Renfrow v. State


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Docket Number: 2002-KA-00602-COA
Linked Case(s): 2002-KA-00602-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Date: 01-20-2004
Opinion Author: Griffis, J.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Sexual battery - Child testimony - Hearsay - M.R.E. 803(25) - Indictment - Jury instruction - Ineffective assistance of counsel
Judge(s) Concurring: McMillin, C.J., King and Southwick, P.JJ., Bridges, Thomas, Lee, Irving, Myers and Chandler, JJ.
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 03-28-2002
Appealed from: Lauderdale County Circuit Court
Judge: Larry Eugene Roberts
District Attorney: Bilbo Mitchell
Case Number: 457-01

Note: Link Inactive

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Harland Craig Renfrow








 

Appellee: State of Mississippi  

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Topic: Sexual battery - Child testimony - Hearsay - M.R.E. 803(25) - Indictment - Jury instruction - Ineffective assistance of counsel

Summary of the Facts: The motion for rehearing is granted, and this opinion is substituted for the original opinion. Harland Renfrow was convicted of sexual battery of a three-year-old female child and was sentenced to life. He appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Child testimony Renfrow argues that he was denied a fair trial because the child was allowed to take the witness stand without first having been qualified as a competent witness. Although the court did not conduct a preliminary investigation of the child to determine competency, it was not required to do so. In addition, Renfrow has not demonstrated that the judge abused his discretion. Renfrow also argues that he was denied his constitutional right to confront the child. The court struck the child's testimony and instructed the jury to disregard the comments of the child. Since the child's testimony was stricken from the record, there was no need or basis for the court to allow cross-examination. Renfrow also argues that it was error to admit the child’s hearsay statements concerning the cause of the injuries. Because the judge followed the proper procedure required by M.R.E. 803(25), he did not abuse his discretion in allowing this testimony. Issue 2: Indictment Renfrow argues that the indictment was flawed because it named the instrument used to injure the child as a "foreign object." Use of the term "foreign object" gave Renfrow sufficient notice that an object used in the crime would be introduced into evidence. The term “foreign object” was broad enough to include a sex toy or vibrator, regardless of how it was described, as well as a baby bottle, which was Renfrow’s theory about how the child was injured. Renfrow also argues that the court erred in admitting the vibrator into evidence. A doctor testified that the vibrator introduced at trial was consistent with the child's injuries but that the toy baby bottle was not consistent with the injuries, as claimed by the defendant. Based on this testimony, the court did not err in determining that the prejudicial effect of admitting the vibrator into evidence did not outweigh its probative value. Issue 3: Jury instruction Renfrow argues that it was error for the State's instruction on the elements of the crime to refer to the child as the victim. Because Renfrow did not object to this language, the issue is procedurally barred. Issue 4: Ineffective assistance of counsel Renfrow argues that his counsel was ineffective when he stated during voir dire that the defendant could be released on a technicality even though the proof showed him guilty, failed to eliminate the term “victim” from an instruction, and failed to object to the judge's assistance to the prosecution in the testimony of a witness concerning the photographs that were introduced into evidence. Renfrow has failed to show any probability that the outcome would have been different but for his counsel's comments during voir dire. He simply relies on conclusory statements. The jury was free to determine that the child was the victim of a crime and that the injuries she sustained were not accidental. Even if counsel had objected, Renfrow has failed to demonstrate that the outcome would probably have been different. With regard to the photograph, the photograph in issue was relevant to the child's injuries and there was no abuse of discretion by the court in admitting it.


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