## BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE

Appeal From the Chancery Court of Neshoba County, Mississippi
Cause No. 2005-0332

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## CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES

The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed persons have an interest in the out come of this case. The representations are made in order that the Justices of the Court may evaluate possible disqualifications or recusal.

1. William B. Jacob, Esquire
2. Joseph A. Kieronski, Jr., Esquire
3. Daniel P. Self, Jr., Esquire
4. Henry Palmer, Esquire
5. Robert D. Jones
6. Honorable J. Max Kilpatrick
7. Prentiss E. Sellers
8. Nancy Bridges Sellers

THIS the $31^{\Delta t}$ day of July, 2008.

Attorney for Appellee
Attorney for Appellee
Attorney for Appellee
Attorney for the Appellant
Attorney for Appellant
Chancellor, Sixth Chancery
Appellant
Appellee


WILLIAM B. JACOB

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## SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Mr. Sellers argues that lump sum rehabilitative alimony should not have been awarded after a division of marital assets in this cause. It is uncontested that at the time of trial Mr. Sellers was gainfully employed and his wife, Nancy Sellers, was unemployed. She had been a stay at home mom for almost twenty (20) years. She cared for the two (2) minor children of the parties, along with her step-son, Eddie's child by a prior marriage.

Nancy had previously been employed as a dental hygienist. However, due to the requirements Eddie placed upon her to care for the minor children, especially one who suffered from Tourette's Syndrome, Nancy's dental hygienist certificate had lapsed.

The Chancellor went through a lengthy Ferguson analysis in dividing the marital assets and arriving upon an equitable distribution thereof. There was approximately a fifty-three percent (53\%) to forty-seven percent (47\%) advantage that Eddie enjoyed as a result of this equitable distribution.

Since Nancy was unemployed and Eddie was not providing support to her, Nancy was forced to live on credit cards. Additionally, medical expenses, especially Isaac, had been incurred. Since Eddie was the only party employed, the Chancellor assigned the outstanding marital debt to Eddie. Considering the debt, there was an equal division of marital assets.

The Trial Court further went through an analysis of non-marital property. The Trial Court determined that Eddie enjoyed approximately $\$ 138,000.00$ in separate estate and Nancy had just under $\$ 14,000.00$ in separate estate. Combining the equity in the marital assets with the respective separate estates, Eddie enjoyed a sixty-four percent (64\%) to thirty-six percent (36\%) advantage in assets.

Recognizing, that there was substantial shortfall in income and that Nancy was going to be
re-entering the workforce, the Trial Court determined that for a seventeen (17) month time, ending December 2008, Nancy would need some financial assistance from Eddie. This was especially true since she had custody of one of the minor children of the parties. As such, the Trial Court determined that Nancy should receive $\$ 62,600.00$ in lump sum rehabilitative alimony. The Trial Court then offset this award by $\$ 50,000.00$ representing Eddie's one-half ( $1 / 2$ ) interest in the former marital home leaving the sum of $\$ 12,600.00$ to be paid in cash for the support of Nancy and the minor child to which she had custody.

This award was not only equitable, but considered the station and needs of both parties. Contrary to Eddie's assertion, this was in the form of support for Nancy and not as an equalizer. As such, the Chancellor was eminently correct in so awarding.

Eddie next complains about the division of marital assets. Eddie was awarded fifty-three percent $(53 \%)$ of those assets and Nancy only forty-seven percent (47\%). However, since Eddie was the only party employed at the time of trial and Nancy had expended credit card resources in which to live since she was not being supported by Eddie as previously, the Trial Court, in its equitable division, required that Eddie assume the outstanding credit card and medical expense indebtedness. Some of these medical expenses were for the minor child, Isaac, who suffered from Tourette's Syndrome.

After allowing for the division of indebtedness, the Trial Court determined that there was an equal division of assets between the parties.

The Trial Court made this equitable division utilizing the Ferguson factors and went through a lengthy analysis of those factors. Thus, as a result of the above and foregoing, an equitable division of marital assets was obtained from the Chancellor and any complaint that Eddie has regarding same
is without merit.
Eddie goes through a lengthy analysis of "the types of alimony that could be awarded". He concludes that there is no such thing as "lump sum rehabilitative alimony". However, at least two (2) cased from the Appellate Courts from the State of Mississippi have found otherwise.

Ironically, Eddie concedes in his Brief that "a tyrannical exercise in labeling" should not be utilized and the Appellate Court should look to substance rather than label..

That having been said, Eddie launches into this "tyrannical exercise in labeling".
Eddie further argues that the award of lump sum rehabilitative alimony is for the purpose of equalization of assets. However, the Trial Court, not once, but twice, specifically stated that the purpose of this alimony award was for the support of Nancy to enable her to get back into the workforce. This was needed especially in light of her having custody of one of the minor children of the parties who suffers from Tourette's Syndrome. Additionally, this support will end December 2008 based upon the Chancellor's ruling.

Thus, contrary to the generalizations used by Eddie and the erroneous arguments made by him, it is eminently clear that the Chancellor's decision was correct. Further, the decision is completely supported by the record. Finally, the Chancellor's decision contains no clear and unmistakable error. As a result of the above and foregoing, the ruling of the Chancery Court should be affirmed.

Eddie next complains about the amount of child support. He assets that the child support award was based on calculations and computations by the Trial Court. However, nothing could be further from the truth. Eddie complains that the Trial Judge "did not accept his word" for his income. Again, nothing could be further from the truth.

It is elemental that the Chancellor is not bound by an 8.05 financial statement of a party nor
that parties' testimony concerning it. However, in this case, the Trial Judge, for child support purposes, accepted Eddie's financial statement and his testimony.

Eddie's generalizations again gets him in trouble. He tries to mix income for child support purposes and income for alimony purposes. The Chancellor accepted Eddie's computation regarding child support even though the amount should have been greater. The Chancellor awarded child support in the sum of $\$ 490.00$ per month when, based on Eddie's true adjusted gross income the correct amount of child support should have been $\$ 563.00$ per month. Yet, Eddie still complains.

The Chancellor relied upon the appropriate legal authorities, child support guidelines, and upon the financial statement of Eddie in setting the amount of child support. This was done notwithstanding the fact that Eddie's financial statement as to income was incorrect and his financial statement as to his expenses were incorrect.

Therefore, the Chancellor did not abuse his discretion nor was his decision based on any clear or unmistakable error. As such, the decision of the Trial Court should be affirmed.


#### Abstract

ARGUMENT

\section*{STATEMENT OF THE CASE}

This appeal deals with the divorce issues of Prentiss E. Sellers (hereinafter referred to as Eddie), and Nancy Bridges Sellers (hereinafter referred to as Nancy).

This cause was tried before the Chancery Court of Neshoba County, Mississippi pursuant to a Consent for Divorce wherein the parties had agreed to some of the issues, leaving the contested issues to be decided by the Court.

Of those contested issues two (2) of them are the subject of this appeal, namely, the alimony award and the amount of child support.

At the conclusion of the trial, the Chancellor awarded Nancy $\$ 62,600.00$ in lump sum rehabilitative alimony (CP 222, RE 38). The Trial Court also set the amount of child support to be paid by Eddie to Nancy at the sum of $\$ 490.00$ per month (CP 194, RE 10). From these two (2) awards, Eddie appeals the decision of the Trial Court.

The scope of review in domestic relations matters is limited by the familiar substantial evidence/manifest error rule. In Magee v. Magee, 661 So.2d, 1117 (Miss. 1995), the Court stated: "This Court will not disturb the findings of a Chancellor unless the Chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied." (Page 1122).

In Magee (supra), the Court went on to state: "The amount of an alimony award is a matter to a great extent within the discretion of the Chancery Court because of its peculiar opportunity to sense the equities of the situation before it." (Page 1122).

In the case Brennan v. Brennan, 638 So.2d, 1320 (Miss. 1994), this Court held: "We have recently defined 'manifest error' as error that is 'unmistakable, clear,


plain or indisputable'." (Page 1323).
As a result, this scope of review accords great deference to the Chancellor's opinions and findings and this deference remains unless and until there is clear and indisputable evidence presented that the Chancellor incorrectly exercised his discretion within the matter. This is a heavy burden to bear and is extremely difficult to accomplish.

## PROPOSITION I: THE CHANCELLOR CORRECTLY ADDRESSED THE ALIMONY ISSUES OF THE PARTIES

Eddie raised three (3) issues which are virtually synonymous contending that the award of lump sum rehabilitative alimony was improperly made. He addressed these first three (3) issues collectively. However, a collective analytical analysis of multiple issues subjects itself to the use of generalizations. This process of using generalizations will lead to faulty reasoning. This faulty reasoning of Eddie was made throughout his presentation of these three (3) issues. Therefore, Nancy will address these three (3) issues separately.

