Leon Fuqua v. State of Mississippi


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Docket Number: 2004-KA-00491-COA
Linked Case(s): 2004-CT-00491-SCT2004-KA-00491-COA2004-KA-00491-COA2004-KA-00491-COA
Oral Argument: 03-23-2005
 

 

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Additional Case Information: Topic: Capital murder & Arson - Sufficiency of indictment - Defense theories - Evidence of past sexual relations - M.R.E. 412 - Duress instruction - Admission of evidence - M.R.E. 401 - M.R.E. 403 - Sufficiency of evidence - Amendment of indictment

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Leon Fuqua




George T. Holmes



 

Appellee: State of Mississippi Scott Stuart; Charles W. Maris, Jr.; Jim Hood  

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Topic: Capital murder & Arson - Sufficiency of indictment - Defense theories - Evidence of past sexual relations - M.R.E. 412 - Duress instruction - Admission of evidence - M.R.E. 401 - M.R.E. 403 - Sufficiency of evidence - Amendment of indictment

Summary of the Facts: The motion for rehearing is granted, and this opinion is substituted for the original opinion. Leon Fuqua was convicted of the crimes of capital murder and arson. Fuqua was sentenced as a habitual offender to two consecutive life terms without the possibility of parole. Fuqua appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Sufficiency of indictment Fuqua argues that Count 1 of his indictment insufficiently charged the crime of capital murder with the underlying felony of sexual battery, because it failed to include the language, "without his consent." Count 1 charged Fuqua with capital murder with the predicate felony of sexual battery, not for sexual battery alone. For capital murders with underlying felonies other than burglary, naming the underlying felony in the indictment is sufficient to put the defendant on notice of the crime charged. Therefore, Fuqua's indictment was not defective for failure to include the essential elements of sexual battery. Issue 2: Defense theories Fuqua argues that he was prevented from developing several theories of defense including: accidental death during consensual rough sex, death as a result of the victim's own negligence, Fuqua's duress at the hands of his co-defendant, and the lesser offense of manslaughter by culpable negligence. The State filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of sexual relations between the victim and Fuqua prior to the date of the crime pursuant to M.R.E. 412. The court found that evidence of sexual behavior that occurred prior to February 16, 2002, was not relevant. Fuqua argues that past sexual battery is a continuing episodic event such as child abuse. Consensual sex between adults on prior occasions is certainly not, by any stretch of the imagination, comparable to episodic child abuse. All that was relevant regarding sexual relations at this trial was whether the victim consented to the shocking abuses visited upon him on February 16, 2002. In addition, Fuqua was allowed a fair opportunity for cross-examination of the State's witnesses in order to develop his defense theories and, therefore, he was not prejudiced. Issue 3: Duress instruction Fuqua argues that the court erred in refusing his proffered jury instruction on duress. Duress is not a legal defense to murder. Assuming arguendo that duress were a defense, there was no evidence at trial to support a finding that Fuqua's death or serious bodily injury was imminent, or that Fuqua was not negligent by placing himself in such a situation. Issue 4: Admission of evidence Fuqua argues that the court erred in allowing the admission of a homemade glass shank, because its admission was extremely prejudicial. The State made no showing that the shank had been used to harm the victim. However, the shank was found by investigators in close proximity with other items that were used to commit the crime. Thus, the shank was at least minimally relevant under M.R.E. 401 as part of the surrounding scene or picture of the crime. Under the particular facts of this case, since there was no showing by the State that the shank was used to commit the crime, the shank was of minimal probative value. If, at the time the State proffered the shank, the court had been aware that there was no evidence the shank was used to harm Fuqua, the court certainly would have been within its discretion in excluding the shank pursuant to M.R.E. 403 as more prejudicial than probative. Since the evidence against Fuqua was overwhelming, even if the admission of the shank was error, such error was harmless. Issue 5: Sufficiency of evidence Fuqua argues that all of the witnesses testified that the sex was consensual and, therefore, the State failed to prove the predicate felony of sexual battery. After reviewing the evidence in the record, it is manifest that Fuqua intended to beat the victim. An eyewitness testified about whether the oral sex had become nonconsensual. Moreover, testimony established that the victim was beaten so severely that his head swelled up “like a pumpkin” and that he had been battered so badly that he could not open his mouth. This is sufficient to support the verdict. Issue 6: Amendment of indictment Fuqua argues that, by failing to enter an order amending the indictment to charge Fuqua as a habitual offender, the amendment by the State at trial was ineffective and could not have been used in sentencing. Due to Fuqua’s failure to object at trial, this issue is procedurally barred.


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