Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison
| Docket Number: | 2003-IA-00743-SCT Linked Case(s): 2003-IA-00743-SCT |
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| Oral Argument: | 12-13-2004 | |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 05-05-2005 Opinion Author: Dickinson, J. Holding: Affirmed in Part, Vacated in Part and Remanded |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Negligence - Subject matter jurisdiction - Ecclesiastical matters - Discovery - Physician/Psychotherapist-Patient privilege - M.R.E. 503 - Priest-Penitent privilege - M.R.E. 505 - Attorney-Client privilege - M.R.E. 502 - Work Product privilege - M.R.C.P. 26(b)(3) Judge(s) Concurring: Waller and Cobb, P.JJ., and Carlson, J. Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz and Randolph, JJ. Dissenting Author : Smith, C.J. Dissent Joined By : Joined in Part by Easley, J. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Easley, J., Concurs in Part and Dissents in Part Without Separate Written Opinion Concurs in Result Only: Graves, J. Procedural History: Interlocutory Appeal Nature of the Case: CIVIL - OTHER |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 03-31-2003 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: Winston Kidd Disposition: The trial court later denied the motion to dismiss and ordered all documents and interrogatory responses produced to the Morrisons. Case Number: 251-02-744CIV |
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| Consolidated: Consolidated with 2003-IA-00744-SCT Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson, Mississippi, and Bishop William R. Houck v. Kenneth Morrison, Francis Morrison, Thomas Morrison, and Dorothy Morrison; Hinds Circuit Court 1st District; LC Case #: 251-02-744C11; Ruling Date: 04/18/2003; Ruling Judge: Winston Kidd | ||
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson, Mississippi |
JOHN JEFFREY TROTTER, JANET McMURTRAY, L. MARTIN NUSSBAUM, ERIC V. HALL |
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| Appellee: | Kenneth Morrison | JOHN F. HAWKINS, CHRISTINA CARROLL, DAVID WAYNE BARIA, ORLANDO RODRIQUEZ RICHMOND, ANTHONY RENARD SIMON, MARY MARVEL FYKE |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Negligence - Subject matter jurisdiction - Ecclesiastical matters - Discovery - Physician/Psychotherapist-Patient privilege - M.R.E. 503 - Priest-Penitent privilege - M.R.E. 505 - Attorney-Client privilege - M.R.E. 502 - Work Product privilege - M.R.C.P. 26(b)(3) |
| Summary of the Facts: | This is a suit brought by a mother and her three children, the Morrisons, against the Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson, arising out of alleged sexual abuse of the children by George Broussard, then a priest of the Diocese. During discovery, the Morrisons propounded certain interrogatories and requests for documents, files and information, regarding other claims and incidents of sexual molestation of children by priests. The Diocese filed written objections to these requests, claiming various privileges. Additionally, the Diocese filed a motion pursuant to M.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) seeking dismissal of the lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court denied the motion to dismiss and ordered all documents and interrogatory responses produced to the Morrisons. The Diocese filed petitions seeking interlocutory appeals of both orders which the Supreme Court granted. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Subject matter jurisdiction The Diocese argues that our courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over such causes of action against religious institutions. The Diocese may ordain whomever it concludes is worthy, and it may engage in whatever religious speech it desires. But if it has specific knowledge that children within its care are in danger of sexual molestation, and if it has the authority, power and ability to protect those children from that known danger of abuse and molestation, it is for a jury to determine whether it took reasonable steps to protect the children. The Morrisons’ claims are more about the duty to protect the children than specific methods employed to supervise priests. Enforcing the duty to protect against sexual molestation of children will not excessively entangle the courts in religious matters. The causes of action in this case are civil conspiracy; breach of fiduciary duty; intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress; fraud and fraudulent concealment; negligent hiring, assignment and retention; negligent misrepresentation; negligent supervision; and loss of consortium. Each cause of action requires a finding that the Diocese either took action it should not have taken, or failed to take action it should have taken, with respect to Broussard’s alleged predilection for sexually molesting children. The wrongful act alleged in the case(for purposes of the vicarious liability claim) is sexual molestation of children. There is nothing remotely religious or ecclesiastical about such reprehensible conduct. And since, according to the affidavits, linethe Diocese enjoyed substantial power and control over the actions of Broussard, the Morrisons are not foreclosed from bringing their claim of vicarious liability against the Diocese because of an absence of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs’ claim of negligent hiring, retention and supervision of Broussard is simply a negligence claim, requiring a finding of duty, breach of duty, causation and damage. The Establishment Clause does not per se prevent civil courts from exercising jurisdiction over such claims. A civil trial may require some inquiry into the relationship between the Diocese and