White v. White
| Docket Number: | 2003-CA-00171-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 03-23-2004 Opinion Author: Lee, J. Holding: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce: Habitual cruel and inhuman treatment - Equitable distribution - Retirement - Alimony - Attorney’s fees - Bonus - Temporary support - Life insurance Judge(s) Concurring: McMillin, C.J., King and Southwick, P.JJ., Bridges, Thomas, Myers, Chandler and Griffis, JJ. Judge(s) Concurring Separately: Irving, J., joined by Bridges and Chandler, JJ. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 11-20-2001 Appealed from: Harrison County Chancery Court Judge: Walter Wesley Teel Disposition: GRANTED DIVORCE TO APPELLANT AND AWARDED CHILD SUPPORT, ALIMONY, AND 50% OF APPELLEE'S STOCKS. Case Number: 00-00015 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Deborah Stewart White |
BETSY E. WALKER |
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| Appellee: | Douglas Bryans White | HARRY M. YOSTE |
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| Topic: | Divorce: Habitual cruel and inhuman treatment - Equitable distribution - Retirement - Alimony - Attorney’s fees - Bonus - Temporary support - Life insurance |
| Summary of the Facts: | Douglas White filed for divorce from Deborah White on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. Deborah counterclaimed for divorce on the grounds of adultery, habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, or, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences. The chancellor granted Deborah a divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. The chancellor awarded both parties joint legal custody of the couple’s children, with primary physical custody awarded to Deborah, ordered Douglas to pay lump sum alimony and child support, and awarded Deborah fifty percent of each of Douglas's financial investments, including his retirement account. Deborah appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Equitable distribution Deborah argues that the chancellor never made a division of the marital and nonmarital assets as required by Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921 (Miss. 1994). In his order, the chancellor clearly articulated his rationale for the equitable division of the marital estate. The parties were married almost twenty years and neither argued that any of their assets should be considered non-marital property. Although the chancellor did not specifically describe the assets as marital, he implicitly did so in trying to equitably divide the assets. Issue 2: Retirement Deborah argues that Douglas' National Guard retirement should have been included as a marital asset. According to one of Douglas' exhibits, he had been in the National Guard for twenty-four years at the time of the trial. It was incumbent upon Douglas to provide proof when submitting his financial disclosure form, and it was error for the chancellor not to request that information from Douglas before equitably dividing the parties' assets. Issue 3: Alimony Deborah argues that she should have been awarded periodic alimony or, in the alternative, a greater amount of lump sum alimony. In deciding whether to award alimony, the court should consider the income and expenses of the parties, the health and earning capacities of the parties, the needs of each party, the obligations and assets of each party, the length of the marriage, the presence or absence of minor children in the home, the age of the parties, the standard of living of the parties during the marriage and at support determination, the tax consequences of the spousal support order, fault or misconduct, wasteful dissipation of assets by either party, and any other equitable factors. The chancellor determined that Deborah was assuming a greater debt than Douglas, noted that Deborah needed assistance in caring for the children, that she had been out of the work force for a few years, and that Douglas' financial means were greater. Therefore, the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in awarding the lump sum alimony. Issue 4: Attorney's fees Deborah argues that the chancellor erred in not awarding her attorney's fees. Factors to be considered in making an award of attorneys' fees include the financial ability of the parties, the skill and standing of the attorney employed, the nature of the case and novelty and difficulty of the questions at issue, the time and labor required, the customary charge in the community, and the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case. Here, Deborah offers no proof of her inability to pay nor does she present any evidence as to the amount of her attorneys' fees. Therefore, the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in failing to award fees. Issue 5: Bonus Deborah argues that the chancellor erred in not including Douglas' 2000 bonus as marital property. At trial, Douglas testified that he did receive a bonus in 2000; however, the details as to the exact amount of the bonus were not clear in the record. Since this bonus was probably either used to help pay temporary support to Deborah or to lessen the family debt, the court did not abuse its discretion. Issue 6: Temporary support Deborah argues that the chancellor erred in not granting her $990 of temporary support arrearage she alleged was due. Although the temporary order awarded Deborah $870 per month, Deborah claims that there was a verbal agreement between the parties that Douglas would pay $1200 per month until trial. The chancellor stated that he would give the verbal agreement such weight as it deserves. His finding that Douglas was not in arrears is not an abuse of discretion. Issue 7: Life insurance The chancellor ordered Douglas to maintain the minor children as permanent beneficiaries on two separate life insurance policies with Deborah as trustee until the children reach the age of twenty-one. Deborah argues that that Douglas cannot be compelled to make his children the beneficiaries of his National Guard Servicemen's Group Life Insurance policy. Douglas' minor children were already named as beneficiaries of the SGLI policy prior to the chancellor's order that he keep the children as such. Since Douglas is still alive and has not changed the primary beneficiaries on the policy, the chancellor's actions did not constitute reversible error. |
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