ISSUE NUMBER 1 - The Awarding of Lump Sum Rehabilitative Alimony After the Division of Marital Assets of the Parties:

The parties agreed that certain issues were contested and were to be decided by the Trial Court. (CP 192-193, RE 8-9).

Contested Area Number 2 dealt with the former marital home; Number 3 dealt with the Karate school, Number 4 dealt with the determination of marital assets, Number 5 dealt with an equitable division of the marital assets and Number 9 dealt with alimony. These Contested Areas were referenced in Eddie's brief but the award of lump sum rehabilitative alimony was the major topic of argument and the area to which reversal is sought by Eddie.

The Chancellor had before him the marital assets of the parties. Likewise, the parties had, for
the most part, agreed on the fair market values of each of these assets. At the conclusion of the trial, the Chancellor made a by item division of these marital assets. (CP 210-213, RE 26-29). After a division was made by the Chancellor, the Trial Court determined that the parties had accumulated $\$ 304,230.00$ worth of assets and assigned $\$ 161,210.00$ to Eddie and $\$ 142,990.00$ to Nancy. Thus, Eddie received approximately fifty-three percent (53\%) of the assets and Nancy only forty-seven percent (47\%). (CP 213, RE 29).

The Trial Court further concluded that:
"Mr. Sellers has a substantial income which has been determined by the Court to be in excess of the amount listed on the 8.05 (Exhibit 3) for purposes of the child support calculation. Once the voluntary retirement plan is added back to his income, he has an adjusted gross income of approximately $\mathbf{\$ 3 , 5 0 0 . 0 0}$." (CP 194, RE 10).

Eddie showed on his 8:05 Financial Statement (Exhibit No. 3) (Attached hereto as Appendix 1) that he had two (2) sources of income. He had salary from his job at the Choctaw Health Center of $\$ 4,279.41$ per month gross. He also showed income from the Karate School of $\$ 200$ per month. Thus, his gross income was in the sum of $\$ 4,479.41$ per month. (See also CP 215, RE 31). He also showed a federal tax refund of $\$ 3,393$ which averages to an additional $\$ 283.75$ per month. With this addition, Eddie's monthly gross income is $\$ 4,762.16$. On Exhibit No. 3, Eddie shows State, Federal and Social Security Taxes of $\$ 738.96$. Therefore, Eddie's Adjusted Gross Income is actually \$4,023.32.

The Trial Court additionally found that Mrs. Sellers had no appreciable income at the time of trial. (CP 195, RE 11). The Trial Court recognized that she had been a stay at home mom for many years taking care of the parties' two (2) children as well as a step-child from a prior relationship of Eddie. One of the children of the parties (namely Isaac), suffers from Tourette's Syndrome (CP

202, RE 18). Further, Nancy, who had been a dental hygienist, lost her certification as such in order to take care of the minor children of the parties hereto. (CP 203, RE 19). Thus, Nancy had been out of the workforce approximately eighteen (18) years during the marriage of the parties.

During the separation of the parties, Nancy had been required to utilize credit cards to maintain her standard of living for herself and her minor child, Isaac. (CP 219, RE 35). As a result of the above and foregoing, the Trial Court addressed certain outstanding expenses, medical bills and credit card debt of the parties, especiaily those used by Nancy for support since she had no income and Eddie was not supporting her. He assigned that debt to Eddie since he was the only employed party before him. (CP 213-214, RE 29-30). The aforesaid debt was subtracted from the total fair market value of the assets of the parties leaving a net equity of $\$ 285,980.00$. Further, after subtracting the aforesaid debt from Eddie's fair market value of the assets awarded, a total equity was awarded to Eddie in the sum of $\$ 142,990.00$ with a like amount awarded Nancy. (CP 214, RE 30). In determining this equitable division of the marital assets, the Trial Court specifically relied upon the case of Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d, 921 (Miss. 1994). (CP 201, RE 17). The Chancellor conducted a lengthy Ferguson analysis regarding equitable distribution. (CP 201-209, RE 17-25). That lengthy analysis led to the above referenced division of marital assets. It should be noted that the marital home being the first item of assets was equally divided between the parties. (CP 210, RE 26).

As required by Ferguson (supra), The Trial Court first made an equitable division of the assets of the parties. Additionally, the Trial Court went through an analysis previously dealing the respective separate estates (non-marital assets) of the parties. The Trial Court then concluded:
"The Court, after equitably dividing the assets and debts and taking into consideration
that Mr. Sellers has a SEPARATE ESTATE of approximately $\$ 137,500.00$ and Mrs. Sellers has a. SEPARATE ESTATE of approximately $\$ 13,620.00$, CONCLUDES THAT THE NEEDS AND FINANCIAL SECURITY OF THE WIFE HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY MET." (CP 215, RE 31).

At this time of the analysis, the respective positions of the parties consisted of the following:

|  | EDDIE | NANCY |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| GROSS MONTHLY <br> INCOME | $\$ 4,762.16$ | $-0-$ |
| EQUITY IN MARITAL <br> ASSETS | $\$ 142,990.00$ | $\$ 142,990.00$ |
| SEPARATE ESTATE | $\$ 137,500.00$ | $\$ 13,620.00$ |
| TOTAL ASSETS | $\$ 280,490.00$ | $\$ 156,610.00$ |
| PERCENTAGE | $64 \%$ | $36 \%$ |

Based upon the above and foregoing it is eminently clear that not only was the Chancellor correct in his conclusion, but also that conclusion was supported by the evidence before him as demonstrated by the above table. Eddie had almost twice the amount of available assets as did Nancy. Further, Nancy was having to re-integrate into the workforce and needed some financial assistance to do so.

Contested Area Number 9 states "Alimony. Whether or not if either party shall receive alimony from the other and, if so, what amount, in what form, and what duration." (CP 193, RE 9).

The Trial Court went through a lengthy analysis using the prior precedent of Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So.2d, 1278 (Miss. 1993) and Cheatham v. Cheatham, 537 So.2nd, 435 (Miss. 1988). (CP 215, RE 31). This analysis was contained within the Court's lengthy Opinion. (CP 215-223, RE 31-39).

Eddie first complains that the income figures relied upon by the Court regarding Eddie's
income was not accurate. He states:
"The lower Court did not rely upon the financial figures provided by Eddie on the stand or in his Rule 8.05 form and income tax return. The Court revised the numbers and crafted new figures, from which it then made the aforesaid awards." (Appellant's Brief Page 20).

As stated previously, generalizations can lead to erroneous statements. Further, the credibility of witnesses is the prevue of the trier of fact. In this case, the trier of fact was the Chancellor. The Chancellor went through a methodical recitation of the inaccuracies of Eddie's testimony and "financial figures" utilized by him in this cause. (CP 215-217, RE 31-33). This methodical analysis included information provided by documentation which included Eddie's gross salary from his place of employment; income from his Karate school; tax returns; depreciation of personal assets; use of personal assets for business deductions; and exaggerated expenses. Thus, not only did Eddie understate his true income, he inflated his expenses associated therewith.(CP 215-217, RE 31-33). On the other hand, Nancy did not commit these errors in testimony.(CP 217, RE 33). This factor weighed heavily upon the Trial Court in its determination of the needs of the respective parties.

Further, it should be remembered that based upon the agreement of the parties, the type, duration and amount of alimony was left to the sound discretion of the Trial Court once a short fall was determined. As such, the Trial Court had to address all of the factors for the various types of alimony and determine, based upon all of the facts presented and the proof elicited, an equitable solution therefrom.

Two (2) major factors were upper most in the mind of the Chancellor. These two (2) factors, after considering the income and assets of the parties, and after an equal and equitable division of the marital assets, along with the disparity in income were (1) to minimize friction between the parties;
and (2) the recognition that Nancy would be returning to the workforce and thus, have her own independent income.

Eddie had testified that he recognized that both parties could no longer live in the former marital home. He further recognized that the Karate school building was closely associated with the former marital home. The Trial Court acknowledged in its ruling that these parties, if in close proximity, one to the other, would result in a massive amount of friction between the parties. Therefore, to minimize that friction, the former marital home and the karate school building would have to be owned by one of the parties. Since both could not own the property, the Chancellor awarded the former marital home and the associated karate building to Nancy.

Eddie, through his brief, continued to use speculation and conjecture on the reason the Court made such and award. He used generalizations that this was done as an "equalizer." There is no need to speculate as to the Court's reasoning, since the Court answered this question.

On July 6, 2007, the Trial Court conducted a hearing on a Motion for Reconsideration of the final Judgment entered. The issue of the lump sum rehabilitative alimony was raised at that hearing. The Chancellor further explained his reasoning for the award of lump sum rehabilitative alimony. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Trial Court rendered a Bench Opinion wherein the Court stated:
"I feel that it is fair and equitable and reaches the goal of the rehabilitative lump sum law which basically is allowing her (Nancy) to re-enter the workforce as she has with a minor child to keep her from being desolate during the process." (RE 54).

