Carpenter v. State


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Docket Number: 2010-KA-00983-COA
Linked Case(s): 2010-KA-00983-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 07-31-2012
Opinion Author: Lee, C.J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Murder - Spousal immunity - Section 13-1-5 - Sufficiency of evidence - Section 97-3-19(1)(a) - Transferred intent instruction - Due process rights
Judge(s) Concurring: Griffis, P.J., Ishee, Roberts, Carlton, Maxwell, Russell and Fair, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Irving, P.J.
Concurs in Result Only: Barnes, J.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 04-05-2002
Appealed from: Leflore County Circuit Court
Judge: Margaret Carey-McCray
Disposition: CONVICTED OF MURDER AND SENTENCED TO LIFE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Case Number: 2004-0190(CMC)(L)

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Walter Carpenter a/k/a Walter L. Carpenter




ROSS R. BARNETT JR.



 

Appellee: State of Mississippi OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: STEPHANIE BRELAND WOOD  

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Topic: Murder - Spousal immunity - Section 13-1-5 - Sufficiency of evidence - Section 97-3-19(1)(a) - Transferred intent instruction - Due process rights

Summary of the Facts: Walter Carpenter was convicted of murder and was sentenced to life. He appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Spousal immunity Carpenter argues the admission of Jewell’s (his wife) testimony over his objection was a violation of section 13-1-5. Communications between spouses made in the presence of a third party do not fall within the protection of section 13-1-5. Jewell presented testimony regarding statements Carpenter made during the time of the incident. These statements were made in the presence of a third party, the victim, rendering them outside the gambit of confidential communications under section 13-1-5. Although Carpenter did not verbally threaten Jewell, the heated argument between Carpenter and Jewell sparked the sequence of events leading to the victim’s death. This is sufficient to make it a “controversy” between them under section 13-1-5. Issue 2: Sufficiency of evidence Carpenter argues that the State failed to prove that he possessed a deliberate design to kill the victim. Under section 97-3-19(1)(a), the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed the victim; without the authority of law; and with deliberate design to affect his death. Here, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find Carpenter guilty of deliberate-design murder. Carpenter admitted he shot and killed the victim. Although Carpenter claims he shot the victim in self-defense, there was no evidence to indicate the victim threatened Carpenter. Jewell testified she thought Carpenter might have been aiming the gun at her. Jewell further stated the victim made no move toward Carpenter that would substantiate Carpenter’s self-defense claim. Issue 3: Transferred intent instruction Carpenter argues that the trial court committed reversible error in granting the State’s jury instruction on transferred intent, because there was no evidentiary basis to show he intended to kill Jewell. However, according to Jewell’s testimony, when Carpenter retrieved his gun, she was the only other person in the room with him, and Carpenter was staring her directly in the face while loading the gun. Jewell also testified that had she not leaned to the side when Carpenter fired the gun, her face “would have been blown off.” Jewell testified she could feel the “heat” from the bullet on the side of her face. Based on these facts, there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for the granting of the jury instruction on transferred intent. Carpenter also argues the jury instruction on transferred intent deviated from the indictment and was wholly inconsistent with the State’s burden of proving he killed the victim with malice aforethought. Deliberate design to kill a person may be formed very quickly, and perhaps only moments before the act of consummating the intent. Based on the evidence, including Jewell’s own testimony, it was possible Carpenter initially intended to shoot Jewell but shot the victim instead. It was also possible for the jury to conclude that Carpenter intended to shoot and kill the victim. The granting of the instruction was not inconsistent with the State’s burden of proof. Issue 4: Due process rights Carpenter argues his due-process rights were violated due to the trial court’s four-year delay in ruling on his post-trial motions. Factors to consider when reviewing appellate-delay claims include length of delay, the reasons for delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right to appeal, and prejudice to the defendant occasioned by the delay. A due-process violation cannot be established absent a showing of prejudice to the defendant. Carpenter has failed to show how the trial court’s delay prejudiced the outcome of his appeal. There is nothing in the record to suggest the delay impaired his grounds for appeal or impeded his ability to defend his case. Furthermore, Carpenter’s trial counsel was responsible for seeking a hearing on his post-trial motions and failed to do so.


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