Crawford v. State
| Docket Number: | 1999-DR-00647-SCT Linked Case(s): 1999-DR-00647-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 12-04-2003 Opinion Author: McRae, P.J. Holding: Applications for Post Conviction Relief, Denied. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Death penalty post-conviction relief - Disclosure of report - Suppression of confession - Timely appearance - Form of verdict - Jury questionnaire - Capacity to assist counsel - Ineffective assistance of counsel Judge(s) Concurring: Pittman, C.J., Smith, P.J., Waller, Cobb, Easley and Graves, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz, J. Concurs in Result Only: Carlson, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - DEATH PENALTY - POST CONVICTION RELIEF |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 04-23-1994 Appealed from: Tippah County Circuit Court Judge: R. Kenneth Coleman Disposition: The Appellant was convicted of burglary, rape, sexual battery, and capital murder and sentenced to death. District Attorney: James M. Hood, III Case Number: TK93013 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Charles Ray Crawford |
THOMAS C. LEVIDIOTIS |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JAMES M. HOOD, III |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Death penalty post-conviction relief - Disclosure of report - Suppression of confession - Timely appearance - Form of verdict - Jury questionnaire - Capacity to assist counsel - Ineffective assistance of counsel |
| Summary of the Facts: | Charles Crawford was convicted of burglary, rape, sexual battery, and capital murder and was sentenced as a habitual offender to death by lethal injection. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Crawford’s convictions and sentences. Crawford has filed a petition for post-conviction relief. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Disclosure of report Crawford argues that an F.B.I. report which was not disclosed before trial contains a statement that directly contradicts the F.B.I. agent’s testimony. The discovery of non-material, impeachment evidence alone is usually not considered sufficient to warrant a new trial. Here, the statements are not directly contradictory. Therefore, the F.B.I. report is of little impeachment value, much less the material value required for the grant of a new trial. Issue 2: Suppression of confessions Crawford argues that his court ordered mental examination was an interrogation in violation of his right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment is violated when a defendant's attorneys receives no notice of the examination or its scope, thereby preventing counsel from giving informed advice and depriving the defendant of his assistance of counsel in making an informed decision. In this case, counsel had, at the very least, notice of the fact that the examination would take place as he signed off on the examination order. Issue 3: Timely appearance Crawford argues that his confessions were improperly admitted at trial since he was not granted an initial appearance until after officials obtained detailed confessions in violation of his right to counsel. When followed by a knowing and voluntary waiver, a subsequent confession becomes competent evidence. Even assuming that Crawford’s right to a timely appearance was offended, he was explained of his rights and he executed written waiver forms. Issue 4: Form of verdict Crawford argues that since the jury wrote the verdict in improper form as to the placement of the words “beyond a reasonable doubt” in reference to the aggravating factors, the form of the verdict was improper. There is no authority for the proposition that the jury must actually write the words "beyond a reasonable doubt" in its verdict. Issue 5: Jury questionnaire Crawford argues that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was compromised by the identification of the defendant and the victim in the case through a questionnaire that had been mailed to the venire several weeks prior to jury selection. Any problems that such occurrences may raise can be sufficiently cured through proper voir dire. Here, the voir dire conducted at trial was sufficient to ensure a fair and impartial jury. Issue 6: Capacity to assist counsel Crawford argues that he was not of the capacity to assist his counsel at trial. Because Crawford has not raised this issue until nine years later, the issue is without merit. Crawford also argues that the court should have granted him new counsel on its own accord. Not until it is apparent that counsel is incompetent or failing to act in the best interests of the defendant should the court take it upon itself to address the matter. Issue 7: Ineffective assistance of counsel Crawford argues that counsel was deficient in not creating a trusting relationship with their client and, as a result, Crawford was prejudiced. However, he has not made the necessary showing that counsel was deficient. Crawford also argues that counsel failed to secure adequate funds to engage in proper investigation, which resulted in an inability to obtain the F.B.I. report. However, Crawford fails to create a nexus between lack of funds and discovery of this report. Crawford also argues that counsel failed to secure funds for expert assistance. However, Crawford did have experts testify at trial and has failed to include an affidavit from any expert which states what exculpatory testimony they would have provided were Crawford able to afford it. Crawford argues that counsel was deficient for not litigating Crawford's overall competency and, specifically, his competency while on medication. Crawford bears the burden of showing facts which would have changed since the original determination, or to provide an affidavit by a doctor who would have testified as to his incompetency. He has not done so. Instead, he has merely provided proof that he had a seizure and no medication, proof that one doctor was "doubtful" of his competency, and his father's assertions that his medication affected the way he presented himself at