Jefferson v. State


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Docket Number: 2011-CP-00265-COA
Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 07-31-2012
Opinion Author: Maxwell, J.
Holding: Affirmed
Additional Case Information: Topic: Compensation for wrongful conviction - Section 11-44-9(1) - Section 11-44-3 - Section 11-44-7(1) - Section 97-17-23(1) - Section 97-17-33 - Refiling petition
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Griffis, P.J., Barnes, Ishee, Roberts and Fair, JJ.
Judge(s) Concurring Separately: Carlton, J.
Procedural History: Dismissal
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - OTHER
Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 01-19-2011
Appealed from: Yazoo County Circuit Court
Judge: Jannie M. Lewis
Disposition: DISMISSED CLAIMS FOR WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
Case Number: 2010-CI43
  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Dennis Jefferson a/k/a Dennis E. Jefferson




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  • Appellant #1 Brief
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    Appellee: State of Mississippi OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: ROGER GOOGE JR.  
    Synopsis provided by:

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    Topic: Compensation for wrongful conviction - Section 11-44-9(1) - Section 11-44-3 - Section 11-44-7(1) - Section 97-17-23(1) - Section 97-17-33 - Refiling petition
    Summary of the Facts: In 2009, the Mississippi Legislature created a statutory right to compensation by the State for “innocent people” wrongfully convicted and imprisoned. The following year, Dennis Jefferson petitioned for statutory compensation. Jefferson claimed he was entitled to compensation because this court reversed his burglary conviction in 2008 and, under the direct-remand rule, remanded his case to the circuit court for resentencing for the lesser-included crime of willful trespass. The circuit court dismissed Jefferson’s compensation claim, and he appeals.
    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Section 11-44-9(1) provides that “Persons convicted, incarcerated and released from custody prior to July 1, 2009, shall commence an action under this chapter not later than June 30, 2012.” Otherwise, an action “shall be commenced within three (3) years after either the grant of a pardon or the grant of judicial relief and satisfaction of other conditions described in [s]ection 11-44-3(1).” If a claimant establishes a claim under section 11-44-3, he must then meet the burden of proof under section 11-44-7(1). Jefferson was charged with violating section 97-17-23(1), which criminalizes “burglary of a dwelling house.”After a jury trial, Jefferson was found guilty of burglary of a building other than a dwelling under section 97-17-33, which the State incorrectly argued was a lesser-included offense. His conviction and sentence were reversed on appeal because the evidence was not legally sufficient to convict Jefferson of either dwelling-house or nondwelling-house burglary. However, the Court of Appeals, under the direct-remand rule, remanded the case for resentencing for willful trespass. Jefferson claimed he was wrongfully convicted and sentenced. He requested $50,000 in compensation and a declaratory judgment that his due-process rights were violated. On appeal, Jefferson claims the circuit court dismissed his petition with prejudice without permitting him ninety days to refile. A dismissal under section 11-44-3(3) “shall be without prejudice to allow adequate refiling within ninety (90) days.” Nowhere in its order did the circuit court restrict this right by dismissing the petition with prejudice. And nowhere in the record did the circuit court deny Jefferson’s attempt to refile his petition. After dismissal, Jefferson chose not to refile his petition but instead filed an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration, followed by this appeal. Thus, it was his own actions—and not the circuit court’s erroneous application of section 11-44-3(3)—that led to him not refiling a petition within ninety days. Jefferson’s petition was deficient. While the circuit judge did not explain in her order why Jefferson’s petition failed to comply with section 11-44-3, Jefferson failed to establish he met the requirements of section 11-44-3(1)(c). This section makes clear that having a conviction vacated or reversed is not enough—just as the mere receipt of a pardon is not enough but, instead, the pardon must also expressly state it is based on the claimant’s innocence. Section 11-44-3(1)(c) clearly and unambiguously requires, “[i]f there was a vacatur or reversal,” the claimant must also establish by documentary evidence that “either the accusatory instrument was dismissed or nol prossed[,] or if a new trial was held, the defendant was found not guilty[.]” As written, this is an express additional requirement that Jefferson has failed to meet.


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