Broomfield, et al. v. State
| Docket Number: | 2002-KA-00421-COA Linked Case(s): 2002-CT-00421-SCT ; 2002-CT-00421-SCT ; 2002-KA-00421-COA |
|
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 02-24-2004 Opinion Author: Griffis, J. |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Armed robbery - Sufficiency of evidence - Section 97-3-79 - Section 97-1-7 - Admission of statement - Admission of wallet - Mistrial - Severance - Lesser included offense instruction Judge(s) Concurring: McMillin, C.J., Southwick, P.J., Myers and Chandler, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz, J. Dissenting Author : King, P.J., and Irving, J. Dissenting Author : Lee, J. Dissent Joined By : Bridges and Thomas, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 03-05-2002 Appealed from: Harrison County Circuit Court Judge: Stephen Simpson Disposition: GUILTY OF ARMED ROBBERY District Attorney: Cono A. Caranna, II Case Number: B2401-01-00414 |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Jerrod Ashton Broomfield and Marquise Leon Flewellen |
GLENN F. RISHEL
JAMES F. THOMPSON
HARRY B. WARD |
||
| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: DEIRDRE MCCRORY |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Armed robbery - Sufficiency of evidence - Section 97-3-79 - Section 97-1-7 - Admission of statement - Admission of wallet - Mistrial - Severance - Lesser included offense instruction |
| Summary of the Facts: | The motion for rehearing is denied, and this opinion is substituted for the original opinion. Marquise Flewellen, Jerrod Broomfield and Douglas Moody were charged with armed robbery and were tried as co-defendants. The jury convicted Broomfield and Flewellen, but was unable to reach a verdict on the charges against Moody. Broomfield and Flewellen appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Sufficiency of evidence Broomfield and Flewellen argue that the proof was insufficient to establish that they possessed the requisite intent to commit a robbery because there was no direct evidence that they demanded or took any items. Section 97-3-79 provides that a person may be convicted of armed robbery if an attempt is made. Section 97-1-7 contemplates a crime for attempt to commit any offense if the person makes any overt act toward the commission of the crime, but for whatever reason he fails to complete the necessary acts. An inference of the intent to steal may arise from proof of the breaking and entering. Therefore, an inference of the intent to take or steal may arise from the evidence of Flewellen’s and Broomfield’s unlawful entry. The jury was free to infer that the plan to commit armed robbery was spoiled when they encountered continuous screams and unexpected resistence. Likewise, the jury was also free to infer that there was an attempt to take the watch or other personal property. The issue of intent is a factual determination and is within the exclusive province of the jury. Considering all of the circumstances, it was a logical inference or presumption for the jury to find that Broomfield and Flewellen had the necessary intent. Issue 2: Admission of statement Broomfield and Flewellen argue that the court erred in admitting a redacted version of a statement Broomfield made to a deputy, because it violated his co-defendants' right to cross-examine witnesses. Because the right to cross-examination may not be vicariously asserted, Broomfield has no standing to assert this issue. Generally, to avoid violating the defendant's right to confront witnesses against him, out-of-court statements by a co-defendant which incriminate the defendant should not be admitted into evidence during the State's case-in-chief since it cannot be known whether the co-defendant will testify, and be subject to cross-examination. The judge must answer the question of whether a particular confession is or is not powerfully incriminating on a case-by-case basis. In this case, Broomfield's statement neither directly mentioned Flewellen nor implicated Flewellen in any criminal activity. The statement was not incriminating on its face. Issue 3: Admission of wallet Broomfield and Flewellen argue that the court erred in admitting Flewellen’s wallet into evidence, because there was no evidence offered to show that the swipe card in the wallet was used in the commission of the crime. Articles such as tools and weapons found near the place or scene of crime or near the place where the defendant was arrested are admissible where the evidence has probative weight or constitute a part of the surrounding scene or picture. Because the evidence connected Flewellen with the crime and constituted part of the surrounding scene, there was no error in its admission. Issue 4: Mistrial Flewellen argues that the court erred in overruling his motions for mistrial which were made because a juror possibly saw him in the holding cell during the lunch break, Bloomfield's reply that "he sat in the car" was prejudicial, and an officer's statement about there being a report of an armed robbery was improper. With regard to his first motion, Flewellen never actually moved for a mistrial and failed to bring it up at a later time. Therefore, it is abandoned. The admission of Bloomfield's redacted statement was not error and so is not grounds for a mistrial. With regard to his third motion, Flewellen has failed to show how he was prejudiced. Issue 5: Severance Flewellen argues that the court erred in not granting him a severance. It is not error to deny a severance where the evidence goes to the guilt of both defendants. Here, there does not appear to be any conflict of interest between Bloomfield and Flewellen, and the evidence introduced at trial supported the guilt of both defendants. Issue 6: Lesser included offense instruction Flewellen argues that the jury was instructed improperly with regard to a lesser included offense. Because he did not ask for the jury to be instructed on a lesser offense, the jury was properly instructed. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
