Flye, et al. v. Spotts
| Docket Number: | 2010-IA-01764-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 08-02-2012 Opinion Author: Lamar, J. Holding: Affirmed and Remanded |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Tort Claims Act - Volunteer fire department - Body corporate - Section 11-46-1(i) Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson and Dickinson, P.JJ., Randolph, Kitchens, Chandler, Pierce and King, JJ. Procedural History: Interlocutory Appeal |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-24-2010 Appealed from: Lowndes County Circuit Court Judge: Lee Howard Case Number: 2009-0018-CV1 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Daniel C. Flye and Lowndes County District 1 Fire Department |
JOHN D. BRADY
BERKLEY N. HUSKISON |
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| Appellee: | Milton Spotts and Brenda Spotts | WILLIAM P. STARKS, II |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Tort Claims Act - Volunteer fire department - Body corporate - Section 11-46-1(i) |
| Summary of the Facts: | The underlying dispute arose from a vehicle collision between volunteer firefighter Daniel Flye and a Lowndes County Sheriff’s Department vehicle, in which Milton Spotts was a passenger and suffered injuries. Both Flye and Spotts had responded to an emergency call to provide assistance to a child who had been hit by a vehicle. Flye had responded in his capacity as a volunteer firefighter with the Lowndes County District 1 Fire Department and was driving his personal vehicle with a county-issued radio. Spotts filed a complaint against the volunteer fire department and Flye. After conducting some discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. The trial court denied summary judgment. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | The defendants argue that the volunteer fire department is a “body corporate” under section 11-46-1(i), since it is a private, nonprofit corporation that performs governmental activities by way of fire protection. Neither the Act nor the Code defines “body corporate.” The phrase “body politic or body corporate” in the MTCA is immediately followed by the words “including, but not limited to, any county, municipality, school district, community hospital . . . [or] airport authority[.]” So “body politic” and “body corporate” are general terms followed by more specific ones. Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, where general words follow specific words in statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only those objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words. Where the opposite sequence is found, i.e., specific words following general ones, the doctrine is equally applicable, and restricts application of the general term to things that are similar to those enumerated. Here, all of the specific words following “body corporate” clearly identify those entities as governmental. Thus, the term “body corporate,” either in isolation or as part of the phrase “body politic or body corporate” in the MTCA, does not include a private corporation. The volunteer fire department is not a political subdivision under the MTCA. |
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