City of Jackson v. Shavers


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Docket Number: 2011-IA-00859-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2011-IA-00859-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 07-26-2012
Opinion Author: Waller, C.J.
Holding: Reversed and Rendered

Additional Case Information: Topic: Wrongful death - Tort Claims Act - Section 11-46-9(1)(c) - Reckless disregard - Request for additional discovery - M.R.C.P. 56(f)
Judge(s) Concurring: Carlson and Dickinson, P.JJ., Randolph, Lamar and Pierce, JJ.
Dissenting Author : Chandler, J.
Dissent Joined By : Kitchens and King, JJ.
Procedural History: Interlocutory Appeal
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WRONGFUL DEATH

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 05-27-2011
Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court
Judge: Winston Kidd
Disposition: Denied the Appellant's motion for summary judgment.
Case Number: 251-08-486CIV

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: The City of Jackson, Mississippi, and The City of Jackson Police Department




KIMBERLY BANKS PIETER TEEUWISSEN



 

Appellee: Shalandria Shavers, Individually, and on Behalf of all the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries, and Heirs of Law of Doris Shavers, Deceased THOMAS J. BELLINDER DENNIS C. SWEET, III TERRIS C. HARRIS DENNIS C. SWEET, IV  

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Topic: Wrongful death - Tort Claims Act - Section 11-46-9(1)(c) - Reckless disregard - Request for additional discovery - M.R.C.P. 56(f)

Summary of the Facts: Henry Phillips murdered Doris Shavers in the home they shared. The heirs of Shavers sued the City of Jackson, claiming the actions of its police officers caused Shavers’s death. The City moved for summary judgment. The court denied the motion. The Supreme Court granted an interlocutory appeal.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: The City of Jackson argues it is immune from liability pursuant to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Section 11-46-9(1)(c) provides that a governmental entity is not liable for any claims arising out of any act or omission of an employee of a governmental entity engaged in the performance or execution of duties or activities relating to police or fire protection unless the employee acted in reckless disregard of the safety and well-being of any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of injury. Reckless disregard is a higher standard than gross negligence, and it embraces willful or wanton conduct which requires knowingly and intentionally doing a thing or wrongful act. The plaintiffs argue that the officers acted in reckless disregard by failing to arrest Phillips prior to the murder of Shavers. They claim that if the officers had run an “NCIC” background search on Phillips, they would have discovered that he was a convicted felon who was in possession of a firearm and they would have arrested Phillips on their initial encounter, thereby preventing Shavers’s death. However, even assuming that Phillips was a convicted felon, and even assuming the officers were required to run an NCIC or other background check, the plaintiffs have not presented evidence that the officers acted in reckless disregard for the safety of Doris Shavers. The officers had no reason to perceive an unreasonable risk to Shavers’s safety or a high probability of harm to her. The officers were not called to a disturbance between Phillips and Shavers, and Shavers was not the target of Phillips’s original threats. There is no evidence that the officers acted in a willful or wanton manner, and no evidence suggests the officers intended for harm to follow their actions. The plaintiffs also argue that summary judgment is inappropriate at this stage of the litigation. Along with the plaintiffs’ response to the City’s motion for summary judgment, they submitted an affidavit from their attorney, pursuant to M.R.C.P. 56(f), stating the need for additional time to conduct discovery. The plaintiffs assert that they have not been able to depose the officers involved in the case, and that the trial court denied the defendant’s motion in order to allow the plaintiffs the opportunity to conduct their desired discovery. Rule 56(f) is in place because the completion of discovery is, in some instances, desirable before the court can determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. Although the trial court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment after it ordered additional time for discovery, the record does not indicate that the trial court denied summary judgment for the purpose of allowing further discovery. More importantly however, no material facts are in dispute or could be exposed through further discovery. Summary judgment may be granted, in spite of a Rule 56(f) request for time for additional discovery, when the record contains all the necessary information for a ruling on the motion.


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