The Trial Court further explained the need for this alimony in that Nancy required some type of financial security to keep her and her minor child from being destitute as she re-entered the workforce after an absence of approximately twenty (20) years.

The Trial Court went on to state that he off-set the lump sum alimony award by $\$ 50,000.00$
to provide Nancy and Isaac with a home recognizing that she had no assets in funds upon which to live. The Trial Court concluded this issue by stating:
"The Court felt that by making this award of lump sum rehabilitative alimony that I did in the manner that I made it would be to the effect that it would comply with the law, allow Mrs. Sellers some security to keep her and the minor child from being desolate as she attempts to re-enter the workforce and at the same time allow her a stable home environment for her and her child that would be free and clear from any liens or encumbrances." (RE 55).

Additionally, Nancy required cash money assistance to get back into the workforce. As such, the Trial Court awarded lump sum rehabilitative alimony to Nancy in the sum of $\$ 62,600.00$ (CP 222, RE 38). Credit was awarded to Eddie in the sum of $\$ 50,000.00$ as his interest in the former marital home with said residence being awarded to Nancy. (CP 222, RE 38).

Eddie then complains:
"The award by the Chancellor to Nancy Sellers of 'lump sum rehabilitative alimony is not recognized by the law.'" (Appellant's Brief, Page 28).

In the case of Gray v. Gray, 909 So.2d, 108 (Miss. App. 2005), this Court was faced with the following issue:
"Whether the Chancellor was in error in awarding periodic alimony and LUMP SUM REHABILITATIVE ALIMONY to Angela or, in the alternative, in awarding alimony in an amount that was more than Richard can pay." (Page 112).

In that case, the matter was reversed not on "award grounds", but on "the brevity of the Chancellor's order" preventing the Appellate Court from reviewing the evidence and the statement of factors that the Chancellor considered in awarding alimony. (\$18).

In the case before the Court at this time, it cannot be said that the Chancellor's Opinion was scanty or brief. The Chancellor went through a well reasoned Opinion citing findings of fact and conclusions of law unlike Gray (supra).

As a result of the above and foregoing, the first issue is not well taken and the reasoning of the Trial Court is substantiated by clear and unmistakable facts and conclusions of law. Thus, no manifest error has occurred.

ISSUE NUMBER 2: The Chancellor was Correct in His Division of Marital Assets.
This Court has stated in Ferguson (supra) that equitable division of marital assets should be made in divorce cases. Mississippi is not a community property state, but is an equitable division state.

However, in this case, the Trial Court awarded Eddie fifty-three percent (53\%) of the marital assets and Nancy only forty-seven percent (47\%) of them. This division of marital assets included an equal division of the fair market value of the marital home and the 401 K of Eddie. Those two (2) assets were the major assets of the parties. (CP 213, RE 29). When the marital debts were factored into the assets, the resulting division between the parties was an equal division. (CP 214, RE 30).

The division of the remaining assets, being the separate estates of the parties, was also conducted. The Trial Court concluded that Eddie's separate estate included a value of $\$ 137,500.00$. Nancy's separate estate consisted of $\$ 13,620.00$.(CP204, RE 20). Thus, Eddie had a ten-fold greater separate estate than did Nancy. The Trial Court further concluded that Nancy had no interest in Eddie's separate estate and likewise, Eddie had no interest in Nancy's separate estate.

As a result of the above and foregoing, the equitable division as mandated by Ferguson (supra) and Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So.2d, 909 (Miss. 1994), has been followed.

Thus, the equitable division of marital assets has been followed by the Chancellor and any complaint of Eddie is without merit.

ISSUE NUMBER 3 - The Trial Court Correctly Divided the Marital Assets and Awarded

Lump Sum Rehabilitative Alimony.
As state above, an equitable division of the marital assets was accomplished by the Trial Court. Further, the Trial Court acknowledged that a deficit existed. This deficit mainly centered around two (2) indisputable and uncontested facts, namely (1) a vast discrepancy in income, just under $\$ 5,000.00$ per month gross for Eddie and no income for Nancy; and (2) a lack of cash available by either party.

Eddie resorts to a lengthy general recitation of the different types of alimony recognized by this State and contends that "lump sum rehabilitative alimony" is not among those types of alimony.

However, Gray (supra) holds to the contrary. Additionally, the case of Caldwell v. Caldwell, 805 So.2d, 659 (Miss. App. 2002), states the following:
"When the Judge awarded Elizabeth $\$ 15,466.66$ as one-third of the sale price, he also AWARDED HER $\mathbf{\$ 8 , 5 0 0 . 0 0}$ IN LUMP SUM REHABILITATIVE ALIMONY. This sum was to be paid from the proceeds of the sale of the home." (\$6).

This case was affirmed by the Appellate Court.

Therefore, lump sum rehabilitative alimony is in fact a part of the jurisprudence of this State. This is true contrary to Eddie's.assertions throughout his Brief. This again illustrates that generalities result in incorrect conclusions.

Eddie contends throughout his Brief that lump sum alimony is "an equalizer". (Appellant's Brief, Page 21, 24, 29, and others).

Eddie relies upon the case of Miller v. Miller, 874 So.2d, 469 (Miss. App. 2004), wherein this Court held that when lump sum alimony was paid "as an equalizer" it is because the property distribution has left one spouses' assets out of balance to the other in such a way as to be inequitable. However, the difficulty with generalizations again appears. Miller (supra) acknowledges that lump
sum alimony is a hybrid divorce concept. It has two (2) parts, not just one (1). One part is to provide support to the receiving spouse and the second part is to be "an equalizer".

The purpose of alimony in any of its forms is to cure inequities that exist between the parties. In analyzing the concept of alimony both of the purposes of it must be considered together. Alimony can be part of division of assets and alimony can also be a part of support. Eddie's generalization regarding "equalizer" fails to consider the second purpose of alimony and that is, support.

Illustrative of this faulty generalization is the argument made by Eddie as follows:
"The Chancellor below considered the Ferguson and Armstrong factors, in the context of equitable distribution and periodic alimony. However, he failed to consider the Cheatham/Ferguson factors in light of a lump sum alimony award." (Appellant's Brief, Page 28).

Eddie further fails to consider the reasoning set forth by the Chancellor himself. This reasoning was done twice. First, the Chancellor set out the reasoning in his original opinion. This reasoning clearly was in the nature of support NOT EQUALIZATION. The second time was on the Motion for Reconsideration. Both opinions stated that the reason for the award was support NOT EQUALIZATION. (See original opinion and RE 55)

Eddie relies, in support of this contention, on the case of Haney v. Haney, 907 So.2d, 948 (Miss. 2005). In discussing equitable division Haney (supra) took the Ferguson factors and the Cheatham factors and made a side-by-side comparison of them. (q25). It was evident that the Ferguson/Cheatham factors in equitable distribution of assets are all enumerated in the Ferguson factors and thus, Cheatham has been subsumed by Ferguson. However, the Ferguson factors relied upon by Haney (supra) dealt with the issue of equitable division and not with the issue of alimony.

In Armstrong (supra), the Court stated:
"The following factors are to be considered by the Chancellor in arriving at findings and entering judgment for alimony:" (1280).

The Court then went on to list the twelve (12) "alimony factors" to be considered by a Trial Court in making an alimony award. These factors would apply to ALL TYPES OF ALIMONY.

Directly following those twelve (12) factors, the Supreme Court then addressed "the types of alimony awards". The Court then stated:
"Our Chancery Courts are vested with broad authority to provide for the material needs of spouses incident to the divorce. Our cases recognize several general forms of awards. We have recognized and approved several general types including, BUT NOT LIMITED TO (a) periodic alimony, sometimes called permanent or continuing alimony; (b) lump sum alimony or alimony in gross; (c) division of jointly accumulated property; (d) award of equitable interest in property." (Page 1281).

Subsequently, in Hubbard v. Hubbard, 656 So.2d, 124 (Miss. 1995), the Supreme Court recognized that putting a time limit on periodic alimony would be appropriate in certain circumstances. The Court coined the term "rehabilitative periodic alimony" as applying to individuals who were re-entering the workforce and needing certain financial assistance in doing so. This type of alimony was crafted to prevent one party from being destitute while getting back into the workforce. It is for the purpose of support for the party that is less well off then the other.

