Hardison v. State
| Docket Number: | 2009-KP-00233-SCT Linked Case(s): 2009-KP-00233-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 08-09-2012 Opinion Author: Dickinson, P.J. Holding: Reversed and Remanded |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Armed robbery - Right to speedy trial - Peremptory strikes - Race neutral reason Judge(s) Concurring: Kitchens, Chandler and King, JJ. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Waller, C.J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 05-24-2006 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: W. Swan Yerger Disposition: Denied the Appellant a peremptory strike and was convicted of armed robbery. District Attorney: Robert Shuler Smith Case Number: 04-0-034-03 WSY |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Merlin Hardison |
PRO SE |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: W. GLENN WATTS SCOTT STUART |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Armed robbery - Right to speedy trial - Peremptory strikes - Race neutral reason |
| Summary of the Facts: | Merlin Hardison was convicted of armed robbery. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Right to speedy trial Because a total of 833 days passed between his indictment and trial, Hardison argues the delay violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Hardison failed to make this objection at the trial in circuit court, and the Supreme Court remanded the issue to the circuit court for a hearing on the matter. As ordered, the circuit court held a hearing. Factors to be considered in analyzing such a claim include length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Because the delay in bringing Hardison to trial was more than three times the presumptively prejudicial eight-month mark, this factor clearly weighs against the State. While a defendant is awarded points for asserting his right, the failure to demand a speedy trial does not count against Hardison. Instead, this factor is neutral. After the alleged crime, Hardison fled to California – where he remained for almost a year following the indictment. This time – 385 days – is attributable to Hardison. Hardison eventually was arrested on March 2, 2005, and trial was set for May 9, 2005. Between his arrest and trial, a total of 445 days elapsed. Of this delay, 316 days resulted from continuances sought by Hardison himself. This time is attributable to Hardison as well. So, of the 833 total days between indictment and trial, 701 days are attributable to Hardison. Because a majority of the delay is attributable to Hardison, the State has overcome the presumption of prejudice in this case. Not a single factor weighs in Hardison’s favor. Thus, Hardison was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Issue 2: Peremptory strikes Hardison argues that the trial court erred by not requiring the State to make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination and by sustaining the State’s Batson challenge. During jury selection, and after Hardison’s counsel struck four white veniremembers, the State made a Batson challenge. Hardison’s counsel argued that the State did not present a prima facie case of discrimination, because the defense struck both African-American and white veniremembers. The State rebutted, arguing that defense counsel struck highly educated older persons, many of whom had served on juries in the past. Ultimately, the trial judge found that the State had raised a prima facie case of discrimination and required Hardison to present race-neutral reasons for striking four white veniremembers. Hardison’s counsel gave reasons for striking those four witnesses. The trial judge agreed with defense counsel’s race-neutral reasons for all but one of the strikes. During voir dire, the juror said that he had served on a jury in an armed-robbery case and that the jury did not reach a verdict because of prosecutorial error. Hardison’s counsel argued that this response suggested to him that the juror regretted not being able to reach a verdict, so he was more likely to convict. The trial court did not err by finding a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The record does not show the racial makeup of the venire. The trial judge’s decision cannot be reversed without knowing the racial makeup of the venire from which the jury was chosen. With regard to the judge’s decision regarding the reason given by Hardison’s counsel for striking the juror, this decision was clear error. Race-neutral reasons which have been approved for striking venire members include age, demeanor, marital status, single with children, prosecutor distrusted juror, educational background, employment history, criminal record, young and single, friend charged with crime, unemployed with no roots in community, posture and demeanor indicated juror was hostile to being in court, juror was late, short term employment. Hardison’s reason – that Gray’s responses about a prior jury experience indicated he might be proprosecution – certainly qualifies as race-neutral. If a prosecutor’s distrust of a venire member is a race-neutral reason, then a defendant’s distrust must be as well. In finding the reason was not race-neutral, the trial judge did not proceed to the third part of the Batson analysis – pretext. The Batson analysis has three steps, and it is imperative that a trial judge follow those steps accordingly. When – as here – the party offers a valid race-neutral reason, the trial judge must allow the strike unless the other party demonstrates that the valid race-neutral reason was a pretext for discrimination. A trial judge’s erroneous denial of a defendant’s peremptory strike requires automatic reversal. |
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