Richardson v. Cornes


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Docket Number: 2002-CA-01485-COA
Linked Case(s): 2002-CT-01485-SCT ; 2002-CT-01485-SCT ; 2002-CA-01485-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 05-18-2004
Opinion Author: Irving, J.
Holding: REVERSED AND REMANDED ON BOTH DIRECT AND CROSS-APPEAL

Additional Case Information: Topic: Wills & estates - Inheritance by father from illegitimate child - Section 91-1-15 (3) (a)- (d) - Estoppel - Attorney’s fees
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Thomas, Lee and Chandler, JJ.
Dissenting Author : Southwick, P.J., and Griffis, J., would grant.
Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Griffis, J.
Concur in Part, Dissent in Part Joined By 1: Bridges and Southwick, P.JJ. And Myers, J.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 07-03-2002
Appealed from: Bolivar County Chancery Court
Judge: William Willard
Disposition: DENIED BERNICE RICHARDSON'S PETITION TO DISINHERIT BIOLOGICAL FATHER AND HIS KINDRED.
Case Number: 96-0300

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: In the Matter of the Estate of Kela Richardson, Deceased: Bernice Richardson, Administratrix of the Estate of Kela Richardson




ELLIS TURNAGE TAMEKIA ROCHELLE GOLIDAY



 

Appellee: Virgil Cornes, Jr., Individually and as the Natural Father and Duly Appointed Guardian of Virgil Cornes, III, a Minor, Jerome Cornes and Julian Cornes WILLIAM HARVEY GRESHAM  

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Topic: Wills & estates - Inheritance by father from illegitimate child - Section 91-1-15 (3) (a)- (d) - Estoppel - Attorney’s fees

Summary of the Facts: Bernice Richardson, in her capacity as the administratrix of the estate of her deceased daughter, Kela Richardson, filed a petition to disinherit Virgil Cornes, Jr., Kela’s biological father, and his three children, Jerome Cornes, Julian Cornes, and Virgil Cornes, III, because Virgil Cornes, Jr. had not acknowledged and supported Kela during her lifetime. The chancellor denied the petition, on the basis that Richardson had previously filed pleadings in which she alleged that the Corneses were Kela’s heirs at law and wrongful death beneficiaries. Richardson appeals, and the Corneses cross-appeal.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Estoppel Pursuant to section 91-1-15 (3) (a)- (d), the father of an illegitimate child, and his kindred, may not inherit from the illegitimate child unless the father acknowledged and supported the child during the child's lifetime. In the absence of a clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous waiver of the requirements of the statute by the maternal heirs of an illegitimate child, the natural father, who has not fulfilled his obligations to acknowledge and support the child during the child's lifetime, is prevented from enjoying the benefits of inheritance. Richardson's prior pleading that the Corneses were heirs and wrongful death beneficiaries of Kela does not mean that she was saying, in the same breath, that she waived the statutory requirement that Virgil Cones, Jr. prove his and his children's entitlement to inherit from Kela. At most, Richardson's admission in her pleadings — that Virgil Cornes, Jr. was Kela's natural father and heir — only dispensed with the requirement that he prove paternity. She said nothing about Virgil Cornes, Jr.'s acknowledgment and support of Kela. A waiver should never be found where the specific matter which is alleged to have been waived is not contained on the face of the pleading which allegedly constitutes the waiver. Even if there were a waiver by Richardson, it would only be enforceable against her and not against her children. Even if Richardson made prior inconsistent statements, there is no showing that she received a benefit from any of her prior statements which she now seeks to abandon to the detriment of the Corneses. Issue 2: Attorney’s fees In their cross-appeal, the Corneses argue that the chancellor erred in awarding the administratrix's and attorney's fees because he made no inquiry as to the reasonableness of the fees. The record supports their argument, and the matter of the administratrix's and attorney's fees is remanded for a hearing on the reasonableness of the fees requested.


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