offered several legal theories instead of setting forth a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense; it contained the language “participated in any way”; the statute defines parties to the offense as those individuals receiving an offer or receiving something of value and Byrom claims that she was not a party to the offense; and it sets forth the June 4, 1999, date of the murder. The indictment must fully notify the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Where an indictment tracks the language of a criminal statute it is sufficient to inform the accused of the charge against him. Byrom’s indictment reasonably provided Byrom with actual notice of the charge against her. In addition, Byrom has failed to prove, or even allege, that she was prejudiced, hampered, or disadvantaged in any way in preparing her defense to meet this indictment. Issue 9: Disclosure of evidence Byrom argues that the court erred in excluding the jailhouse letters written by her co-defendant to Byrom, because their existence had not been disclosed to the State. Byrom argues she was not required to disclose them since they were to be offered for impeachment purposes only. The defense must produce that evidence it intends to use substantively at trial. The letters in this case were substantive evidence and should therefore have been disclosed to the State. In addition, Byrom was not prejudiced by the exclusion of these letters since her counsel was allowed to ask about the statements made in the letters. Issue 10: Guilt by association Byrom argues that the court erred in permitting the jury to hear that her co-defendant was in jail charged with capital murder, because the State sought only to introduce it as an attempt to prove her guilty by association. While it is clearly reversible error for the State to inform the jury that a co-defendant of a defendant on trial has previously been convicted for the same offense, it is altogether different and not improper for the jury to know that there are other persons who have yet to be tried for the same offense for which the defendant is then on trial. Issue 11: Accessory instruction Byrom argues that the court erred in denying an accessory after the fact instruction. Although a defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case, the court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere, or is without evidentiary foundation. The elements of accessory after the fact are that a completed felony has been committed; the accused concealed, received, relieved, aided, or assisted a felon, knowing that such person had committed a felony; and such assistance or aid was rendered with the intent to enable such felon to escape or avoid arrest after the commission of such felony. The evidence presented at trial clearly demonstrated Byrom’s involvement prior to this crime. Therefore, there was no evidence to support Byrom’s proposed instruction. Issue 12: Cross-examination Byrom argues that the judge erred by allowing the State to rehabilitate a witness prior to her counsel having a chance to impeach him. However, no foundation was laid for impeaching the witness. Issue 13: Dog’s tracking qualifications Byrom argues that the court erred in allowing the testimony of a former sheriff’s deputy regarding the actions of his trained canine, because the dog’s tracking qualifications were not properly established in the record. Not only did Byrom fail to object to the qualifications of the dog, but the dog was highly trained and certified for law enforcement purposes, and his qualifications are evident from the record. Issue 14: Murder instruction Byrom argues that the jury was improperly instructed with regard to the elements of this crime. Instructions in a criminal case which follow the language of a pertinent statute are sufficient. The instruction in this case was consistent with the statute and the indictment. Issue 15: Death sentence Byrom argues that the court erred in sentencing her to death, because there was insufficient evidence of the aggravating factor that this crime was committed for pecuniary gain, and the court failed to give proper consideration to the mitigating factors. Although Byrom did not know the exact amount of insurance her husband carried, she thought it was $150,000. The evidence was sufficient to support the pecuniary gain aggravating factor. In addition, the judge appropriately considered all the mitigating factors and properly weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in reaching his sentencing decision. Issue 16: Proportionality analysis There is nothing about Byrom or her crime that would make the death penalty excessive or disproportionate in this case. |
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