Once the Chancellor in this case determined that Eddie had a substantial income in comparison to Nancy, Nancy had custody of Isaac by agreement of the parties, Eddie was gainfully employed and Nancy was not, Eddie had residential opportunities other than the former marital home, Nancy did not have residential opportunities except for the former marital home, Isaac needed a roof over his head, Nancy needed to re-entered the workforce and time was needed for this purpose, the issue of friction between the parties needed to be minimized, and a consideration of the alimony factors listed in Armstrong (supra) was made, then the Trial Court wisely considered the Armstrong
and Cheatham factors which resulted in the lump sum rehabilitative alimony award made.
Contrary to the assertions of Eddie, the Chancellor utilized the Armstrong factors and the Cheatham factors and specifically stated that not only were those factors considered, but in addition, specific findings of fact and conclusions of law made regarding each of those factors. (CP 215-222, RE 31-38).

Ironically, Eddie relies upon the case of Elliottv. Rogers, 775 So.2d, 1285 (Miss. App. 2000) when he states:
"The Appellate Court looks to the substance, not the label."
In that case involving an agreed settlement, the Court noted that it was being invited to a "tyrannical exercise in labeling." (Appellant's Brief, Page 28). This "tyrannical exercise in labeling" is identical to that which Eddie is trying to invite this Court to do.

Based upon the evidence presented, the Trial Court was of the opinion that a seventeen (17) month rehabilitative alimony cash award would be sufficient to allow Nancy to regain and re-enter the workforce. This seventeen (17) month time period will end December 2008. (CP 223, RE 39).

Throughout his Brief, Eddie contends that this alimony award is for the purpose of "equalization". He does this in general terms throughout his Brief and then speculates that "in the instant case, this new label appears to be a post-equitable distribution transfer of assets from Eddie to Nancy." (Appellant's Brief, Page 28). Again, however, generalizations and speculation result in misleading and inaccurate statements.

The Trial Court answered the speculation, specifically when it stated:
"The award (lump sum rehabilitative alimony) is in the nature of spousal support for Mrs. Sellers." (CP 223, RE 39).

This same reasoning was stated by the Chancellor on the Motion for Reconsideration when the Court stated that Nancy's need for cash and a stable home for Isaac was critical. He ruled that support NOT EQUALIZATION was the reason for the award. This stated reason is completely contrary to that espoused by Eddie.

Thus, based upon actual fact and not speculation, the Trial Court awarded this alimony sum to Nancy in the form of support, not as an equalizer. The Trial Court went on to further announce that since this award was in the nature of spousal support, the Trial Court would then grant unto Eddie an off-set by allowing him to claim both children for tax purposes during the period of time that he was to be paying this lump sum rehabilitative alimony. (CP 223, RE 39).

When generalizations are removed and specifics are considered, the Chancellor correctly awarded lump sum rehabilitative alimony to Nancy and equitably divided the marital assets between the parties.

As a result of all of the above and foregoing in these three (3) issues, the Chancellor's decision was completely supported by the record, contained no clear and unmistakable error and should be affirmed by this Court.

## PROPOSITION II: THE CHANCELLOR CORRECTLY DETERMINED THE AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT TO BE PAID BY THE PARTIES

The amount of child support to be awarded in divorce matters is governed by Section 43-19101 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, as amended. Pursuant to this statute, the child support guidelines for one (1) child is fourteen percent (14\%) of the paying parties' adjusted gross income. This section defines gross income as income from all sources. Subtracted from the gross income are Federal, State and local taxes, Social Security contributions and mandatory retirement and disability
contributions. Excepted from this subtraction is any "voluntary retirement and disability contributions." (See Section 43-19-101(3)(b)(iii)). The resulting figure is defined by this statute as "adjusted gross income".

Based upon Eddie's Rule 8.05 financial statement, he claimed that his salary from employment at the Choctaw Health Center was in the sum of $\$ 4,279.41$ per month. Eddie additionally showed income from the Karate school of $\$ 200.00$ per month, giving him a total gross income of $\$ 4,479.41$. On this same 8.05 Statement, Eddie contended that his State Income Tax liability was $\$ 129.60$ per month; Federal Income Tax liability was $\$ 305.10$ per month; Social Security taxes in the sum of $\$ 304.26$ per month; and medical insurance premiums of $\$ 302.40$ per month. Eddie further listed a voluntary 401 K retirement sum in the amount of $\$ 342.36$ per month. Thus, excluding the voluntary 401 K contribution, pursuant to his 8.05 financial statement (Exhibit No 3), Eddie shows an adjusted gross income of $\$ 3,438.05$. Further, the tax return attached to the aforesaid Rule 8.05 statement shows a tax refund of $\$ 3,393.00$ which averages to the sum of $\$ 282.75$ per month additional income. The Chancellor rounded the adjusted gross income of Eddie to the sum of $\$ 3,500.00$ per month. Based thereon, the child support computation was made.

In this case, the Trial Court determined that Eddie's adjusted gross income was the sum of $\$ 3,500.00$ per month. Utilizing the above referenced statute, the Trial Court determined that fourteen percent (14\%) of the adjusted gross income was in the sum of $\$ 490.00$ per month which is the amount of child support set by the Chancellor for Eddie to pay unto Nancy. (CP 194, RE 10). As stated previously (Appellee's Brief page 4), Eddie's true Adjusted Gross Income was in the sum of $\$ 4,023.32$. This would mean that his actual child support based on the guidelines would be in the sum of $\$ 563.26$ per month. Yet, the Chancellor only set the child support amount as $\$ 490$ per month.

Eddie contends in his Brief:
"In this cause, the child support determination was based upon figures that were not traceable to the record. The award of child support was predicated upon the revision by the Trial Judge of Eddie's financial figures. His projected monthly income was increased by $\$ 200.00$ from the "Eddie Sellers' Karate School", which was later awarded to Nancy. The lower Court added to the monthly income a voluntary retirement deduction, gave a credit of an unstated amount for hospitalization insurance paid by Eddie, and allowed no credit for Austin while in Eddie's custody." (Appellant's Brief, Page 32).

This entire proposition is predicated upon this one paragraph. The assertion made by Eddie in his Brief, quoted above, is totally and completely contrary to the true facts and Opinion of the Chancellor. (It should be noted that Eddie NOT NANCY was awarded the "Eddie Sellers' Karate School" (CP 230, RE 46).)

In the case of Bittick v. Bittick, Slip Opinion No. 2007-CP-00401-COA (Miss. App. July 22, 2008), that Court determined that the Chancellor has the sole responsibility to determine the credibility of witnesses and evidence and the weight to be given to each. ( $\| 3$ ). Eddie contends that his "revised monthly adjusted gross income" of $\$ 3,500.00$ was not supported by substantial evidence. Yet, this adjusted gross income for child support purposes, came not from financial projections made and through extrapolations, as in Fountain v. Fountain, 877 So.2d, 474 (Miss. App. 2003); not from business expense adjustments as in Nix v. Nix, 790 So.2d, 198 (Miss. 2001); not from nonintroduced financial declarations as in Ellzey v. White, 922 So.2d, 40 (Miss. App. 2006); not from parochial school tuition additions as in Moses v. Moses, 879 So.2d, 1043 (Miss. App. 2004), BUT FROM EXHIBIT 3 WHICH WAS THE FINANCIAL DECLARATION, RULE 8.05, STATEMENT OF EDDIE SELLERS HIMSELF.

After determining the appropriate amount of child support for Eddie, the Trial Court did
utilize an income analysis of Eddie regarding a totally and separate distinct issue, namely alimony. (CP 215-217, RE 31-33). This analysis being required by Armstrong (supra) was made in order to show that the true income of Eddie Sellers was not supported by his Rule 8.05 statement. This analysis not only looked at Eddie's income but also his expenses. After this analysis of his income and expenses, the Trial Court did not find it appropriate to adjust upward the child support that Eddie was required to pay unto Nancy. Thus, if anyone should be complaining, it is Nancy, not Eddie.

Further, Eddie is the one who increased his monthly income by $\$ 200.00$ per month from his Karate school. This figure was placed on his Rule 8.05 financial statement by himself, not by the Trial Court. Contrary to the assertions in his Brief, Eddie recognized that his tax return showed a loss for the Karate school, for tax purposes only, but for child support purposes he had an income of $\$ 200.00$ per month. This representation was made by Eddie, not by the Trial Court.

Eddie asserts in his Brief that the voluntary retirement deduction from his paycheck should not have been re-added to his income for computation of child support. Yet, pursuant to the child support guideline statute quoted above, voluntary contributions to a retirement plan are not appropriate deductions from gross income in the computation of adjusted gross income for child support purposes.

Eddie further asserts that the Trial Court "gave him credit for an unstated amount of hospitalization insurance paid by Eddie." (Appellant's Brief, Page 32). However, it is true that the Chancellor did not quote the figure for medical insurance, but that figure was presented to the Trial Court by Eddie through his financial declaration as the sum of $\mathbf{\$ 3 0 2 . 4 0}$ per month.