Broussard to learn its nature and extent. However, the court’s inquiry will end at learning whether the Diocese had the authority and power over Broussard to do that which our common law says should have been done, given the extent of knowledge and information available to it. Valid, neutral laws which regulate conduct the State is free to regulate will be upheld against all institutions, including those of a religious nature. The tort laws of Mississippi are valid, neutral laws which regulate conduct the State is free to regulate, and such laws must be upheld against all institutions, including the Diocese. When a civil right depends upon an ecclesiastical matter, it is the civil court and not the ecclesiastical which is to decide. But the civil tribunal tries the civil right, and no more, taking the ecclesiastical decisions out of which the civil right arises as it finds them. The Diocese argues that the breach of fiduciary duty claim is no more than an action for clergy malpractice. This case is not about clergy malpractice. It involves no claim that Broussard was negligent or incompetent in the rendering of religious services or priestly advice. In fact, many of the instances of molestation are alleged to have taken place at the Morrisons’ home and lake house, unrelated to any church activity. Although a priest may not be held to be in a fiduciary relationship merely based upon his status as a priest, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is not prohibited by the First Amendment. The affidavits submitted by the Diocese make clear that the Diocese had the power and authority to remove Broussard from his position at the Church. Whether the Diocese had sufficient knowledge and information to obligate it to refuse to hire and/or retain Broussard is a question of fact to be decided at trial. As a matter of law, a fiduciary duty did not exist merely because Broussard was the Morrisons’ priest. However, it may have existed for other reasons. With regard to the claim of fraudulent concealment, a church may not hide behind the first amendment when perpetrating fraud upon the public or its members. Regardless of what policies or practices may have been adopted by the Diocese, it may be held liable for negligence if the Morrisons can establish the elements of such a claim. In addition, the Morrisons are not barred from presenting their claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in circuit court. The mother’s loss of consortium claim is also not barred. Issue 2: Discovery The Diocese argues that various privileges apply to the requested responses and documents, including Physician/Psychotherapist-Patient, Self-Critical Analysis, Priest-Penitent, Attorney-Client, Work Product, and First Amendment. Also, the Diocese claims it is privileged from violation of privacy rights arising from Canon law. In certain cases of alleged sexual molestation of children, the Diocese referred the accused priest and the victim to doctors and therapists for treatment and counseling. While it is true that the priests and victims waived the privilege, allowing disclosure of the information to the Diocese, there is no evidence or indication that the waivers were intended to be general. Therefore, the documents in the possession of the Diocese which qualify under M.R.E. 503(b) remain privileged, and may not be produced to the Morrisons, absent a waiver pursuant to Rule 503©. The Diocese argues that documents it created for the purpose of self-analysis and criticism should be protected from disclosure as a matter of public policy. No federal or state court has recognized this privilege. Thus, self-critical documents may not be included in the privilege log. The Diocese also seeks protection from production of certain documents pursuant to the Priest-Penitent privilege of M.R.E. 505. This privilege does not apply unless the communication was made to a clergyman in his or her professional character as spiritual adviser. Most of the documents claimed to be protected were clearly not directed to anyone in their professional character as spiritual adviser. Such documents are therefore not protected by this privilege. The Diocese asserts the attorney-client privilege under M.R.E. 502 for numerous documents which do not qualify. The work product privilege of M.R.C.P. 26(b)(3) protects documents prepared in anticipation of litigation, unless the party seeking discovery has a substantial need of the materials and is unable without undue hardship to obtain the equivalent of the materials by other means. With respect to the meetings of the Investigative Review Committee, the privilege may partially protect some of the minutes. There is no privilege under the First Amendment to refuse to produce religious-oriented documents. No statute, regulation, or case in Mississippi has adopted the Doctrine of Church Autonomy as a bar to discovery. The decision by the trial court ordering the Diocese to produce all documents and interrogatory responses is an abuse of discretion. However, the failure of the Diocese to precisely assert privilege as to particular documents resulted in a difficult task for the trial judge which, in turn, resulted in an order that all documents be produced. The Diocese is directed to produce within 30 days of the issuance of this Court’s mandate all interrogatory responses and documents it does not, in good faith, claim are privileged. For documents and responses it claims are privileged, the Diocese must provide to the trial court a detailed privilege log in which each such response and document, and portion of a response or document, claimed to be privileged is listed and identified by file name, document number, and privilege claimed. |
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