Smith v. Smith


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Docket Number: 2001-CA-00905-COA
Linked Case(s): 2001-CA-00905-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 01-27-2004
Opinion Author: Thomas, J.
Holding: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART

Additional Case Information: Topic: Modification of divorce judgment - Parol evidence
Judge(s) Concurring: McMillin, C.J., King and Southwick, P.JJ., Bridges, Lee, Irving, Myers, Chandler and Griffis, JJ.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 03-23-2001
Appealed from: Lee County Chancery Court
Judge: John C. Ross, Jr.
Disposition: THOMAS SMITH'S REQUEST FOR REDUCTION OF SUPPORT DENIED. MARY JANE SMITH'S COUNTER-CLAIM FOR $15,000 DENIED. THOMAS SMITH ORDERED TO REIMBURSE MARY JANE $167.43 FOR THE PAYMENT OF AN AIRLINE TICKET.
Case Number: 00-1124

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Mary Jane Smith




CHARLES R. BRETT



 

Appellee: Thomas Smith J. MARK SHELTON JANA L. DAWSON  

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Topic: Modification of divorce judgment - Parol evidence

Summary of the Facts: Thomas Smith filed a complaint for modification and other relief from a divorce judgment and agreement of the Superior Court of Santa Clara, California, in the Lee County Chancery Court. Mary Jane Smith filed a counter-claim alleging that Thomas was in contempt for failure to pay her $15,000. The chancellor denied Thomas' request for modification, held that Thomas was not in arrears as to thepayment of $15,000, and ordered Thomas to reimburse Mary Jane $167.43 for a plane ticket he deducted from one of her monthly checks. Mary Jane appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Mary Jane argues that the court erred in allowing Thomas to produce evidence which showed that he had paid a joint tax liability in the amount of $30,000, and argue that his payment of that liability fulfilled a debt of $15,000 which Mary Jane claimed he owed. Under the parol evidence rule, where a contract is not ambiguous, the intention of the contracting parties should be taken solely from the wording of the contract. Parol evidence of the intention of the parties may be received to clear up an ambiguity by reason of which, such intention is not definitely expressed. Here, the parties entered into a 1998 written agreement which clearly and unambiguously laid out the payment of the taxes by Thomas and the repayment from an IRA by Mary Jane. It also discussed the equalization of two life insurance policies which would require Thomas to pay Mary Jane $15,000. The chancery court allowed Thomas to testify to an oral agreement which allegedly occurred in December 1997, more than six months before the June 1998 final decree was entered. The intention of the parties should have been taken from the wording of the contract. Therefore, the judgment is reversed and rendered.


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