In utilizing the computations of Eddie's true monthly income, during the alimony analysis of Eddie's monthly income, the Trial Court acknowledged that Eddie had substantially greater sums than
those submitted on his Rule 8.05 statement. Additionally, there is at least $\$ 282.75$ per month of additional income from the tax refund that was not included on Eddie's financial statement.

It is acknowledged that consideration should be given to Eddie's support of one (1) of the two (2) minor children of the parties and the Trial Court gave that consideration to Eddie by leaving the "adjusted gross income" at the lower figure as shown on the Rule 8.05 statement instead of the true adjusted gross income which is substantially higher. As such, the amount of child support assessed by the Trial Court for Eddie to pay unto Nancy, is the appropriate sum and is supported by the evidence and the record.

At the time of trial, Nancy was unemployed. As such, the Trial Court recognized that both parents have a responsibility of supporting their children. In this case, each parent had custody of one (1) child. Based upon Magriuder v. Magruder, 881 So.2d, 365 (Miss. App. 2004), this Court acknowledged that when both parents have separate incomes, then child support should be paid in proportion to the relative financial ability of each. At the time of trial since Nancy was unemployed, her financial ability to pay child support was non-existent.

As such, the Trial Court ruled:
"On the other hand, Mrs. Sellers shows no income whatsoever, and the Court finds that no child support can be assessed at this time; however, once she becomes gainfully employed, her child support obligation will be subject to reconsideration. Accordingly, the Court orders that Mrs. Sellers is to pay no child support at this time." (CP 195, RE11).

Thus, contrary to Eddie's assertion, Nancy did not "receive a pass from paying child support". (Appellant's Brief, Page 34).

Eddie cited no case that stood for the proposition that child support was based on "assets". All cases cited by Eddie indicate that child support is based upon income, not upon assets. If assets
were to be utilized in determining child support, then Eddie's assets would likewise come into play and his child support would be substantially higher than awarded by the Trial Court.

Based upon the above and foregoing, it is eminently clear that the amount of child support awarded to Nancy complies with the statutory guidelines for child support determination. Thus, the Chancellor was eminently correct in his award of child support and his findings should be affirmed.

## CONCLUSION

The Trial Court correctly divided the marital assets. The Trial Court correctly assessed the spousal support awarded to Nancy. Further, the amount of child support to be paid by Eddie to Nancy was calculated upon the proper adjusted gross income with appropriate considerations made for the circumstances for which the Trial Court found itself.

As such, the decision of the Trial Court should be affirmed in all respects and all costs of this appeal should be assessed against Eddie.

Respectfully submitted, this the $\qquad$ day of July, 2008.

## NANCY BRIDGES SELLERS, APPELLEE

BY:


## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, William B. Jacob, of counsel for the Appellee, Nancy Bridges Sellers, do hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Appellee's Brief to the following:

Henry Palmer, Esquire
Lawyers, PLLC
Post Office Box 1205
Meridian, Mississippi 39302-1205
Marvin E. Wiggins, Jr., Esquire
Attorney at Law
Post Office Box 696
DeKalb, Mississippi 39328-0696
Honorable J. Max Kilpatrick
Chancellor, Sixth District
Post Office Drawer 520
Philadelphia, Mississippi 39350
THIS the $31^{\Delta t}$ day of July, 2008.


[^0]
## APPENDIX 1

## RULE 8.05 FINANCIAL STATEMENT OF EDDIE SELLERS

EXHIBIT "A"
NANCY BRIDGES SELLERS
PLAINTIFF

VS.
CIVIL ACTION NUMBER: $2015-332$

PRENTISS E. (EDDIE) SELLERS
DEFENDANT'

## I. GENERAL INFORMATION

| NAME: | Prentiss E. (Eddie) Sellers |
| :--- | :--- |
| ADDRESS: | 15560 Hwy 15 South |
| CITY, STATE \& ZIP CODE: | Philadelphia, MS |
| DATE OF BIRTH: | $1 / 7 / 55$ |
| SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: | $587-84-9212$ |
| OCCUPATION: | Energy Manager |
| EMPLOYER: | Choctaw Health Center |
| EMPLOYER'S ADDRESS: | 210 Hospital Circle |
|  | Philadelphia, MS |

MINOR CTITI.DREN:

| NAME | DATE OF BIRTH |
| :--- | :--- |
| Prentiss Austin Sellers | $10 / 27 / 89$ |
| Isaac Lucas Sellers | $3 / 15 / 98$ |
|  |  |
|  |  |

EXHIBIT NO GEE B
CAUSLNO $2005-322$.
Evidence
For Identification $\qquad$

Time
NESHOBA COUATCHACDTCLR

## EXHIBIT "A" CON'INUED

11. INCOME STATEMENT

AS OF 8/3/06

## G:ROSS MONTHLY INCOME

## AMOUNT

| 1. Salary and Wages including commission, bonuses, <br> allowances and overtime. (To arrive at a monthly <br> income figure if paid weckly, multiply income by <br> 4.3; if paid bi-weekly, multiply income by 2.16 | *See attached 200S W-2, <br> 2004 Tax Return \& 2006 <br> YTD check stub |
| :--- | :--- |
| 2. Pension and retirement |  |
| 3. Social Security |  |
| 4. Disability and unemployed insurance |  |
| 5. Public assistance (welfare, AFDC payments, ctc) |  |
| 6. Dividends and interest |  |
| 7. Rental income |  |
| 8. Other income (Karate School) |  |
| 9. Other income |  |
| TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME: |  |
|  |  |
| 1. State income taxes |  |
| 2. Federal income taxes |  |
| 3. Social Security |  |
| 4. Modical insurance |  |
| 5. Retirement |  |
| 6. Union or other dues |  |
| 7. Other (specify) 401k |  |
| 8. Other (specify) |  |
| 9. TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS: |  |
| 10. NUMBER OF EXEMPTIONS |  |
| 11. NET MONTHLY PAY: |  |
|  |  |

## EXHIBIT "A" CONTINUED

## III. EXPENSE STATEMENT

A. LIVING EXPENSES

AS OF 8/3/06 AS OF:

Houschold Children Houschold Childeen



## EXHibit "B"

## IV. STATEMENT OF ASSETS

## A. Real Estate

| Tile in the name of: | Eddic \& Nancy Sellers |
| :--- | :--- |
| Address: | 15560 Hwy 15 South, Philadelphia, MS |
| Who paid costs: | Eddie |
|  |  |
| Value (estimatc) | $118,000.00$ |
| Mortgage balance | $-0-$ |
| Equity | $118,000.00$ |


| Title in the name of: | Prentiss Sellers and Betty Crane |
| :--- | :--- |
| Address: | 11200 Rd 410, Philadelphia, MS |
| Who paid costs: |  |
| How cost paid: |  |
| Value (estimate) | $\$ 95,000,00$ to $\$ 100,000,00$ |
| Mortgage balance | 0.00 |
| Equity | $\$ 95,000,00$ to $\$ 100,000,00$ |


| Title in the name of: | Prentiss Sellers and Betty Crane |
| :--- | :--- |
| Address: | 1108 Keith Strect, Philadelphia |
| Who paid costs: | gift from mother |
| How cost paid: |  |
| Valuc (cstimate) | $\$ 50,000.00$ |
| Mortgage balance | 0.00 |
| Equity | $\$ 50,000.00$ |

*List mortigage balance also under liabilitics on the next page. List the amount of your monthly payment only under LIABILITIES.
B. MOTOR VEHICLES:

| Registered in the name of: | Eddie \& Nancy Sellers |
| :--- | :--- |
| Ycar: 1999 | Model: Dodge Mini. Van |
| Who paid costs: | Both |
| How cost paid: | Monthly |
| Value: | $4,610.00$ |
| Loan Balancc: | 0 |
| Equity: | $4,610.00$ |


| Registered in the name of: | Eddie Sellers |
| :--- | :--- |
| Ycar: 2000 | Model Ford Ranger |
| Who paid costs: | Eddic |
| How cost paid: | Monthly |
| Value: | $4,735.00$ |
| Loan Balance: | 0 |
| Equity: | $4,735.00$ |

C. Other Personal Property (such as home compulers, guns, lawmowers, TVS, jewelry, household furnishings, ctc.)
[TEM
VAL.UE

| 1986 Ford Bronco | 1500.00 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 1983 Ford Bronco | 0.00 |
| 2003 Bucll Blast Motorcycle | $2,000.00$ |
| Terry Bass Boat, Motor \& Trailer | $1,000.00$ |
| 1997 Yamaha 4-wheeler | $1,000.00$ |
| Houschold Furnishings | $15,000.00$ |
| Yard \& Garden Equipment | $1,000.00$ |
| Computer | $1,000.00$ |
| ** See attached asset sheet |  |
|  |  |
| TOTAI. | $\$ 22,500.00$ |

D. Checking/Savings (name of Bank, Account Number and Amount in Account, including CD's, moncy markets, passbook accounts, etc.)

