Bledsoe v. State
| Docket Number: | 2002-KA-01409-COA Linked Case(s): 2002-KA-01409-COA |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 01-20-2004 Opinion Author: Thomas, J. Holding: AFFIRMED |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Armed robbery - Identifications - Weight of evidence - Continuance - Section 99 15 29 - Exclusion of testimony Judge(s) Concurring: McMillin, C.J., King and Southwick, P.JJ., Bridges, Lee, Irving, Myers, Chandler and Griffis, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 05-02-2002 Appealed from: Calhoun County Circuit Court Judge: Henry L. Lackey Disposition: JOHNSON: CONVICTION OF ARMED ROBBERY, SENTENCED TO THIRTY-FIVE YEARS; BLEDSOE: CONVICTION OF ARMED ROBBERY AND SENTENCED TO THIRTY-FIVE YEARS AS AN HABITUAL OFFENDER IN CUSTODY OF MDOC. District Attorney: James M. Hood, III Case Number: CK2001-108B |
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| Consolidated: 2002-KA-01406-COA Arnold Jeffrey Johnson v. State of Mississippi; Calhoun Circuit Court; LC Case #: CK2001-108C; Ruling Date: 05/02/2002; Ruling Judge: Henry L. Lackey | ||
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Lester Bledsoe |
JAMES P. VANCE
B. LEON JOHNSON |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BILLY L. GORE |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Armed robbery - Identifications - Weight of evidence - Continuance - Section 99 15 29 - Exclusion of testimony |
| Summary of the Facts: | Lester Bledsoe and Arnold Johnson were convicted of armed robbery. Both were sentenced to thirty five years' imprisonment as habitual offenders. Both appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Identifications Bledsoe and Johnson argue that the identifications of them should have been suppressed because the photo array shown to the eyewitnesses was unduly suggestive. Unnecessarily suggestive pretrial identification procedures are proscribed where a substantial likelihood of misidentification exists. Here, the photographs used were mug shots, a common practice in putting together photo arrays for identification procedures which, in and of itself, does not equal a suggestive procedure. Actually, the eyewitnesses identified the suspects from the newspaper. These identifications were not in any fashion connected with State activity. The subsequent photo array, which did nothing but satisfy a law enforcement procedure, was immaterial to the actual identification by the witnesses. Issue 2: Weight of evidence Johnson and Bledsoe list a number of reasons why the identifications made by the eyewitnesses should not be trusted. The weight and worth of any witness's testimony is a matter left to the jury. Although Bledsoe and Johnson had ample opportunity to attempt to impeach the testimony of the witnesses and did so with great vigor, the jury obviously believed the witnesses. Issue 3: Continuance Johnson and Bledsoe argue that the court erred in denying their motion for a continuance which they made on the basis of a new witness whose statement required further investigation; the need for time to obtain an expert in the field of mistaken identification; and the necessity of having the suppression hearing transcript before trial in order to prepare for cross examination of the eyewitnesses. Section 99 15 29 provides that the application for a continuance must include the names and addresses of the absent witnesses and what facts the witness is expected to provide. Johnson and Bledsoe did not name witnesses or state what facts were peculiarly within the unnamed witnesses' knowledge. Therefore, the motion was properly denied. Also, denial of the motion for the purpose of obtaining an expert on misidentifications was not an abuse of discretion since both defendants had known for months that the basis of the State's case rested upon the identifications. Issue 4: Exclusion of testimony Johnson and Bledsoe argue that the court erred in excluding testimony by the mother of the third man indicted for the robbery and whose own criminal case had been severed from that of Johnson and Bledsoe. Because the whereabouts as well as the mental capacity of the third defendant is not relevant to the defense of Johnson and Bledsoe, the court did not err in excluding the testimony. |
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