Ferro v. Ferro
| Docket Number: | 2002-CA-01774-COA Linked Case(s): 2002-CA-01774-COA |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 02-03-2004 Opinion Author: Chandler, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce: Habitual cruel and inhuman treatment - Equitable division of assets - Rehabilitative alimony - Attorney’s fees Judge(s) Concurring: McMillin, C.J., King and Southwick, P.JJ., Bridges, Thomas, Lee, Irving, Myers and Griffis, JJ. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 03-22-2002 Appealed from: Hancock County Chancery Court Judge: Sanford R. Steckler Disposition: HUSBAND GRANTED DIVORCE ON GROUNDS OF CRUEL AND INHUMAN TREATMENT AND ASSETS DIVIDED. Case Number: 00-0004 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Margie Nell Ferro |
JOSEPH R. MEADOWS |
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| Appellee: | Robert Charles Ferro | DEAN HOLLEMAN |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Divorce: Habitual cruel and inhuman treatment - Equitable division of assets - Rehabilitative alimony - Attorney’s fees |
| Summary of the Facts: | Charles Ferro was granted a divorce from Margie Ferro on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. The court divided the parties' assets, and awarded Margie rehabilitative alimony for a period of a year. Margie appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Habitual cruel and inhuman treatment Margie argues that the court erred in granting a divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Habitual cruel and inhuman treatment may be established by a showing of conduct that either endangers life, limb or health, or creates a reasonable apprehension of such danger, rendering the relationship unsafe for the party seeking relief, or is so unnatural and infamous as to make the marriage revolting to the non-offending spouse. Margie allowed her thirty-six year old adult son to live in the marital abode for extended periods over the objections of her husband. Her son has even gone so far as to physically attack and injure Charles in his own home. The son’s presence has placed Charles in reasonable apprehension of life, limb and health, and Margie’s disregard for Charles's safety and well being is nothing short of brutal. The evidence is sufficient to establish grounds for a divorce based on habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Issue 2: Equitable division of assets Margie argues that the court erred in setting the value of the couple’s business at fifty thousand dollars. The law of this state requires equitable, not equal, distribution of the marital estate which is based on both spouses' contributions during the marriage. Although the chancellor awarded Margie a one-third interest of the business which was approximately seventeen thousand dollars, Margie also owns non-marital real property with improvements valued at fifty-eight thousand dollars. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion. Margie also argues that the court’s order regarding the sale of the parties’ homestead is unworkable. The court’s order that the proceeds from the sale of the home be split and that both parties do everything to protect the investment was not an abuse of discretion. Issue 3: Rehabilitative alimony Margie argues that the award of rehabilitative alimony for a year in the amount of five hundred dollars per month is error. Margie has skills as an insurance agent and computer operator. The evidence did not support any medical disability that would inhibit her from gainful employment. In addition, many of the expenses claimed are a result of supporting a household consisting of Margie and her thirty-six year old son. The chancellor clearly examined the income tax returns and financial declarations of the parties and considered Margie's need for financial security as well as her earning capacity. Therefore, there is no error. Issue 4: Attorney’s fees Both parties argue that the chancellor abused his discretion in denying them attorney's fees. In assessing the appropriateness of an award, the chancellor should consider the relative financial ability of the parties. Here, the court properly found each party had sufficient assets from which to pay their respective fees. |
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