Name(s) on Account Bank/Acct No. Type of Acct. Balance

| Eddie Sellers | 2142255 | Checking | $\$ 500.00$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Eddie Sellers (Karate <br> School) | 1522184 | Checking | $\$ 200.00$ |
| Eddie Sellers | 181052683 | Checking | $\$ 333.39$ |
|  |  |  |  |

E. Other Investments (IRA's stock(s), mutual funds, pension plans, ctc.)

Bank Account No.
Type of investment
Balance

| TransAmerica | 401 K | $\$ 162,000.00$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |
| Total: |  | $\$ 162,000.00$ |

F. Tife Insurance (cxcludc children)

| Insured | Company | Face Amount. Less Loans | Cash value | Bencticiary |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Eddie Sellers | Choctaw Healh Center |  | \$50,000.00 | Nancy Sellers |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

## G. All Other Assets

ITFM
VALUE

| Karate School \& Land | 10,000 |
| :--- | :--- |
| $1 / 2$ All Marital Asscts |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |

11．LIABILITIES（Include mortgage，car loan，credit cards，personal loans）． （Include also under 35－44 on Page 4 of Exhibit＂A＂）

| Creditor Whose Names） | Current <br> Balance Due Monthly Payment |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | Who Pays

## ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF TRUTHFULNESS

1 declare to the Court that the foregoing Exhibits＂$A$＂and＂$B$＂including attachments，are true and correct and that this declaration was executed on the $\qquad$ day of $\qquad$ ADD． 2006.


VS.
PRENTISS E. (EDDIE) SELLERS

CIVIL ACTION NUMBER: $\qquad$
DEFENDANT

## CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I. Pent mas Sullen, do hereby certify that I have this date complied with Rule 8.05 of the Uniform Chancery Court Rules and that Shave mailed and/or delivered a copy of a detailed written statement of actual income and expenses and assets and liabilities to the attorney tor the opposing party.

SO CERTIFED on this the $\qquad$ day of $\qquad$ , A.D. 2006.


EMPLOYMENT HISTORY
The following is a general statement of the employment history and earnings from the inception of the marriage or the date of' divorce, whichever is applicable.

FMPI.OYMENT
Choctaw Health Center

DATES (INCLUSIVE)
May 1985-Present

RATE OFPAY
$\$ 24.76$ per hour

This the 4 day of $\qquad$ 2006.






KARATE AND RETAIL SALES
C Business name. If no separale busiress name, leave blank.

E Entor code from Inativetions

- 812990

D Employer 10 number (EIN), II ony 80-0044070
E Business adaress (inciuding sutte or room no.). City, towil or post othree, slate, and ZIP cose
F Accounting method: (1) $X]$ Cash (2) $\square$ Accrual (3) $\square$ Oher (specify) -
 Pärt 1恎至 Income

| 1 | Gross receipls or sales. Caution. If this income was reported to you on form W. 2 and the 'Statulory employee' box on that form was checked, see the instructions and check here. | 13,819. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | Returns and allowances. |  |
| 3 | Subtract line 2 from lino 1. | 13,819. |
| 4 | Cost of goods sold (from ling 42 on page 2). | $2,284$. |
| 5 | Gross profit. Subtract line 4 from line 3. | 12,535 |
| 6 | Other income, including Federal and state gasoline or fuel tax credit or refund |  |
| 7 | Gross income. Add lines 5 and 6. | 12,535. |

Partill Expenses. Enter expenses for business use of your home only on line 30.

32 If you have a loss, check the box that describes your investment in this activily (see instructions).

- If you checkod 320, enter tho loss on Form 1040, line 12, and also on Schedule SE, line 2 (statutory employees, see instructions). Estates and trusts, enter on Form 1041, line 3.
- If you checked 32b, you must allach Form 6198.


BAA For Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, see Form 1040 instructions.

## Part.lle - Cost of Goods Sold (see instructions)

33 Method(s) used to value closing inventory: a $\square$ Cost b $\square$ Lower of cost or markel $c \square$ Other (attach explanation)
. 4 Was there any change in determining quantities, costs, of valuations between opening and closing inventory? If 'Yes.' allach explanation

| 35 | $\begin{aligned} & \square \mathrm{No} \\ & 1,000 . \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| 36 | 1,284. |
| 37 |  |
| 38 |  |
| 39 |  |
| 40 | 2,284. |
| 41 | 1,000. |
| 42 | 1,284. |

42 Cost of goods sold. Sublracl line 41 from line 40 . Enter the result here and on page 1 , line 4 .
1,284.

## PartiVat Information on Your Vehicle. Complete this part only if you are claiming car or truck expensos on line 9 and are not required to file form 4562 for this business. See the instructions for line 13 to find out if you must file Form 4562.

43 When did you place your vehicle in service for business purposes? (month, day, year)

-     -         -             -                 -                     -                         -                             -                                 -                                     - .

44 Of the total number of miles you drove your vehicle during 2004, enter the number of miles you used your vehicle for. a Bustness $\qquad$


Part. $V_{\text {w: }}$ Other Expenses. List below business expenses nol included on lines 8-26 or line 30 .

| Dues and Subscriptions | 263. |
| :---: | :---: |
| Licenses | 125. |
| Postage | 237. |
| Printing | 100. |
| Telephone | 1.753. |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
| 48 Total other expenses. Enter here and on page 1, line 27. | 2.478. |



BAA For Papenwork Reduction Act Notice, see Form 1040 Instructions.
 Depres
Including (inherited. Wis $1 / 2$ of Eddie has sister just
inherited. His $1 / 2$ of OME NO. 1543.0172

Property Under Section 179
Note: If you have any lis ied property, complete Part $V$ before you complete Part 1 .
1 Maximum amount. See instructions for a higher limit for certain businesses. $\qquad$ $\$ 102,000$.
2 Total cost of section 179 property placed in service (see instructions).
3 Threshold cost of section 179 property before reduction in limitation
enter $\cdot 0$.
3410,000 .
4 Reduction in limitation. Subtract line 3 from line 2 . If zero or less, enter . 0 .
5 Dollar limitation for tax year. Subtract line 4 from line 1 . If zero or less, enter $\cdot 0$. If married filing separately, see instructions
6
(a) Desccipilion of Property

7 Listed property. Enter the amount from line 29


8 Total elected cost of section 179 property. Add amounts in column (c), lines 6 and 7 .
9 Tentative deduction. Enter the smaller of line 5 or line 8.
10 Carryover of disallowed deduction from line 13 of your 2003 Form 4562
11 Business income limitation. Enter the smaller of business income (not less than zero) or line 5 (see instils)
12 Section 179 expense deduction. Add lines 9 and 10 , but do not enter more than line 11.


13 Carryover of disallowed deduction 10 2005. Add lines 9 and 10 , less line 12

## Note: Do not use Part II or Part III below for listed properly. Instead, use Part V.

## Part IIS. Special Depreciation Allowance and Other Depreciation (Do not include listed properly.)

 one or more general assol accounts, chock here

Section B - Assets Placed In Service During 2004 Tax Year Using the General Doproclation System


## PaitiV: Sum Summary (see instructions)

21 Listed property. Entor amount from line 28.
22 Total. Add amounts from line 12, lines 14 through 17, lines 19 and 20 in column ( 0 ), and line 21. Enter here and on the appropriate lines of your return. Partnerships and S corporations - see instructions.
23 For assets shown above and placed in service during the current year, enter the portion of the basis attributable to section 263A costs


| 21 |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| 22 | 1,328 |
|  | $\cdots$ |
|  |  |

BAA For Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, see separate instructions.
FOH20912L 09/30704
Form 4562 (2004)

PartV Listed Property (Include automobiles, cortain other vehictes, cellular telephones, certain computers, und proporty used tor entertainmenl, recreation, or amusement.)
Note: For any vehicle for which you are using the standard milesge rate or deducting lease expense, complete only 243, 240. columns (a) through (c) of Section A, all of Section B, and Section C if applicable.

Section A - Depreciation and Other Information (Caution: See instructions for limits for passenger automobilos.)


26 Property used more than $50 \%$ in a qualified business use (see instructions):


## Section B - Information on Use of Vehicles

Complete this section for vehicles used by a sole proprietor, pariner, or other 'more than $\$ \%$ owner,' or relatod person. If you provided vehicles to your employees, first answer the questions in Section C to see it you meet an exception to completing this section for those vehicles.

30 Total business/investment miles driven during the year (do not include commuting mites - see instructions).
31 Total cormmuting miles driven during the year.
32 Total other personal (noncommuting) miles driven.

- Total miles driven during the ycar. Add lines 30 through 32.