trial. Crawford argues that counsel was ineffective because it failed to object that the indictment was invalid on its face. However, the invalidity of Crawford’s indictment was addressed on appeal and Crawford was found not to have been prejudiced. Crawford also argues that his counsel should have challenged the indictment because one of the members of the grand jury was related to a prosecution witness. Absent statutory provision to the contrary, it is permissible for a member of the grand jury to be related to the victim, meaning that such relation, alone, is not grounds for disqualification. Crawford argues that it was ineffective for counsel to not file a motion to suppress prior bad acts and convictions. When the defense is insanity, the door is thrown wide open for the admission of evidence of every act of the accused’s life relevant to the issue of sanity and is admissible in evidence. Here, the insanity defense was employed. Crawford argues that counsel was ineffective because they did not file a written motion to suppress confession statements. However, such a motion was made ore tenus, and Crawford fails to cite any cases that stand for the proposition that motions must be made in writing. Crawford argues that counsel was inefficient for failing to request a bench trial. There is no right to a trial by bench. Crawford argues that counsel’s failure to appeal the denial of his petition to proceed ex parte to secure funds rendered counsel’s assistance ineffective. However, Crawford identified the specific expert he wished to obtain and that expert appeared and testified at his trial. Therefore, his need to proceed ex parte was rendered moot. Crawford argues that his counsel was ineffective for failure to pursue plea negotiations. However, Crawford provides no evidence that the prosecution even considered tendering a plea offer to him. Crawford argues that counsel was rendered ineffective because it was unable to secure individual sequestered voir dire. However, Crawford has cited no authority that indicates that the failure to obtain individualized, sequestered voir dire renders counsel’s assistance ineffective. Crawford argues that counsel failed to ask necessary questions or properly challenge jurors. However, he fails to allege what questions should have been asked or provide case law supporting his contention. Crawford argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to rehabilitate jurors who had stated that their opposition to the death penalty would either preclude them from being able to impose such punishment and/or would prevent them from rendering an impartial verdict. However, it is not ineffective assistance for counsel to fail to attempt rehabilitation of jurors when those jurors make it unmistakably clear that they could either not vote for the death penalty or that their attitude towards the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to defendant’s guilt. Although Crawford argues counsel was ineffective in failing to have two jurors removed for cause, both jurors were removed from the case and both were removed for cause. Crawford argues that counsel conceded guilt and, therefore, was ineffective in his opening statement. However, counsel conceded underlying facts, yet at all times argued that Crawford was not guilty by reason of insanity. Crawford argues that it was ineffective for counsel not to demand a pre-trial hearing on admissibility regarding prior bad acts. However, Crawford fails to cite any case which states that it is ineffective assistance for counsel to fail to insist on such a pre-trial hearing. Crawford argues ineffectiveness in failing to object to testimony concerning prior bad acts. However, the evidence he complains of was admissible. Crawford argues that counsel was ineffective for not requiring the trial court to conduct an on the record hearing concerning admissibility of DNA evidence. However, counsel did make a motion in limine to prevent the introduction of DNA evidence. Crawford argues that counsels’ refusal to cross examine the states’ expert witness on hair was ineffective assistance. However, Crawford has not cited any case law that finds it per se ineffective to not cross examine and opposing party’s expert witness. Crawford argues that counsel was ineffective for not objecting to three specific pieces of testimony which, he claims, were designed to and did inflame the jury. However, he has failed to show that there was a reasonable probability that the jury would have returned a different verdict had these statements been objected to and stricken from the record. Crawford argues that counsel was ineffective because of the failure to secure the attendance of witnesses at a pretrial hearing and at trial. However, the record shows quite clearly the court’s willingness to reopen the specific motion when the proper witnesses were in attendance. Crawford argues that counsel failed to object to the prosecution’s use of the testimony of an officer to establish prior convictions. However, he cites to no authority for the proposition that the prosecution is required to provide certified copies of convictions to prove aggravators at the sentencing phase of a capital murder case. Crawford argues that he was prejudiced by counsels’ ineffectiveness in dealing with juror speculation regarding Crawford’s parole eligibility. However, Crawford fails to make any showing that any of the jurors were confused on this topic. Crawford argues that counsel failed to investigate mitigating evidence. A court is to determine whether counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment in conducting its investigation based on an assessment of the prevailing professional norms, including a context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen from counsel’s perspective at the time. Because Crawford has failed to even allege any information outside of the knowledge of counsel, much less provide the necessary affidavits, there is no need to even examine the reasonableness of counsels’ investigation. |
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