Jones v. State


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Docket Number: 2003-KA-01909-SCT
Oral Argument: 04-06-2005
 

 

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Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 10-20-2005
Opinion Author: Cobb, P.J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Transfer of cocaine - Amendment of indictment
Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller, P.J., Easley, Carlson, Dickinson and Randolph, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz, J.
Dissenting Author : Graves, J.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 05-22-2003
Appealed from: Rankin County Circuit Court
Judge: Samac Richardson
Disposition: Jones was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment (last 10 years suspended) and five years’ probation upon release.
District Attorney: DAVID CLARK
Case Number: 14,602

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Dewayne K. Jones




John Richard May, Jr.; Julie Ann Epps; Rhonda C. Cooper



 

Appellee: State of Mississippi Deirdre McCrory; Scott Stuart; Charles W. Maris, Jr.; Jim Hood  

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Topic: Transfer of cocaine - Amendment of indictment

Summary of the Facts: Dewayne Jones was convicted of transferring cocaine and was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment (last 10 years suspended) and five years’ probation upon release. He appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Jones argues that the court committed reversible error by amending the indictment to accuse Jones of transferring cocaine to “Grady Shoemaker” instead of a “confidential informant” as originally alleged in the indictment. The State can only amend the indictment if the amendment does not change the facts which are the essence of the offense, or materially alter a defense of the defendant so that it results in prejudice to the case. The identity of the person to whom the drugs were sold does not change the essence of the offense, since such identity is not an element of the offense. Jones argues that the lateness of the amendment to indictment prejudiced him since he relied on the original indictment to prepare his defense. However, Jones knew of the role of Grady Shoemaker in the alleged cocaine transaction and the importance of Shoemaker’s potential testimony to the case. Therefore, Jones could not have been surprised by the State’s attempt to prove Jones transferred cocaine to Shoemaker. The two defenses which Jones claims he no longer had after the amendment, would not have changed the outcome of the case, nor even had a substantial effect on it. Jones also argues that the court denied him a fundamentally fair trial by allowing the amendment on the morning of trial and after the jury had been selected. Jones does not allege that the State refused to disclose Shoemaker as a potential witness. Instead, Jones asserts that the State misled the defense by concealing the identity of the State’s “true” material witness. While two of Jones’s defenses were impaired, this did not prejudice his case. Neither of the two lost defenses relate to any essential element of the offense. In addition, it is not necessary for the indictment to mention the purchaser of the drugs when the defendant is charged with the sale of drugs.


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