34 Was the vehicle available for personal use during off-duly hours?
35 Was the vehicle used primarily by a more lhan $5 \%$ owner or related person?
36 is another vehicle available for personal use?


## Section C - Questions for Employers Who Provide Vehicios for Use by Their Employees

Answer these questions to determine if you meet an exception to completing Section B for vehicles usod by employees who are not more than $5 \%$ owners or related persons (see instructions).

37 Do you maintain a written policy statement that prohibits all personal use of vahicles, including commuting. by your employees?
38 Do you maintain a written policy slatement that prohibits personal use of vehicles, except commuting, by your employees? See instructions for vehicles used by corporate officers, directors, or $1 \%$ or more owners.
39 Do you treal all usc of vehicles by employees as personal usc?
40 Do you provide more than five vehicles lo your employees, obtain information from your employees about the use of the vehicles, and retain the information received?
41 Do you meet the requirements concerning qualified automobile demonstration use? (see insiructions). Note: If your answer to 37, 38, 39, 40, or 41 is 'Yes,' do not complete Section E for the covered vehictes.

| Yes | No |
| :---: | :---: |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |

## Pait'VI Amortization


Ve(s) shown on return

CAUTION: You cannot take this credit if either of the following applies.

- The amounl on Form 1000, line 37, or Form 1040A, line 22, is more than $\$ 25,000$ ( $\$ 37,500$ if head of housohold; $\$ 50,000$ if marriod filing jointly).
- The person(s) who made the qualified contribution or elective deferral (a) was born after January 1, 1987, (b) is claimed as a dependent on someone else's 2004 tax relurn, or (c) was a student (see instruclions).

1 Traditional and Roth IRA contributions for 2004. Do nol include rollover conlributions
2 Elective deferrals to a $401(k)$ or other qualified employer plan, voluntary employee contributions, and 501(c)(18)(D) plan contributions for 2004 (sce instructions)
3 Add lines 1 and 2
4 Certain distributions received after 2001 and before the due dete (including extensions) of your 2004 tax return (see instructions). If married filing joinily, include both spouses' amounts in both columns. See instructions for an exception
5 Subtract line 4 from line 3 . It zero or less, enter - 0
6 In each column, enter the smaller of line 5 or $\$ 2,000$ $\qquad$


Add the amounts on line 6. If zero, stop: you cannol take this credit.


8 Enter the arnount from Form 1040, line 37* or Form 1040A, line 22 $\qquad$


9 Enter the applicable decimal amount shown below:

| If line 8 is- |  | And your filling stalus is- <br> Over- |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| But not <br> over- | Married <br> filing jointly <br> Enter on line 9- | Head of <br> household | Single, Married fling <br> separately, or <br> Qualifying widow(er) |  |
| $\ldots$ | $\$ 15,000$ | .5 | .5 | .5 |
| $\$ 15,000$ | $\$ 16,250$ | .5 | .5 | .2 |
| $\$ 16,250$ | $\$ 22,500$ | .5 | .5 | .1 |
| $\$ 22,500$ | $\$ 24,375$ | .5 | .2 | .1 |
| $\$ 24,375$ | $\$ 25,000$ | .5 | .1 | .1 |
| $\$ 25,000$ | $\$ 30,000$ | .5 | .1 | .0 |
| $\$ 30,000$ | $\$ 32,500$ | .2 | .1 | .0 |
| $\$ 32,500$ | $\$ 37,500$ | .1 | .1 | .0 |
| $\$ 37,500$ | $\$ 50,000$ | .1 | .0 | .0 |
| $\$ 50,000$ | $\ldots$ | .0 | .0 | .0 |

Note: It line 9 is zero, stop; you cannot take this credit.

10 Multiply line 7 by line 9
11 Enter the amount from Form 1040, lino 45, or Form 1040A, line 28
12 Enter the total of your credits from Form 1040, lines 46 through 49, of Form 1040A, lines 29 through 31.
13 Sublract line 12 from line 11. If zero, stop; you cannol take this credit
14 Credil for qualified retirement savings contributions. Enter the smaller of line 10 or line 13 here and on Form 1040, line 50, or Form 1040A. line 32

*See Publication 590 for the amounl to enter if you are filing Form 2555, 2555-EZ, or 4563 or you are excluding income from Puerto Rico.
BAA For Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, see Instructions.
form 8880 (2004)

X Married - Combined or Joint Return - Enter $\$ 12,000$ on Lino 12. Married - Spouse Died in 2004-Enler \$12,000 on Line 12. Married - Filing Separale Relurns - Enter $\$ 12,000$ on Line 12. Enter Spouse's name above. Head of Family - Enler $\$ 8,000$ on Line 12. Provide Name, SSN. and Relationship of the Dependent Living in the Home with You on Line 6. Single - Enter $\$ 6,000$ on Line 12 .
6 Dependents (In column (c) enter C for child, P for parent or R for relative).
(a) Name
(b) Dependent SSN
(c) Relationship

AUSTIN SELLERS
ISAAC SELLERS
587-83-6223

Taxpoyer Age
$\square$ Toxpayer
$\square$ Spouse Age $\square$ $\square$ Spouse 65 or Over $\square_{\text {Blind }}$ Wages, salaries, lips, cte (Attach W-2s) Other Income (Amount from Line 46, Page 2 of this Form) Adjustments to Gross intome (Amount from Line 55, Page 2 of this Form)
18 Mississippi Adjusted Gross Income (Line 15 plus Line 16 minus Line 17).
20 Amount of Exemption (Line 13 or Line 14 it Married Filing Separatcly)
21 Mississippi Taxable Income (Line 18 less Lines 19 and 20). See Instructions. If less than 0 , enter 0
22 Total Income Tax Due (For Tax Computalion, See Instructions).
23 Mississippi Income Tax Wittheld (Altach W.2s).
24 Estimaled Tax Payments and/or Amount Paid with Extension
25 Credit for Income Tax Paid to Another State (Attach Copy of Return filed with olher States).
26 Other Credits (See Instructions) Enter code for each type of credit claimed... 26 A $\square$ 26B
 26 C $\square$
S.
$\frac{\bar{C}}{C}$ For Computer Use Only - Do Nol Write Above This Line
27 Total Credits (Add Lines 23 through 26). $\qquad$
28 Enter the Amount of Overpoyment if Line 27 is Larger Ihan Line 22. $\qquad$ SSN........
SDouse SSN. 587-84-9212 426-02-6580 County Code. 50
$\theta$ Number of Dependents Listed on Line 6
9 Number of Boxes Marked ' $X$ ' on Line 7
10 Total of Line 8 plus Line 9
$\theta$
11 Line $10 \times \$ 1,500$ a $\qquad$

|  | $10-2$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| 11 | 3,000. |
| 12 | 12,000. |
| 13 | 15,000. |
|  |  |
| 14 |  |

29 Amount of Overpayment to be Applied to Your Next Year Estimaled Tax Account OVERPAYMENT 27
Voluntary Contribution Check-offs (See Form 80-108, Page 1 and instructions) Enter Total of $\mathcal{L}, \mathrm{M}, \mathrm{K}$, and $Z$ in Right Column
$30-(L)$

-(M) (1) (K) (z) Z)
31 Amount of Overpayment to be Refunded to You (Sublracl Lines 29 and 30 from Linc 28)..... REFUND
31 Amount of Overpayment to be Refunded to You (Sublracl Lines 29 and 30 from Line 28)..... REFUND $31-(R)$
Column 8 (Spouse)
12 Enter Amount from
13 Total (Line 11 olus
14 If Married - Filing
Returns, Enter $1 / 2$
Column A CToxpayer)
44,405 15
32 Enter Balance Due if Line 22 is Larger Than Line 27 BALANCE DUE 32 Interest on Underpayment of Estimaled Tax Payments (Allach Form 80-320) $\qquad$
Late Payments - Interest at 1\% Por Month and Penalty at $1 / 2 \%$ Per Month. $33-(1)$
TOTAL DUE (Add Lines 32, 33, and 34). Attach Check or Money Order for Tolal Due Dayable to: State Tax Commission, ENCLOSE PAYMENT VOUCHER 80-106.


## )JUSTMENTS TO GROSS INCOME

| 47 | Payments to an IRA. |
| :---: | :---: |
| 48 | Payments to Self-employod SEP, SIMPLE, and qualificd plans |
| 49 | Interest Penalty on Eariy Withdrawal of Savings |
| 50 | Alimony Pard (Complete Schedule P Below). |
| 51 | Moving Expense (Attach Federal Form 3903 or 3903F). |
| 52 | National Guard or Reserve Pay (Enter the Lesser of the Guard/Reserve Pay or the $\$ 5,000$ Statutory Exclusion Per Taxpayer) |
| 53 | Mississippi Prepaid Affordable College Tuition (MPACT) and/or Mississippi Aftordable College Savings (MACS). |
| 54 | Self-Employed Heallh Insurance Deduction (Same as Federal Deduction). . Total Adjustments (Add Amts for Lines 47 through 54. Carry Amls to Page 1, Line 17) |

Schedule P - Alimony Paid


THIS RETURN MUST BE SIGNED. Under penaltes of periury I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying sehedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and beliet it is true, corract ond complele.


