J.S., et al. v. Lamar County Sch. Dist.
| Docket Number: | 2011-CA-00260-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 07-17-2012 Opinion Author: Maxwell, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Tort Claims Act - Section 11-46-9(1)(d) - Discretionary function - Public function test - Immunity Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Russell and Fair, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: Carlton, J., Concurs in Result Only Without Separate Written Opinion Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 01-18-2011 Appealed from: Lamar County Circuit Court Judge: Anthony Mozingo Disposition: SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED IN FAVOR OF APPELLEE Case Number: 2009-143 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | J.S. and L.S., Individually, and as Next Best Friends of A.S., A Minor |
MARC L. BOUTWELL |
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| Appellee: | Lamar County School District | RICHARD D. NORTON BRAD A. TOUCHSTONE |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Tort Claims Act - Section 11-46-9(1)(d) - Discretionary function - Public function test - Immunity |
| Summary of the Facts: | J.S. and L.S. sued the Lamar County School District based on neck injuries allegedly sustained by their daughter A.S. in a car wreck in the parking lot of Oak Grove High School. The complaint alleged the District was negligent because it failed to maintain reasonable control of the vehicles in the parking lot and safe traffic conditions on campus. The District moved for summary judgment which the court granted. A.S. appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Section 11-46-9(1)(d) provides immunity to governmental entities, such as school districts, from claims based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused. In determining whether a governmental entity is exempt from liability under section 11-46-9(1)(d), a two-part public-function test is used. Under this test, the Court must first determine whether the activity in question involved an element of choice or judgment and if so, must also determine whether that choice or judgment involved social, economic, or political-policy considerations. The “activity in question” is the District’s oversight of the Oak Grove parking lot as students were leaving school. This activity is discretionary and thus meets prong one of the public-function test. There is no statute directing how a school district is to direct and control traffic on its campuses. How traffic flowed, where students could park, and where speed bumps were placed all involved choice or judgment. A duty is discretionary when it is not imposed by law and depends upon the judgment or choice of the government entity or its employee. While there is evidence the District was aware that fender benders were occurring in the campus parking lot, there is no evidence the District knew that the student who hit the car A.S. was in was a careless driver or that they witnessed her driving erratically and failed to intervene. The second part of the public-function test limits the scope of discretionary-function immunity to only those functions which by nature are policy decisions, whether made at the operational or planning level. Here, the decision to allow students to drive to school involves economic and public policy. By allowing students to transport themselves to school, the District does not have to pay to bus these students to school but does have to pay to maintain a parking lot. Further, this decision also enables students the freedom to work or attend church or another civic function after school, without having to wait on a bus to take them home. Thus, the District’s activities met both prongs of the public-function test and were entitled to immunity under section 11-46-9(1)(d). |
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