Brink v. State
| Docket Number: | 2002-KA-00583-COA Linked Case(s): 2002-KA-00583-COA |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-15-2004 Opinion Author: Chandler, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Capital murder - Suppression of statement - Funds for DNA testing - Photograph - Character instruction - M.R.E. 404(a)(1) Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Bridges and Southwick, P.JJ., Lee, Myers and Griffis, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Thomas, J. Concurs in Result Only: Irving, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 02-14-2002 Appealed from: Jackson County Circuit Court Judge: Kathy King Jackson Disposition: THE DEFENDANT WAS FOUND GUILTY OF CAPITAL MURDER AND SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE. Case Number: 00-10,059(2) |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Joshua Kevin Brink |
JOSHUA KEVIN BRINK (PRO SE)
ROSS PARKER SIMONS
H. BERNARD GAUTIER |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JEAN SMITH VAUGHAN |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Capital murder - Suppression of statement - Funds for DNA testing - Photograph - Character instruction - M.R.E. 404(a)(1) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Joshua Brink was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Suppression of statement Brink argues that the court erroneously admitted his statement despite evidence that Brink invoked his right to counsel and the statement was coerced by threats, violence and promises of reward. The State makes a prima facie case of voluntariness when an officer, or other person with knowledge of the facts, testifies that the confession was made voluntarily without any threats, coercion, or offer of reward. Here, the State offered the testimony of several officers and Brink's videotaped statement. This case was originally remanded to the lower court to conduct a full suppression hearing and make new findings of fact and conclusions regarding the voluntariness of Brink's videotaped statement. In its opinion on remand, the lower court found that Brink's testimony was rebutted by his statements on the videotape that he was "over" the slapping incident, that he was unafraid of the officers to whom he confessed, and that he just wanted it all to be over. The court also found that testimony of the officers rebutted Brink's allegations of coercion. Given the evidence in the record, the court's finding that Brink's confession was not induced by the slap or by threats was not manifest error or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. With regard to his right to counsel, at the time of Brink's confession, Brink was merely a suspect who had been brought to the sheriff's department for questioning. Therefore, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet attached. However, he had a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation. When an accused invokes the right to counsel, all police questioning must cease until counsel has been made available, unless the accused initiates further communication with the police. Here, Brink's testimony that he invoked the right at the crime scene was contradicted by the testimony of the officers present. Issue 2: Funds for DNA testing Brink argues that the court erred in denying his motion for funds for DNA analysis of sexual assault suspect evidence collection kits and to hire an expert witness to assist in the preparation and presentation of direct evidence regarding the DNA analysis and with cross-examination of any rebuttal experts. In determining whether a criminal defendant is entitled to an independent expert to evaluate DNA evidence, the court should consider the private interest that will be affected by the action of the State, the governmental interest that will be affected if the safeguard is provided, and the probable value of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards are not provided. Although Brink argues that DNA testing could have shown consent or lack of force, his counsel admitted in open court that the DNA evidence at issue could only show the fact of penetration of an orifice, and could not show whether or not the penetration was forcible. In his videotaped statement that was admitted into evidence, Brink admitted to having oral and vaginal sex with the victim. The sole probative value of DNA analysis of the evidence would have consisted of inconclusive support for Brink's contention that he had vaginal and not anal sex with the victim, and this evidence would not have been at all probative of the issue of consent. Issue 3: Photographs Brink argues that the court should have excluded three photographs of the victim, because they were more prejudicial than probative. Photographs have evidentiary value when they aid in describing the circumstances of the killing and the corpus delicti; they describe the location of the body and cause of death; or they supplement or clarify witness testimony. Here, the photographs had evidentiary value since they aided the witnesses who testified about the crime scene and the circumstances of the killing. Issue 4: Character instruction Brink argues that the court erred in denying a proffered instruction regarding Brink's character for peacefulness. Under M.R.E. 404(a)(1), a criminal defendant is entitled to offer his good character as evidence of the improbability that he committed the act charged. However, instructions on general reputation or character of the accused are both argumentative and a comment upon the weight of the testimony. Therefore, Brink was not entitled to any jury instruction that emphasized the evidence of his peaceful character. |
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