Page 1


For Computer Use Only - Do Not Write Above This Line PART 1: SCHEDULE A - Itemized Deductions - (From Federal Form 1040 Schedule $A$, enter the amount from Ihe line indicaled)
If the amount of AGI on Form 1040 exceeds the tederal limits, you must refer to your Federal Schedule A and complete the worksheet provided in the Mississippi instructions. Enter the result on Line 9 below. In the event you flited using the standard deduction on your Federal Relurn and wish 10 itemize for Mississippi purposes, use Federal Form 1040 Schedule A as a worksheet and transfer the informalion trom ine specitic lines indicated to this Schedule A.

1 a Medical and Dental Expenses (Form 1040 Schedule A). b AGI from Federal Form 1040: \$ $\qquad$ $\times 7.5 \%$ (.075)
e Medical and Dental Expense Deduction (Subtract line 10 from line 1a.)
2a Total Taxes Paid
6 Less State Income Taxes
c Total Taxes Paid Deduction (Subtract Line $2 b$ from Line $2 a$.) .
3 Total Interest Paid.
a Charitable Contributions
5 Tolal Casually or Theit Loss (Attach Federal Form 4684).
6a Employee Expenses and Miscellancous Deduchions Subject to 2\% Limitation (Allach Fedoral Form 2106).
b AGI from Federal Form 1040: \$ $\qquad$ $\times 2 \%(.02)$
c Sublracl line $6 b$ from line $6 a$ $\qquad$
7a Miscellaneous Deductions not subject to Federal $2 \%$ AGI Limit
6 Less Gambling Losses.
c Other Miscellaneous Deductions (Subtract Line 7b from Lino 7a.).
6 Mississippi Hemized Deductıons - (Add Lines 1c, 2c, 3, 4, 5, 6c, and 7c.) Enter here and on Form 80.105. Page 1. Line 19 or Form 80-205, Page 1, Line 163.
9 Mississippi Itemized Deductions (Federal timits due to AGI apply) Enter the amount here and on Form 80-105, Page 1, Line 19 or Form 80-205, Page 1, Line 163.


PART 2: SCHEDULE B - Interest and Dividend Income from Federal Form 1040 Schedule B. enler the amount from the line indicated)
If you received capital gain distributions but do not need SCHEDULE $O$ to report any other gains or losses, then enter the gain on Form 80.105 . Page 2. Line 40 or From 80-205, Page 2, Line 39. Tolal inlerest and dividend amounls on Lines 4 and 5 below, from joinlly owned pccounts.


## 1 Interest Income From All Sources

2 Inlerest from obligations of the U.S. Government included in Line 1 above
3 Interest on obligations of other countries, states, cites, of palitical subdivisions OUTSIDE Mississippi.
4 Total Interest (Line 1 minus Line 2, plus Line 3). Enter here and on Form 80.105, Page 2, Line 40 or Form 80-205, Page 2, Line 39.
5 Total Dividends From All Sources.


6 Amount of Nontaxable Distributtons Reported in Line 5.
Ordinary Dividends for Mississippi. (Line 5 minus Line
Line 41 or Non-Resident Form 00.205 . Page 2 Line 40.
6) Enier here and on Resident Form 80-105, Page 2. Line 41 or Non-Resident Form 80-205, Page 2, Line 40.

## PART 3: VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION CHECK-OFFS (Resident Returns Only)

You may elect lo voluntarily contribule ail or part (al leas $\$ 1$ ) of your income tax relund to one or more of the funds lisled below Your contribution may be clamed as a lax deductible charitable contribution on your slato and federal income lax returns. Once your relurn is filed contribution may contribution is final and cannol be retunded. On page 1, Line 30 , form $80-105$ please indicate by each Fund L , $\mathrm{M}, \mathrm{K}$ and/or Z the
 - 100 (may be downloaded from our websile www.mste.slate.ms.us) for an explanation of the purpose of each of theso funds and how tho jund donations will bo used.
(L) Mississippi Wildife Herilage Fund
(M) Mississippi Educational Trust Fund
(K) Mississippi Commission for Volunteer Service Fund
(Z) Mississippi Fire Fighters Memorial Burn Cenler Fund


PART 4: Income (Loss) from Rents, Royalties, Partnerships, S Corporations, Trusts and Estates INCOME (LOSS) FROM RENTAL REAL ESTATE AND ROYALTIES


INCOME (LOSS) FROM PARTNERSHIPS AND S CORPORATIONS


INCOME LOSS FROM ESTATES AND TRUSTS


## PART 5: Schedule N - Other Income (Loss) and Supplemental Income





Section B - Assets Placed In Service During 2004 Tax Year Using the General Deprociation System

| Clossificisitat of propenty | (b) Month and year placed in snivice | (c) Basis for deprecialion (busincras/ivesinent use only - 800 instructions) | (d) Recovery pariod | $\begin{gathered} (e) \\ \text { convention } \end{gathered}$ | motheal | ( 0 ) Onenraciblion cocurction |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 19a 3-year properly. | $\because \because$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| b 5-year properly......... |  | 649. | 5 | HY | 200DB | 130. |
| c 7 -year property..... |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| d 10 -year property.... |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| e 15 -year property........... |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| f 20 -ycar properly......... |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| g25-year property.......... |  | $\cdot$ | 25 yrs |  | S/L |  |
| $h$ Residential rental properly |  |  | 27.5 yIs | MM | S/L |  |
|  |  |  | 27.5 yrs | MM | S/L |  |
| \| Nonresidential real property |  |  | 39 Yrs | MM | S/L |  |
|  |  |  |  | MM | S/L |  |
| Section C - Assets Placed in Service During 2004 Tax Year Using the Alternative Depreciatlon Sysiem |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| a Class |  |  |  |  | S/L |  |
| b12-year................ |  |  | 12 yrs |  | S/L |  |
| c 40.year................. |  |  | 40 yrs | MM | $S / L$ |  |
| Partiv. Summary (sec instruclions) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 Lisled property. Enter amount from line 28 |  |  |  |  | 21 |  |
| Total. Add smounts from tine 12, lincs 14 trough 17 , lines 19 and 20 in column ( 9 ), and line 21. Enter here and on tho appropriate lines of yout return. Partnerstips and 'S corporations - see instuctions. |  |  |  |  | 22 | 1,32日. |
| For assels shown above a the portion of the basis att | d placed in servis ibutable to secli | e during the current $y$ 263A costs. | r, enter |  |  | MA, |

BAA For Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, see separate instructions.


## Section $B$ - Information on Use of Vehicles

Complete this section for vehicles used by a sole probrietor, pariner, or other 'more than $5 \%$ owner,' or related person If you provided vehicles to your employees, first answer the questions in Section C to see if you meet an exception to complating this section for those vehicles

30 Tolal businessfinvestment miles driven during the year (do not include commuting miles - see instructions).
31 Total commuting mitcs driven during the year.
32 Total other personal (noncommuling) miles driven.
-33 Total miles driven during the year. Add lines 30 tirough 32.

|  |  | (b) <br> Vehicle 2 |  | (c) <br> Vehicle 3 |  | (d) <br> Venicle 4 |  | (e) <br> Vehiclo 5 |  | (1) <br> Vehicle 6 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Yes | No | Yes | No | Yos | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## Section C - Questions for Employers Who Provide Vehlcles lor Use by Their Employees

Answer these questions to determine if you meet an exception to completing Section B for vehicles used by employeos who are not more than $5 \%$ owners or related persons (see instructions).

37 Do you maintain a written policy statement that prohbits all personal use of vehicles, including commuling. by your employess?

38 Do you maintain a written policy statement thet prohibits personal use of vehicles, except commuling, by your employees? See instructions for vehicles used by corporalo officers, directors, or $1 \%$ or more owners.
39 Do you treat all use of vemicles by employees as personal use?

| Yos | No |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |

40 Do you provide more than live vehicles to your employees, obtain information from your employees about the use of the vehicles, and retan the information received? .
41 Do you meet the requiroments concerning qualified automobile demonstration use? (see instructions).
Note: If your answer to $37,38,39,40$, or 41 is 'Yes,' do not complete Section $B$ for the covered vehicles.

## Part:VI: Amortization

(a)

Description ol cosا
(b)

Date amortization bopins
(c)
amorlizald
amount
(d) code
section
(0)
Ampertizntion
Deriod or Arberiod or
percentajo
( $)$
Ancorlizalian
lor this yoar



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