Cuccia v. Cuccia
| Docket Number: | 2010-CT-00083-SCT Linked Case(s): 2010-CA-00083-COA ; 2010-CA-00083-COA ; 2010-CT-00083-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-28-2012 Opinion Author: Pierce, J. Holding: Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part; Chancery court reversed and remanded. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Equitable distribution - Marital assets - Child custody - Rehabilitative alimony Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson, P.J., Randolph and Lamar, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): King, J. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Kitchens, J. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part Joined By 1: Dickinson, P.J., and Chandler, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 10-16-2009 Appealed from: DeSoto County Chancery Court Judge: Percy L. Lynchard, Jr. Disposition: DIVORCE ENTERED, CUSTODY AWARDED TO MOTHER AND CHILD SUPPORT AND REHABILITATIVE ALIMONY AWARDED Case Number: 08-01-0191 |
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| Note: | The original Court of Appeals opinion can be found at http://courts.ms.gov/Images/Opinions/CO70705.pdf . | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Anthony Joseph Cuccia |
RACHAEL EMILY PUTNAM
JERRY WESLEY HISAW
KAY FARESE TURNER |
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| Appellee: | Julie Anne (Reavy) Cuccia | JOY W. GRAVES MALENDA HARRIS MEACHAM |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Equitable distribution - Marital assets - Child custody - Rehabilitative alimony |
| Summary of the Facts: | Anthony Cuccia separated from his wife, Julie Anne Cuccia, after eleven years of marriage. Tony eventually filed for divorce based on irreconcilable differences. Tony later filed an amended complaint for divorce, adding that he was entitled to a divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhumane treatment. Tony and Julie Anne consented to an irreconcilable-differences divorce, but left equitable distribution of property, child custody, and alimony for the chancery court to decide. The chancery court granted custody to Julie Anne, dividing the marital estate, and awarding alimony. Tony appealed, and the Court of Appeals overturned several of the chancery court’s findings and remanded the issues for reexamination. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Equitable distribution Julie Anne argues that at least part of Tony’s bonus money was marital property and Tony failed to show otherwise; that the chancery court properly classified her post-separation-purchased home as separate property; and that the chancery court was not obligated to consider marital debt in dividing the marital estate, and that, if it was, the marital debt was insignificant. Marital property has been classified as being any and all property acquired or accumulated during the marriage. Assets so acquired or accumulated during the course of the marriage are marital assets and are subject to an equitable distribution by the chancellor. Generally, for the purposes of accumulating marital property, the time period runs from the date of marriage until the final judgment of divorce. However, a temporary support order may serve as a line of demarcation in determining whether property is marital or separate. In this case, a separate maintenance order was not entered, but a temporary support order was issued on May 6, 2008, and filed on May 9, 2008. The chancellor did not set out the specific date as the line of demarcation in classifying marital verus nonmarital property. He must do so and then determine which assets and liabilities are marital and nonmarital and divide the estate equitably. Tony received a bonus check from FedEx in July 2008 in the amount of $43,460 for the period of June 1, 2007, through May 31, 2008. Tony provided evidence that the bonus he received was actually a combination of two bonuses – an annual long-term bonus and an annual incentive bonus. The vast majority of this bonus appears to have been “accumulated during the marriage” and seems to have been based in part on Tony’s individual job performance during the marriage. Not only did the chancery court fail to set forth the line of demarcation in classifying marital versus nonmarital property, it failed to take into consideration the amount of Tony’s bonus contributed to the marital debt shown in this case. The chancery court should have considered marital debt in equitably distributing the marital estate. After the marital residence was sold, and after the temporary support order was entered, Julie Anne purchased a home. The chancery court must address this asset on remand. Tony, Julie Anne, and Tony’s parents were deeded 100 acres of undeveloped woodland with joint ownership and rights of survivorship. The acreage was purchased for approximately $52,500 in 2001, and no improvements have been made on the land since that time. The chancery court ruled that the acreage was marital property. Because the chancery court incorrectly divided the marital estate, the chancery court must also address this asset on remand. Issue 2: Child custody The Court of Appeals reversed and rendered the chancery court’s custody determination, having found that the chancery court committed reversible error in awarding Julie Anne sole legal and physical custody of the children. Julie Anne argues that the Court of Appeals’ decision with regard to child custody is based on inaccurate facts and unsupported allegations about her home and the role of the parties in caring for the children. The chancery court found that most of the Albright factors favored neither party. Specifically, the chancery court found that “continuity of care,” “best parenting skills,” and “willingness to provide primary childcare” favored Julie Anne. However, the Court of Appeals determined that “continuity of care” and “best parenting skills” favored neither party, and also decided that Tony had exhibited a “willingness” to care for his children. While the Court of Appeals did not err in finding that “best parenting skills” and “willingness to provide primary childcare” favored neither party, the chancery court did not err in its determination that “continuity of care” favored Julie Anne. The chancery court noted that this was not a case in which joint custody was appropriate, because Tony and Julie Anne could not work together to make joint custody feasible. The chancery court was in the best position to make that determination. However, the Court of Appeals properly found that the chancery court erred by not issuing an injunction against Julie Anne, restricting the number and size of any dogs she may have in her residence with the children. The chancery court’s order is devoid of any consideration regarding the children being around the dogs that Julie Anne sometimes has in her home through her dog-rescue operation. Accordingly, the chancery court must revisit this issue and make findings that are in the best interest of the children. Issue 3: Rehabilitative alimony The chancery court determined that there was a great disparity in the incomes of Tony and Julie Anne and ordered rehabilitative alimony. The Court of Appeals found the award of rehabilitative alimony to be manifestly erroneous because of the amount already awarded to Julie Anne, her personal income, Tony’s monthly obligations, and Tony’s decrease in salary. Rehabilitative periodic alimony is an equitable mechanism which allows a party needing assistance to become self-supporting without becoming destitute in the interim. As such, rehabilitative alimony is not to be considered by the chancery court as an equalizer between the parties. From the record, it is clear that Julie Anne was seeking a means to become self-supporting. As such, there was no error in the chancery court’s decision to award Julie Anne rehabilitative alimony to return to school. Alimony should be revisited by the chancery court on remand. |
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